"WHERE WERE THEY UNTIL NOW?": Aging, Care and Abandonment in a Bosnian Town

Abstract

This article delves into Bosnia-Herzegovina, and especially into the town of Bihac, to ethnographically examine the changing nature of the state and family, as visible through practices of elder care. I use my ethnographic data gathered at a nursing home Vitalis in Bihac, and especially the predicament of an elderly Bosnian woman whom I call Zemka, to argue that both the state and family in postwar and postsocialist Bosnia-Herzegovina materialize as semi-absent. In the process of unpacking these multiple semi-absences, I reveal the lived effects of changing postwar and postsocialist state, and altering kinship relations as they affect "ordinary" people.

Azra Hromadzic

Department of Anthropology, Maxwell School, Syracuse University

This article delves into Bosnia-Herzegovina, and especially into the town of Bihac, to ethnographically examine the changing nature of the state and family, as visible through practices of elder care. I use my ethnographic data gathered at a nursing home Vitalis in Bihac, and especially the predicament of an elderly Bosnian woman whom I call Zemka, to argue that both the state and family in postwar and postsocialist Bosnia-Herzegovina materialize as semi-absent. In the process of unpacking these multiple semi-absences, I reveal the lived effects of changing postwar and postsocialist state, and altering kinship relations as they affect "ordinary" people.

Keywords: care, aging, the state, family, semi-absence, socialism and postsocialism, war and postwar

The "crisis of care" (Phillips and Benner 1995), and especially care for the elderly, is emerging as a momentous topic in anthropology, sociology, gerontology and other academic disciplines, as well as in the world of policy-making. Numerous studies point at different domains of this "crisis", including the socio-economic impact of the longer life span in more privileged parts of the world; shrinking of states' social and health services; and novel configurations of family relationships that challenge traditional expectations of caregiving in diverse sociocultural contexts (see United Nations 2002).

In this article, I delve into the Balkans, and especially Bosnia-Herzegovina, to examine the effects of these shifting topographies and modalities of care on "ordinary"1 lives. It is within the Balkans, I argue, that the anxiety around "the aging predicament", and the altering roles of family and state in providing care for the elderly are especially evident and exacerbated by the converging postsocialist (1989 to present) and postwar (1995 to present) transformations (see also Havelka 2003).

This domain of social transformation is left unexamined by the majority of scholars of the region.2 The overwhelming number of anthropological and other studies of the Balkans and especially Bosnia-Herzegovina, my own included, analyze this region mainly through the lens of ethnicity, nationalism and postwar reconstruction (see, among many others, Bieber 2005; Brown 2006; Chandler 1999; Campbell 1999; Coles 2007; Fassin and Pandoli 2010; Hayden 1996; Hromadzic 2015; Jansen 2005; Kurtovic 2011; Sorabji 1995; Veredery 1994; Woodward 1995). The concerns of "ordinary people", however, reflect many other domains of struggle, which powerfully and complexly shape the lives of people and yet, they stay either invisible or marginalized in the majority of (ethno)nationalism-focused studies (for an exception see, among a few others, Stubbs 2002; Stubbs and Maglajli^ 2012; Zavirshek and Leskoshek 2005).3

In what follows, I seek to illuminate some of these literature-marginalized yet life-shaping forces and events by focusing on competing expectations and ideologies of care and responsibility as they converge in the lives of ordinary Bosnians. In order to do so, I focus on the predicament of one of those people, an elderly woman whom I call Zemka,4 and whose struggles with care, responsibility, and neglect beautifully capture the ways in which the state, home and exile (Lamb 2009), abandonment (Biehl 2005; Bourgois 2009), and societal abjection (Gilleard and Higgs 2011) are being talked about, lived, and imagined.

In my use of Zemka's story, I work against "geroanthropological amnesia" (Cohen 1994: 151) which tends to romanticize, contain, dehistoricize and depoliticize the old age. Rather, I locate this ethnographic encounter within the sphere of "the political", in an anthropological, thus broad and contextual, sense of politics. The story's powerful content is used to shed light on the historically-informed arrangements of care which are emerging, converging and reassembling from the ruins of war and socialism. More specifically, I use ethnography as a hermeneutic device to seize and make sense of the effects of changing postwar and postsocialist state and altering kinship relations as they affect ordinary people. Zemka's is thus a story of aging dislocated; by gently hinting at its phenomenological (experiential and embodied), rational/political (hegemonic, ideological and gendered) and hermeneutic dimensions (Cohen 1994: 151), in this article I argue that both the state and family in postwar and postsocialist Bosnia-Herzegovina materialize as semi-absent: the state is bureaucratically and politically ubiquitous but biopolitically shrinking, and family is materially present but physically elsewhere. It is within the contours of uneven and multiple, politically and socially generated semi-absences that we can begin to grasp the terrain of aging and care as fundamental dimensions of political and social practice in Bosnia where "lives seem habitually at stake" ( Jasharevi^ 2011: 109).

"I am going to Amerika, to live with my son"

It is early June 2013 and a warm day in Biha^, a north-western Bosnian town5 located at the border with Croatia. Together with several other residents, I am sifting in a shade of a huge umbrella in front of "Vitalis" - a privately owned, two-year-old and 20-bed capacity home for the elderly. A car, which model and color I fail to decipher in the bright, mid-day sun, parks in the driveway of "Vitalis". Lidija, the owner of the home jumps on her feet and rushes to the gate in order to welcome the home's new resident, Zemka. I see a middle aged man come out of the driver's seat and open the back door. The man lifts Zemka from the back seat and gently lowers her in the wheelchair - we "park" Zemka at the second, large table. Several other residents look at the newcomer, curiously. The man who brought Zemka to "Vitalis" collapses into one of the chairs, sweating. He wipes his face, impatiently. I look at Zemka - her hands are deep purple, almost black. I see that below her hospital gown, marked by dried blood in several large spots, her feet are also swollen and dark.

The man, whose name is Sead, starts telling me the dramatic story of Zemka's arrival at "Vitalis": Zemka was released from Biha^'s cantonal hospital today. Two days ago, the hospital called Zemka's three daughters who live in Germany and informed them that the family needed to come and collect their mother by 2 p.m. the following day - the hospital has done everything it could and now it was the family's turn and responsibility to take care of her. The daughters - Ekrema, Selma and Adila - thousands of miles away and busy with their jobs and their own nuclear families, panicked, knowing that they could not come to Biha^ in time to take over their feeble mother. Frantically, they searched on the Internet for some institution to turn to; that is how they discovered Lidija's privately owned nursing home. At the same time, they contacted the closest and nearest family relative, Sead, who lives two and a half hours away from Biha^, near a central Bosnian town, Jajce. He told them that he was willing to help, but could not be there by 2 p.m. the next day.

Lidija was moved by the plea of this family which, she learned soon, suffered greatly during and after the war. She wanted to help but did not have any beds available. Thus, she called the hospital and asked that they keep Zemka for another day while she prepared for her arrival. The main nurse, according to Lidija, said harshly: "No, we cannot do that. We do not make money off of them", implying that Lidija lives off of the old people's predicament. Lidija was so upset by the comment that she threatened to call the police and tell them that the state hospital was throwing out an 80-year-old refugee woman on the street. After Lidija's threat, the nurse softened and said that the hospital would keep Zemka under their roof for another day.

While Lidija is telling us this story, Zemka looks at me, smiles and says: "I am going to Amerika [the US], to live with my son." Sead shakes his head sadly and whispers to me: 'She has dementia. Her son was killed during the war in Srebrenica.' Sead finishes his drink, gets up, hugs his fragile aunt in a blood-stained hospital gown, and leaves for Jajce. Soon after, I also leave the home, deeply moved. Five days later, on the way to "Vitalis", I see an obituary announcing Zemka's death; her dzenaza (the Islamic funeral ritual), the obituary stated, was scheduled for the next day. I arrive at the nursing home in the early afternoon and find Zemka's daughters siffing in front of the home, talking to Lidija and other residents. They are here for their mother's funeral and they are sad and furious. They complain about the state that "has no order nor system" ('nema ni reda ni sistema'), where hospitals can throw old and sick out on the street, and where "the family of a shahid or martyr" ('shehidska familija') can be treated like this. They are going to sue the hospital! They live in Germany, and something like this would never happen there! Lidija, who also spent some refugee years in Germany, nods in agreement. She gently tries to soothe the family. The sisters finally leave. As we watch their car drive away, Lidija whispers to me: "They cannot sue them. Do you know that Zemka arrived to the hospital in a terrible condition? She was neglected. I mean, where were they [the family] until now?"

Zemka's story is remarkably rich - it captures, discloses, and complicates multiple affective attachments and practical relationships of love, care, and abandonment as they are being refashioned in a postwar context at the end of socialism. Zemka is a subject who fell through the cracks and eventually died caught between these shifting topographies of care and neglect. In order to unpack Zemka's unique story, I situate it within (post)war and postsocialist fields. Even though postwar and postsocialist effects are profoundly tangled in the lives of people, for the purpose of analytic clarity, I divide them into two separate sections. To the spectrum of the (post)war experience we first turn.

(Post)War assemblages: sehidi, life and death

Zemka's family was caught at the epicenter of the Yugoslav wars in 1990s. The Bosnian war caught this already elderly woman in her mid-60s in Sipovo, the town where she lived most of her life. Sipovo was a "mixed" town-the majority of population was ethnically Serb (roughly 80 percent), with a significant presence of Bosniaks (around 18 percent) and some others (primarily Croats and Yugoslavs). This "mixed" town's habitus, in which different ethnic groups intermingled for centuries, was typical of Bosnia-Herzegovina and socialist Yugoslavia at large.6

Zemka's was one of those Bosniak families that were forced out of their home during the early stages of the war.7 At the beginning of the war Zemka's only son, Edin, was serving his mandatory duty in the Yugoslav People's Army (JNA), and was sent to eastern Bosnia, where he escaped the JNA ranks and joined the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Several years later, Edin was killed by the Serb paramilitaries in Srebrenica, the notorious site of Bosnian genocide. The news of this enormous loss caught Zemka's family crippled by the war: Zemka's daughters, after several years of refugee life, and encouraged by their parents to leave the warridden Bosnia, ended up in Germany, together with hundreds of thousands of other refugees from Bosnia-Herzegovina. Zemka's husband passed away during their refugee saga. Zemka, left alone, with her former house now firmly incorporated into the territory and structures of the "Republika Srpska" (the Serb Republic), found herself living in Bijelo Brdo,8 a mixed Serb-Muslim town not far from Biha^, away from both her daughters and her extended family which was scattered between Sipovo and the rest of the world. In Bijelo Brdo, she was visited everyday by a retired Serb nurse who regularly changed Zemka's bandages. Even though no one at "Vitalis" knew for sure how Zemka ended up in this part of Bosnia-Herzegovina, the final years of her life vividly capture the contemporary contradictions of postwar state, family and care, as Lidija's words powerfully illustrate: "How ironic - to be a refugee expelled by the Serbs, to have your son killed by them, and then to end up all by yourself, in an unfamiliar town, cared by a Serb women. Nobody knows what awaits them." With her health rapidly deteriorating, Zemka was eventually transferred to the largest regional hospital in Biha^. As Zemka's body was progressively deteriorating, her daughters found themselves in a situation typical of many other Bosnians and Herzegovinians living in a war-produced diaspora, looking for a solution to their transnational problem - taking care of their aging parents and other family members at a distance. These processes unveiled a "collective scandal"9 and a tender zone of cultural intimacy (Herzfeld 2005): the growing inability of the state and family in contemporary Bosnia and Herzegovina to take care of their elderly.

Postsocialist realities: the semi-absent state and family10

Starting in the 1950s, socialist Yugoslavia developed a prolitic yet decentralized web of republic-based professional bodies responsible for providing social protection (Zavirshek and Leskoshek 2005: 39). The infrastructure of Yugoslav social work was rather developed and implemented mostly through a wide network of local Centers for Social Work as well as through the "traditional long-stay residential institutions for children and adults" (Stubbs and Maglajli^ 2007: 1177). While the parameters of social protection varied across the Yugoslav's six republics, in all of them the social welfare system included some elements of the socialist self-management, Bismarckianism, and the engagement of a number of non-state actors, such as religious institutions (Stubbs and Maglajli^ 2007: 1176).

As a result of these coordinates of "socialist humanism" (see, among others, Cohen and Markovi^ 1975; Horvat 1982), the Yugoslav state, and the socialist state more broadly, was experienced as paternalistic (Manning 2007) or imagined "as a caring parent that provided for its citizen-children" (Dunn 2008: 247; see also Verdery 1996). This representation of the caring state created expectations about what the state should deliver (Dunn 2008): the supreme duty of the state, as "the big father" (Zavirshek and Leskoshek 2005: 40) was to "take care of the society as whole", the process that, according to socialist ideology, would eventually lead to the termination of the need for social help in general, since everyone would be taken care of.11 In order to achieve this, the Yugoslav state, through large scale technologies of regulation, started to collect information and thus engage in the control of biological conditions of its population. As a result, "the government became responsible for living conditions of the people "from the birth until the grave" ('od kolijevke pa do groba') (Zavirshek and Leskoshek 2005: 46). In harmony with the rest of its citizen-care policies, the socialist health care system provided universal medical assistance and it was defined as "rational, progressive and scientific" (Read 2007: 204). These "universal" entitlements to social security and healthcare were central to socialist modernity and the means through which the socialist state demonstrated that it cared for its citizens (Read 2007: 203). The Yugoslav people's response to these socialism-produced novelties was a combination of "enthusiasm and hope, mixed with fear and suspicion" (Zavirshek and Leskoshek 2005: 46).

While the state extended its control and management of populations to almost all domains of citizen-care, when it came to the care of old people, the state had a strong commitment to avoid creating separate (medical) environments that would solely focus on the elderly (Sokolovsky et al. 1991: 322). Rather, the decentralized socialist system focused on the creation of comprehensive primary care services and health centers associated with local "self-managing communities of interest (...) originating in the homes of people's health ('domovi narodnog zdravlja')" (Sokolovsky et al. 1991: 322). In addition, different republics within Yugoslavia showed a varied distribution of the centers of elderly: in 1987 Croatia was leading the way with the highest number (120) of special residencies for the elderly (Dom umirovljenika - "home for retired persons") while Belgrade, the capital of Serbia and the former Yugoslavia, had only 2 of these centers (Sokolovsky et al. 1991: 321). These discrepancies are reflections of different historical and infrastructural influences, and of more recent demographic trends: for example, Croatia has seen a more developed infrastructure for the care of elderly while Serbia has harbored the largest number of orphan-care facilities.12 In addition, rural Croatia witnessed a heavy out-migration of the young, who could not take care of their elderly parents (Sokolovsky et al. 1991: 321), showing again a strong socio-cultural link between the state, family, and eldercare.

The paternalistic relationships and self-projections of the Yugoslav state and its citizens, and the "structures of feeling" (Williams 1977) they enticed relied heavily on traditional approaches to family care, however. For example, conventionally, Bosnians, especially Bosnian women, took care of their elderly family members. Similar to many East European countries where the state projected an image of a caring state, in reality "the private sphere of kinship, friends and personal networks became the focus for emotionally inflicted and socially embedded care" (Read 2007: 206). Until recently, elderly Bosnians were physically and emotionally cared for by their children and they were often expected to live with (at least) one of them, usually the youngest son and his family. These expectations were based on the cultural notions that stress the communal nature of kinship and symbiotic relationship between generations (Simi^ 1990: 97). The legal system incorporated this cultural expectation as well: for example, Article 150 of the former Yugoslav Constitution defined the care of the elderly as children's responsibility (Tomorad and Galoguza 1984: 306) and Article 190/10 stated: "Members of the family shall have the duty and right to maintain parents (...) and to be maintained by them, as an expression of their family solidarity" (see Sokolovsky et al. 1991: 321). These legal rights and institutionalized expectations of family care were not always legally enforced,13 however, but they still continued to shape the vernacular understandings and responsibilities of care, apparent in Lidija's comment: "where were they until now?", implying that Zemka's daughters should not expect the state to do "their job" - take care of their fragile mother. Due to the war-produced exile, many families could not fulfill these expectations of care at proximity, thus triggering a major reshufling of the postwar and postsocialist assemblage of care, and, in the process, revealing many raptures, ideologies and myths about delivering care, past and present.

With the postwar state in pieces and families in fragments, "the crisis of care" in BosniaHerzegovina became ubiquitous and it revealed the conflicting ideologies and expectations of care: on the one side, the state projected an image of caregiving but relied on family to care for the elderly, while, on the other side, families did most of caregiving, but still embodied an ideology of the paternalistic state. These conflicting expectations and impossibilities to fulfil their real and imagined former roles revealed the cracks in the ideology of responsibility and caused multiple affective reactions and accusations of failure. The family, just like the state, thus emerged as semi-absent; materially present (they pay for the substantial private nursing care expenses)14 and physically far away (unavailable to deliver love and care at close proximity). And yet, regardless of the postwar state's progressive withdrawal from biopolitics - the postwar state is both bureaucratically omnipresent and biopolitically absent/increasingly withdrawn from citizen-care - Zemka's daughters still had an expectation that the state would at least help them, since they were "family of the martyr" (sehidska porodica). In other words, the postwar Bosnia-Herzegovina, the daughters believed, had a "moral debt" (Han 2012: 4) toward Zemka's family, for the highest sacrifice the family had given to the state in blood, to protect its very existence during the war. When this moral debt was not honored, but neglected by the state - in this case the cantonal hospital in Bihac - the daughters felt a deep sense of betrayal, injustice, and, finally, anger. These competing expectations of care and reciprocity between the postwar state and its most deserving subjects - the martyr's family - thus created a void filled with potent diasporic citizen disappointment and Zemka's neglected, bruised old body. I interpret this topography of Zemka's body - suffering, bruised, blood-stained and swollen - as an embodied symbol of the state's and family's semi-absences as they powerfully collapse into the body of an elderly woman in contemporary Bosnia. Zemka's experience is a powerful reflection of these semi-absences which are deeply embodied, painfully tangible and indicative of changing and differential "pedagogies of attention" (Cohen 2008: 337).

Conclusion

Zemka's moving story of life and death in the Balkans illustrates the effects of semi-absent state and family on the country's elderly. This family's experiences are both unique in their intimate struggles, pains and wounds, and yet, in many ways, similar to most others. This is the story of war displacement and destruction of lives, bodies and objects; the weakening, semi-absence and reformation of the postwar and postsocilist state; families fragmented across continents; new homes and borders, and shifting terrains and expectations of life and death, and care and responsibility.

The majority of people I encountered in Bosnia-Herzegovina share some of the experiences and sentiments revealed in Zemka's story: they frequently complain about their poor health, the declining health of their family and friends, premature deaths of many friends and acquaintances, the crumbling and shrinking medical and social systems of care, and about the growing burden of social, moral and economic debt left in the wake of these changes. These processes, experiences and stories shape lives and deaths of people in the Balkans, but they also point at the need to bring into conversation that what scholarship in the region has treated as separate: postwar and postsocialist regimes of citizen care; failed responsibility and expectations that generate the emerging privatized spaces of differential care. It is exactly these uneven, simultaneously local, regional, and transnational configurations of love, care, and abandonment that produce unique, idiosyncratic, and seemingly contradictory yet intimately interwoven experiences of past and future, presence and absence, politics and affect, and hope and betrayal in contemporary Bosnia and beyond.

1 I use "ordinary people" with much caution in this work. As Veena Das (2007) has pointed out, "everyday" is where much deeply political work happens.

2 This "omission" is closely related to the ways in which what counts as (useful) knowledge (about the Balkans in this case) is being produced, and to the distribution of research grants and fellowships.

3 This is not to say, of course, that ethnonationalism is not important to people in the Balkans. Rather, it is one of numerous powerful forces - including poverty, unemployment and corruption - that converge to mold ordinary lives.

4 All personal names have been changed to protect the privacy of individuals included in this study.

5 The Biha^ region, also known as Krajina, with approximately 300,000 mostly Bosniak residents, is the northwestern pocket of the country and "Bosnia's forgotten battlefield" (O' Shea 2012). The region suffered terribly during the war in the 1990s. The largest town is Biha^, the 6th largest Bosnian-Herzegovinian town of approximately 50,000 inhabitants. The region was besieged for over 3 years but never conquered by the Serb army. At the beginning of the war, the Serb population of Biha^ left the city for other Serb-dominated regions of the country or for abroad. The war began in June 1992 with the Serb army besieging and intensely shelling the town. Bosniak (roughly 66 percent of the town's population) and Croat (roughly 8 percent of the town's population) armies and civilians defended their town jointly during over 3 years of siege. In addition, in 1993, the northern part of the besieged region, led by the businessmen turn politician Fikret Abdi^, proclaimed independence from the Bosnian government and its army, and started to collaborate with the Serb forces. This created a very difficult situation for the besieged region, which was liberated in the controversial Bosnian-Croatian Army offensive in the August of 1995, soon after which the Dayton Peace Agreement was signed. The Agreement brought peace to Bosnia-Herzegovina and divided the country into Bosniak-Croat Federation (51% of territory) and Republika Srpska (49% of territory). These entities were given all the characteristics of states within a more complex state. The Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina is further divided into 10 cantons. Biha^ is the administrative center and the largest city in the Una-Sana Canton.

6 The Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was a federation of six republics: Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Serbia (with two autonomous regions Kosovo and Vojvodina), Montenegro, and Macedonia. It emerged from the WWII under the leadership of its charismatic communist leader, Josip Broz Tito and his ideology of Brotherhood and Unity -the official policy of interethnic relations that proposed that all Yugoslav "nations and nationalities" (narodi and narodnosti) should peacefully coexist and nurture the notion of intermarriage and cross-ethnic affiliation.

7 Bosnia-Herzegovina became an independent state on April 6, 1992. On the same day that Bosnia-Herzegovina was officially recognized, Serbian paramilitary units and Yugoslav People's Army (Jugoslovenska Narodna Armija or JNA) attacked Bosnia's capital, Sarajevo, and initiated a war in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The army of the self-proclaimed Serbian Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina (Republika Srpska or RS) within Bosnia-Herzegovina, with the help of men and weapons from Serbia, succeeded in ethnically cleansing, thus brutally unmixing, intertwined communities and lives (Hayden 1996), and conquering close to 70% of the country's territory by the end of 1993. It also perpetrated some of the most brutal acts of violence exercised against the non-Serb populations, including Zemka's family.

8 Bijelo Brdo is a pseudonym.

9 I am grateful to Larisa Jasharevi^ for this phrase.

10 Parts of this section will also appear in A. Hromadzic. Forthcoming 2016. "Affective labor: work, love, and care for the elderly in Biha^" in Brkovic, C., V. Celebcic and S. Jansen ,eds. egotiating Social Relations in Bosnia and Herzegovina , Farnham: Ashgate.

11 Of course, not "everyone" was equally deserving of the government's protection and help. Zavirshek and Leskoshek (2005: 47-49) explain how the government divided its people into "deserving" and "undeserving", or "ours" and "not-ours," where the laffer were mostly former owners of shops, factories, and banks, and some Jewish survivors, who were all expropriated by the new socialist government.

12 Paul Stubbs, personal communication, October 17, 2014.

13 Tomorad and Galoguza argue that regardless of the legal right to be taken care of by their offspring, the elderly very rarely used these means to secure these rights, since the emotional basis of the relationship was not present. The authors also argue that children were sometimes materially unable to support their parents (1984: 306, n1).

14 Private care for elderly is very expensive in relation to the Bosnian standard of living. The monthly fee is between 750 and 1050 Bosnian Convertible Marks (KM) (approximately 380-535 euro) - a sum too high for the majority of the country's older inhabitants, who receive an average monthly pension of 350-400 KM (178-204 euro). The family members who work all over the world can only sporadically visit their aging parents and relatives, but they are, in most instances, committed to paying for their expensive (in local terms) care.

COMMENTS

Jason Danely

Department of Social Sciences, Oxford Brookes University

Placing the dislocated fragments of broken bodies, states, and families

Azra Hromadzic's article is a masterful example of ethnography that moves between the seemingly distant and the seemingly near, revealing, in the process, that neither was ever what it had seemed. There is Zemka, more than a bruised and bloodied body, more than a socially abandoned victim, but a point of translation, where the affective reality of far-away others becomes decoded, interpreted, and given value. Taking a step back from the question of how care and abandonment are enacted and what kind of effects they have on the topography of power/knowledge of post-war Bosnia, we might ask in the first place why anyone should care at all, especially when such care is bound to be fraught with complications and contradictions? Why should her family, in "war-produced exile" in Germany (Hromadzic, this issue), care that Zemka has a place in a care home? Why should a distant relative drive hours to deliver her there despite his weak sense of attachment to her? Why should the state care for older citizens like Zemka?

Expectations about who should care, why they should care, and what constitutes good care produces a tense atmosphere of fragile bonds, unstable and uncertain alliance. Although like older people elsewhere, Zemka's aging body and mind makes her too cumbersome to move very far, her placelessness drags her along from one institution to the next. She is not mobile, autonomous, self-reliant, able to choose, to risk. Age and disability alone are not enough to explain Zemka's vulnerability; it is inseparable from the politics of care emerging in post-socialist, post-war Bosnia and elsewhere as the world continues to grow older.

Hromadzic vividly describes Zemka's ageing "topography," the trail of broken relationships and betrayals that simultaneously mark both her care and her abandonment, as "an embodied symbol of the state's and family's semi-absences" (Hromadzic, this issue). Here Hromadzic's work makes its boldest contribution, articulating with ethnographic work on care in other contexts, such as Lisa Stevenson's Life beside Itself (2013), Anne Allison's Precarious Japan (2013), Giordano (2014) Practices of Translation and the Making of Migrant Subjectivities in Contemporary Italy, and my own work in Aging and Loss (Danely 2014). In each of these cases the semi-absence of state and family leaves vulnerable subjects in suspense (Choy and Zee 2015) - the conditions of life are uncertain and contingent, broken by the dislocations like war and the violence of care (cf. Wool 2015). As Hromadzic's interlocutor, Lidija remarks, "Nobody knows what awaits them" (Hromadzic, this issue).

Perhaps Zemka's dementia is the appropriate way of inhabiting this space of suspension. It allows her the comfort of believing that her son, whom she is unaware died in the war years earlier, will take her to Amerika, providing her with both a place and a family. Zemka's symp- toms appear to reconcile one set of dislocations (moving from the hospital to the care home, her daughter's move from Bosnia to Germany, the son's move from life to death) with an-other (from present to non-present, from Bosnia to Amerika, from neglect to care). Zemka too, embodies a semi-absence.

The condition of suspense catches not only the older person herself, but her carers as well. There appears to be no solid ground of justice or even an ethic of care to steady them. This is familiar from my own work with carers in Japan, and while I am often asked which is better, care by the family or by an institution, I know that the answer is never straightforward. In Japan, as in the conditions that Hromadizi^ describes, the family is not a stable and cohesive unit tightly bound by a uniform pattern of kinship, nor is the state and the care system centralized and rational. Both family and the state are better approached as "assemblages" (Hromadzic, this issue) that produce and uneven and contradictory terrain of (dis)engagement.

Hromadzic's article (this issue) asks us to imagine a "state in pieces and families in fragments". Care by the state here cannot be opposed to care by the family, nor can care be easily characterized by mutuality or "plurality" - terms that imply an affective and political adjustment of subjectivity in order to adhere to ethical virtues. The family who care about Zemka's welfare are not physically present, yet the caregivers who are present also seem not to care. The semi-absences are also semi-recognitions of the subject of care. What mediates the semirecognition (money, influence, ethnicity, e.g.) and how are these reinterpreted in a way that transforms their value in the context of care for the elderly? What should one do to a subject that can only be partially recognized? What is the moral responsibility of family or the state in such matters? That is, who holds responsibility for the violence inflicted on Zemka that eventually precipitated her death? These are largely empirical questions, but they are, I believe, important if we are to follow Hromadzic's line of thought and attempt to apply it in other settings.

Finally, Hromadzic's ethnography opens up a critical space to question the degree to which we are ever fully present to others. Are the semi-absences she describes always present in care relationships, and particularly inter-generational relationships? Is this qualitatively different, one might ask, than the condition of alterity that we as anthropologists face in our writing about others? While Zemka's richly aesthetic narrative pulls me in emotionally, for example, I am also faced with the fact of my own semi-absence towards her own condition. And so reading this kind of work has seized me as well, suspended me in the present-absence of mourning for a woman whose life I must believe to be meaningful, evocative, productive. If the notion of semi-absence is to be expanded further, it might benefit most by more explicitly addressing and incorporating aspects of violence, mourning, and narrative (cf. Das 2006; Jackson 2014), in ways that could further illuminate the challenge our understandings of age.

Milos Milenkovic

Department of Ethnology and Anthropology, Faculty of Philosophy, University of Belgrade

Public is (also) individual

The introductory article by Azra Hromadzic presents a welcome contribution, since it deals with a very important research topic inside ethnological-anthropological studies of the state and its institutions in the region of ex-Yugoslavia and that is the problem of constant diminishing of, and even denying, the responsibility of individuals for their own destiny, including their medical and social welfare. The same approach is also evident in the contemporary anthropological research on the link between economy, politics and culture. Having in mind a low level of urbanization before the establishment of the communist-socialist state which "cares" and a chaotic mixture of three types of state and social organizations which have preceded it (foreign colonial monarchy which combined feudalism and early company capitalism, local monarchy with regional ambitions which combined kinship-based communitarianism with early state capitalism and a local variant of sharia feudalism with the elements of late slavery), where individualistic culture was almost non-existent, the countries of ex-Yugoslavia present a textbook example for the analysis of the concepts of the community and individual and of their mutual potential as well as responsibility. This is specially the case with the transitional/postsocialist destinies of the citizens of ex-Yugoslav societies. While living in the region in which the external or internal Other was deemed responsible/guilty both for collective and individual destinies, the citizens of ex-Yugoslav republics, including Bosna which is the main topic of the leading article, rarely got any systematic incentive, except for rare liberal15 attempts, to develop as responsible individuals who consciously bear the consequences and take credits for their actions or the lack of them. Hence the introductory article tackles a very important topic even though it approaches it in an ideologically biased way, which is legitimate in critical anthropology, since it opts for, lately quite common, left-oriented anthropological criticism of the degradation of the welfare/social security/state and the reduction in the scope and the level of services included in the tax-financed social benefits, attributed to "liberalism".

Using the standard combination of arguments on the crisis of the welfare state which she juxtaposes with the informants' narratives, the author tells the story - and frames it theoretically when necessary - about the ethnographic research which can inform, supplement, but also negate standard explanations of transition processes in postsocialist societies. However, the author failed to notice the methodological trap one might fall into when placing the ethnographic focus on personal narratives: a) the trap of nostalgia, especially present in post-Yugoslav societies, maybe primarily in Bosnian society and b) the trap of adopting the ethno-explicative, hence the knowledge which is through its own definition inferior, to expert ethnological-anthropological scientific knowledge. Those two methodological traps significantly steered the conclusion towards the responsibility of the state and not the responsibility of an individual and didn't take into account the actions (nationalisation, expropriation, confiscation, forced illegal taxation, lack of saving and investment schemes) and the lack of them (surrendering one's own destiny to the collective, justifying one's lack of concern for the future by real or alleged deficits of the system) before the onset of the old age.16

Furthermore, the author failed to offer, which is otherwise quite common in the anthropological studies of post-socialism, the analysis of the situation which preceded the current devastation of the social welfare state. What lacks is the description of the (im)possibility of communism/real socialism to fulfil its promises and especially the analysis of the reasons whether it was capable of doing it anyway, structurally speaking (besides the redistribution of capital which was accumulated by individuals or companies, combined by accruing debt). W hat lacks in this article and which would be worth a discussion or a repeated/more detailed research, is the discrepancy between informant's nostalgic narratives on pre-capitalist social care and the scientific truth which is available from the sources and expert analyses. There is also a lack of a more grounded reference to the existing, even though scarce, literature on aging, pensions and insurance, especially on organized care of elderly in Yugoslav context as the key concept behind the proposed argument. A more detailed research could offer a coherent periodization and contextualisation of changes in public gerontology system after the breakup of the socialist state, having in mind the fact that the socialist state was systematically taking from its citizens their earnings, which they could therefore not invest in pensions and insurance funds, simultaneously creating within them a dependence on the economically unsustainable public system of social care, with catastrophic consequences for certain individuals, especially those who were not able to create their own networks of social support during transition years. In that sense, it would be not only academically interested but also socially useful if the author would more precisely define the processes which she mentioned, name the agents of the incomplete reforms she referred to and match the type of analysis with the conclusion she offered, having in mind that her conclusions - generalized and prone to discussion - lack proper argumentation which would follow from the presented analysis. The author did not prove, she only assumed that the system of social care, especially care of elderly in ex-Yugoslavia and Bosnia especially was a) functional and b) that any similar system was sustainable in contemporary Bosnia.

The article definitively presents a contribution to the widening of the debate on the impact of socio-cultural changes, including economic and legal, on the conceptualization of the role of the state in the life of individuals. This debate is indeed necessary in post-Yugoslav ethnologies/anthropologies, especially having in mind the tendency of the anthropologists to join neo-collectivist anti-liberal movements for which we know, as history taught us, that they, in general, provoke fascism in our societies and can represent a Weimarian introduction to new wars, criminal redistribution of private property and destruction of public in the name of the collective. It is exactly this confusion between public and collective, and which is also present in this article, that I suggest for a future debate, if there would ever occur such an opportunity.

15 The social life of the term "liberal" could be a good starting point not only for an anthropological debate, but also for a multilateral project, having in mind the significance of socio-cultural change which was the result of the transition of the political and economic systems of the ex-Yugoslav states and societies during the last few decades. Here I use the term "liberal" in its original meaning - appreciation of individual freedoms - not in the American sense of the word (meaning "socialism"), nor the Balkan sense of the word ("antisocialism").

16 This, of course, does not refer to the situations in which the war victims were forced to preserve their own lives and therefore could not worry in advance about the quality of life during their later years. Except for those individuals who were directly affected by the war, the argument presented in the introductory article referred to all the people who lived in Yugoslav societies in the last decades and this is the problem I am accentuating here. This argument, as presented, could not refer to all of us and it could not be used as a basis for understanding/justif ying the positions of any individuals, except for those who were the direct victims of the war.

Sonja Podgorelec

Institute for Migration and Ethnic Studies, Zagreb

"We could use a care home, but it would be a scandal to leave your parents there, a big disgrace!" Formal and informal care for the elderly in Croatia

From the end of the 20th century and during the first decades of the 21st century, in Europe in general there is an increasing insecurity as to how to deal with social and economic changes and the consequences of population aging on the demographic structure of societies. Taking into account the rapid aging of the population and an increasing number of older persons who (for longer periods) live alone and in their later age need assistance from the third parties, the scientific attention is focused on (economically) sustainable and (socially) required types and modalities of care. The scientists are trying to answer the question whether numerous older persons are becoming a (too)heavy burden for the contemporary family (which is still the main provider of the informal care) and for the state whose economic power is increasingly diminishing (which is the provider of the formal types of care) (Sundström and Johansson 2005; Podgorelec and Klempic 2007). Are there changes in the societal expectations from individual family members, especially women, as the main providers of care (taking into account their working careers) and in the level of intergenerational solidarity of the members? Are there changes in the expectations that the older people have as to who should be the main care provider? W hat are the implications of the increased commercialization of care for the quality of life of the elderly?

The comparison of the data from the last three censuses points to the fact that "the population of Croatia is characterized by rapid aging and high levels of agedness" (Nejashmi^ and Toski^ 2013: 92) and according to the average age of 41.7 years (2011), Croatia "belongs to the group of European countries with the highest level of population agedness" (Zivi^, Turk and Pokos 2014: 248). Increase in the overall percentage of people at 65 years of age and older and the increase of the percentage of the oldest group of the elderly (80 and older), with both groups including the highest number of people with medical problems who require tending and care, represent a big challenge for medical systems, systems of social welfare and pension system, especially in the rural regions where institutional and non-institutional care is much less developed as compared to the urban parts of the country.

My commentary on Azra Hromadzic's introductory article on the "crisis of care" for the elderly in Bosnia and Herzegovina in the second decade of the 2000s, is a kind of a supplement to the topics the author mentioned in which the author mentioned certain problems and data related to the care of the elderly in Croatia. More precisely, on the basis of the research conducted mostly in the rural regions of Croatia, we will try to present some patterns of care for the elderly in Croatia and point to the changes in the expectations of the potential care recipients towards the care givers.

Migrations - mitigating circumstance to the providers of informal care

The populations of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia of all generations, younger and older alike, share the consequences of the periods of joint history which have significantly influenced their contemporary way of life. For the majority of individuals (families), the consequences were, first of all, multiple losses which are visible in the decline of the economic power (often resulting in poverty), the change in the quality of social networks (mostly their narrowing) and the changes in social norms and basic values (on the level of the state, local community and family). Taking into account the rapid tempo of aging of one or both societies, the problems related to the way of life of a contemporary family and the reasons for the changes in the attitude of the community and the state towards elderly care, also have to be analysed in the context of migrations. Namely, a large percentage of population in their most productive years and especially in the period since the end of the 1960s, participated in the migrations instigated mostly by economic reasons. In the last 25 years, those were augmented by numerous voluntary or forced migrations the reasons for which were, first of all, the break-up of the common state and the war (during the 1990s), led on the territories of both countries, as well as politic, economic and social consequences of the war, crimes against civilians and different forms of (usually economic) crime. All the above mentioned reasons could be clearly observed in the changes of the conditions surrounding the care for elderly people in both states.

Public policies in Croatia are quite prone to mask the problems linked to the aging of population and care of the elderly who are in need of tending and care, by equating those problems with (too)large a ratio of the number of the retired people over the number of the employed people, which presents an unsurmountable financial burden for the economy of societies undergoing crisis. Among retired people in Croatia, as well as in other transition states of ex-Yugoslavia, there is a large percentage of those who left the labour market long before the age limit for their retirement (60 or 65 years of age), i.e. before they crossed from the period of late maturity to early old age. An increasing number of (even young) retired people was primarily the consequence of the transition from the planned to market economy and the transformation of the type of ownership which accompanied that change, secondly the consequence of the war and its aftermath as well as the consequence of a several decades of erroneous economic politics.

Hromadzic, with her debate on the aspects of (inadequate) presence of the state in care for elderly and through the title of the article itself, "Where were they until now?" accentuates the severity of the consequences of transformation of Bosnian and Herzegovinian society, especially on the level of family relations. Family and local community in Bosnia and Herzegovina and in Croatia since the 1990s have been facing different types of mainly negative influences. For example, the (im)possibility of employment, loss of a large number of jobs and high unemployment of young people (the cause of increased poverty levels of large number of people in both countries), changes in the structure of family which is the main care provider for all its members (smaller number of children, increased number of the elderly), significant emigration of young people, especially from rural areas and after Croatia's ascension to the European Union (allowing Croatian citizens to find jobs in some EU countries), from urban areas also. The experience of migration causes changes in the way of life of the members of families who participate in migration but also in the expectations of those, usually older members, who are left behind. In the context of population migration which was the consequence of war, a certain percentage of population, both Croats and Serbs, after the peaceful reintegration, i.e. after the infrastructural renovation of the destroyed objects and houses, did not return to Croatia. "Because of the long-term exile and refugee status a part of the population (...), especially young people adapted to the life in the new setting and did not want to return..." (Klempic Bogadi and Laji^ 2014: 448). Hence, most of those who returned were older and the research confirmed that "almost 30% of the returnees were older than 65 years of age", while with respect to the quality of life [and the possibility of obtaining any type of informal care], especially endangered were the single-person households with the average age of 70 (Mesi^ and Bagi^ 2011: 85-87). A large number of the returnees returned to the underdeveloped, peripheral rural regions with insufficient health care and other forms of formal care almost completely missing.

Organization of formal care - presence of state

Hromadzic outlined that from all the countries in the ex-state, Croatia had the widest network of institutional care for elderly citizens. What happened with that system today? According to the data of the Ministry of Social Policy and Youth for 2015, institutional accommodation for older citizens of Croatia is organized in 226 care homes (including state and county homes and an increasing number of care homes of different founders and legal entities which provide care without care home facilities, such as NGOs, religious communities, etc.). Care homes today take care for 17 53617 people. Comparing those data with data of ten years ago,18 we could see a continual development of the network of institutional care (especially the number of commercial types of accommodation) as well as a rising number (percentage)19 of older citizens placed in care homes. Alongside institutional organization, equally important, especially in the rural regions, is the organization of the non-institutional types of care and according to the data for 2015, 5 65520 of elderly people were placed in the family care and foster care homes.

Intergenerational solidarity - presence of family members

For older people in rural regions in which a high level of activity is preserved until a very old age21 (Podgorelec 2008; Podgorelec and Klempic Bogadi 2013; Klempic Bogadi and Podgorelec 2014), and in which the main expectations of the people still are that, when the times comes, the care of the aged member of the family would be provided primarily by the spouse and then the children (the largest number of whom has moved away and live in other parts of Croatia or abroad) or some other member of the closer family, what is extremely important is this provision of help and care in old people's homes.22 Some non-institutional programs have proved to be very efficient, such as "Help in homes for the elderly" and "Day care and help in home for elderly" which included another 15 550 of old people, mostly in rural, frequently isolated and severely depopulated areas of Croatia. One such programme is realized through employing geronto-attendants which daily visit the homes of older people. Pilot program was introduced to the small islands in Sibenik Archipelago. Mostly it included old people living in single person households, those with need of medical attention or with lesser functional capabilities, of very old age, with no children or with the children who migrated (Podgorelec and Klempic Bogadi 2013). The staff of the Sibenik Centre for Help and Care concluded that in the last six years, the majority of the older citizens who were provided services in their own homes remained living on the islands till very old age (average between 75 and 80), were longer functionally capable and were more independent than the people of the same age living in the town.

Expectations of the (potential) recipients of care

Have the above mentioned social changes inf;uenced the attitudes of the potential care recipients and also care providers? A gradual change in the expectations as to who, alongside the family, should be the active provider of care at old age is a ref;ection of the changes in lifestyle of the new generations. When speaking about rural areas which were severely affected by war or about peripheral areas of small Croatian islands, the difficult economic situation, financial impoverishment of people and insufficient number of institutions for social and health care for the elderly as well as inadequate (or non-existent) organization of non-institutional care still require a strong intergenerational solidarity of parents and their children (Podgorelec 2008; Knodel et al. 2010; Heylen 2010; Klempic Bogadi and Podgorelec 2011). One of my interlocutors (M, 75), referring to his potential helplessness, said: "Am I afraid of the old age? I'm counting on my children, I hope. I'm lucky to have them!"

Intergenerational support is expressed through joint activities, love and help in the form of money and services. A number of my informants in their middle and late middle age still felt that the responsibility of taking care of their elderly parents was exclusively theirs and because of that reason a number of individuals decided, even before their retirement in the cities (to which they moved because of education and/or employment), to return to their island villages to take care of their parents (Podgorelec and Klempic Bogadi 2013).

W hile younger family members (grown up children) more readily accept the possibility that the state (institutions) could partially be involved in providing help, service and care when they can't23 (or couldn't), the older people still expect the care to be provided by the members of their immediate family and hence some of them said: "Once families used to care for their elders while today, what a disgrace, a stranger in some care home is supposed to take care of you" (M, 82 yrs) or "[Once] we didn't need care homes, since young people lived together with the oldies" (Z, 87). Help is primarily expected from the spouses and grown up children and after that from other family members, friends and neighbours (Sundström and Johansson 2005; Podgorelec 2008). However, the way of life of an increasing number of old people who live alone and their children don't live nearby, brings about a gradual change in the attitudes about the expectations as to who should be the care provider and the institutional accommodation or some other form of non-institutional care are becoming increasingly acceptable:

There are a lot of old people. But there is nobody who is not cared for. If people are really old, then they have an old people's home, those who have no one. There are elderly, but none who is not taken care of, so to say. (F, 86)

Firstly, I'm happy that the dear Lord is looking after me and my health. But tomorrow, look here, you fall into bed and who's gonna do it? Children are far away! (M, 77)

The best things is "there's no place like home", or as the proverb says, there is no place like home, yes, if that's possible. But for me it's not possible. No neighbours, nothing, what am I to do all alone? (F, 94)

People who belong to the age group of younger elderly notice a gradual change in the expectations towards institutional care as compared to earlier generations:

People consider old people's home as the last stage in their lives. But I think it is wrong to see it that way, I think you should be happy that you can finish your life in a decent way... it used to be a disgrace, but now it's not so much anymore. It's better to be there safe, then to be home alone where something can happen to a person. Because now when there are no young people anymore, there is no one to take care... I don't know, but my mum always said: "Hope you are not going to place me in an old people's home." That generation did not accept that. (F, 67)

Instead of a conclusion

Informal care is still the main form of providing care for the older people in Croatia. Single person households are increasingly frequent in rural areas of Croatia which are also the regions with the poorest distribution of any form of formal care for the elderly. For older people who live alone and who don't have a family member close enough to them as to provide support and help when necessary, the most acceptable formal type of help or care is the one they can get in their own homes. Children, on the other hand, who, together with the spouses, are still the main providers of care, and their aged parents, also, want to have the opportunity of choosing some forms of organized (formal) care provided by the state which is, due to the economic shortages, increasingly incapable of providing that care.

17 What makes up to 2.31% of the total population of the elderly.

18 According to the data of the Ministry of Health and Social Policy, at the end of 2006, 12 233 old people were placed in care homes which amounts to 1.8% of the people of 65 years of age and older.

19 Increase in the percentage is even more significant if we take into account the aging of total population.

20 Or 0.75% of the total population of the old people, which together with those people placed in care homes, amounts to over 3% of total population of the elderly.

21 Which often means that the need for care by others arrives later in life and lasts for shorter periods of time (Sundström and Johansson 2005).

22 Organized help and care, according to 2015 data, is provided for 5 083 older citizen of Croatia in their own homes.

23 Many left their villages and towns, as was the case with Zemka and her family. Here the reason for migrating is not the focus of our research, even though it is not irrelevant, but the fact that the older people are more frequently left alone.

Tihana Rubic24

Department of Ethnology and Cultural Anthropology, Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences, University of Zagreb

Zeljka Petrovic Osmak

Ethnographic Museum, Zagreb

Abandonment and/or relatedness: few thoughts on kinship, aging and transformations

Azra Hromadzic in her text uses an ethnographic case study for her analysis and interpretation. The main plot is short, but ethnographically rich, a family situation in which an 80 year old woman, a widow and a mother of four, of three grown up living daughters and one son who was killed in the last Bosnian war, was being transferred from the hospital care to a private care home in which she died after a few days, already extremely ill when she arrived. After her death, the daughters, who haven't been living in Bosnia since they left as refugees during the 1990s and who now live in Germany, arrive to the home and in an emotionally disturbing debate, voice their disappointment and shock with the Bosnian health care which, immediately after providing basic medical help in a public hospital, discharged the old woman, keeping her for only one day and not a day more.

This family situation, documented through observation and interview with the interested parties, is a relevant example for the analysis and interpretation of family, social and political relations. The author discusses social values linked with the state and family as the institutions providing care for the elderly as well as social expectations reflected, for example, in the commentary of the manager of the private care home spoken to the researcher and referring to the members of the family of the deceased old woman: "Where were they until now?" This story shows that a life situation can be a trigger for consequential conflicting family and social relations. The retold story is a very illustrative ethnographic example, since it contains intimate and multi-layered data on opinions, actions and values.

Aging - as an experience and a concept - has been insufficiently researched and problematized in ethnology and cultural anthropology. We think that the experience of aging is by no means universal, even though there are certain "general" transformations linked with the older generation in a broader context: for example, today's demographic and socio-political challenges such as the aging of population or prolonged life span, the crisis of social security and of "classical" pension and family systems. Here we could also list various regional challenges of an increased number of old people who live alone (as is the case in China in the recent years), as well as (for example in the United States) the existence of a morally questionable politics of distribution of health care resources explicitly on the basis of age (with older people being deprived), etc.

In the context of the significance of all those and other processes linked to aging, we consider the contribution by Azra Hromadzic to be ethnographically extremely relevant. However, in the following paragraphs of our commentary we point to certain problems in analysis and interpretation.

Ethnological and cultural-anthropological interpretations which are formed on the basis of individual examples can frequently fall into a "trap" when the interpretation based on an anecdotal example is used in a broader context. The author in this article, as she emphasized in her introduction, discusses and problematizes care for the elderly in wartime and post-war Bosnia and Herzegovina. In a diachronic perspective, her interpretations and data refer to socialist, post-socialist and contemporary periods and in one segment the author even refers to pre-socialist period - when she interprets the characteristics of the institution of "traditional" family, its inner relations and values.

By contrasting the two main periods - socialist - when, according to the author, formalinstitutional care for the elderly existed and postsocialist, wartime and post-war - when those earlier forms of care, as author claimed, faced a crisis and gradually disappeared, the author interpreted the ethnographic case study which is the focus of her article as if the "destiny" of this old woman in postsocialist and post-war context, as it happened, was inevitable. In other words, that it was a direct consequence of the degradation of formal-institutional and family patterns of care and support, caused mostly by a very abrupt cut caused by the war in the 1990s, separating families and breaking (direct, physical) bonds: "due to the war-produced exile, many families could not fulfil those expectations of care at proximity, thus triggering a major reshufling of the post-war and postsocialist assemblage of care..." (Hromadzic, this issue).

Even though this thesis can seem familiar, it demands a more complex questioning of the macro-processes, among others, of those which occurred during the 20th century in the area of social security - those provided by the state and those provided by the family - and their mutual relationship. Care for the elderly in socialism and care for the elderly in postsocialist/ post-war period were presented in the text as two completely opposing frameworks generally characterized by discontinuities. The war had undoubtedly caused many wounds, changes and suffering. Numerical data additionally confirm this claim - in the last war it was estimated that on the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina "around 100 000 people have been lost, while around 2 700 000 have become displaced" (Grbi^ Jakopovi^ 2011: 317-318). In many European countries the wave of immigration of refugees and displaced persons from Bosnia was significant during that period and a Finn anthropologist Laura Hu^unen wrote on transformations in social and ethnic structure in Finland during the 1990s, which confirmed the scope of war-related immigration to Finland in that period: "Practically all Bosnians in Finland came there as refugees during or soon after the war in Bosnia, and most of them were either Bosnian Muslims/Bosniaks or with mixed background" (Hu^unen 2008: 236). War conflict in the countries of ex-Yugoslavia created a surrounding which "produced maximum insecurity for people of all age groups" (Podgorelec 2008: 31).

However, besides discontinuities, there are also continuities, since people did not "overnight", on all levels, during the 1990s, start to live according to some new model. Namely, Bosnia and Herzegovina is, just like other countries in the region, traditionally an emigration country (Capo and Jur^evi^ 2014: 18). Migrations (political, economic...) were a continuum in both its war and peace times. Due to migrations, families were forced to find new mechanisms for their own survival (economic, symbolic, etc.) even in situations when they were not sharing the same physical space. Modern anthropology is now for a long time developing the concepts of dislocation and transnational social spaces - those which "surpass one particular physical place and are realized in the processes of modern migration, dislocation and relocation (Capo and Gulin Zrni2011: 13; cf. Vuorela 2008). Those "spaces" are interpreted more as an adjustment and transformation than as degradation of social (usually family) bonds and relationships:

on the basis of transnational paradigm the researches have started to observe migrants inside transnational social areas which they create between and above interstate borders thus maintaining thick, multiple social relations which link their societies, of origin and destination (...) [Ties and relationships] link two or more spaces and people living in them and there is a circulation of things, money and services between those two spaces located in two states (...). Since this extensive exchange is happening on the level of family and kinship networks and the localities where people live (...)[we can talk about] about parallel multiple levels of social networks. (Capo and Jur^evi^ 2014: 24)

In the circumstances of constant emigrations, families were facing challenges and changes in family structure, as well as, partly, disintegrations of ("traditional" relations), even before the last war. Disintegration of traditional institutions of, for example, three-generational household, as observed by Norwegian social anthropologist Tone Bringa (2009: 49), was occurring in Bosnia in the decades preceding the 1990s and even in the countries of "Western democracies" (cf. Podgorelec 2008: 31). Those processes were noted in, for example, the first half of the 1970s since "everyday relations were occurring (...) with a higher level of openness and insecurity" (Podgorelec 2008: 31). In that sense, the emphasized dichotomies socialism-postsocialism, pre-war and post-war context were just one of possible aspects of deep complexities (transformations and continuities) of social (primarily family) relations.

On the other hand, in spite of a generally accepted attitude that socialist period was a period of social "security", there was only a narrow time frame, 1950s and 1960s, which could be called a "golden age" (Grandits 2010: 25) of "security" - welfare state - also in a broader, European, context (ibid.). Since after those decades, until today, there followed a process of destabilization of social and welfare state which was even more accentuated since the late 1980s, especially in the countries with intensive economic-political restructuring, during the transition from socialism to new economic-political system. We would like to emphasize that even during the above mentioned "golden age", the sectors such as housebuilding, health care, industry, social care, etc., on a practical, executive level did not correlate with the discourse: despite of ideology and striving, resources were always modest and limited. Hence the part in which Hromadzic talks about prior sustenance, security and a state which takes care about its citizens, like "the big father", was more about discourse than the practice itself and hence we are of the opinion that the difference between the two contrasted periods mentioned in the text is exaggerated. Finally, family in this context was consequentially always present as a source of support, care and help (social security), of "emotionally inflicted and socially embedded care", both in socialism and post-socialism (cf. Heady 2010; Grandits 2010; Rubi^ and Leutlo^ 2015), but, of course, always with inherited discrepancies and challenges.

We would also like to comment shortly on our expectations which stemmed from the author's announcement in the summary, and which pointed to some of our research (for example Rubi^ 2012), that the text would critically examine and discuss the term "ordinary people", or in Hromadzic's words: "I use 'ordinary people' with much caution in this work. As (...) 'everyday' is where much deeply political work happens". We think that the term "ordinary people" is, before anything else, just a (common) discursive category used in collective ideas and narratives and that it carries implicit meanings and politization potential. However, in the text we have not detected the announced critical approach, just the author's usage of very questionable terms such as: "majority of people", "ordinary people", "ordinary Bosnians".

W henever there are attempts to interpret certain things on a level broader than just family relations, and such exist in the text, using one family as example, i.e. using contemporary and recent excerpts of family life, they are after all inadequately grounded and require wider ethnographic research of other family and anecdotal stories, which would, at the level of analysis and interpretation, surpass the anecdotal level. Methodologically it is completely legitimate to analyse one case study, but this requires a more extensive study and archival preparation (cf. Vuorela 2008). Having in mind the complexity of the subject matter which is discussed in the article as well as the author's attempt to offer interpretation of the processes and events much broader than a single family case study, we are of the opinion that an interpretative and analytical goal set this way requires additional ethnographic or study material.

The paper would, according to our opinion, benefit from the discussion and problematization of the challenges of emic/etic research position when dealing with "one's own" national, social, cultural, economic and political context as a research topic. On what levels is this position etic and on which it is emic? We should recall Claude Lévi-Strauss's observations on one's own research position in France during the 1950s when he witnessed, together with his fellow citizens at the time, a staged event of the public execution of Santa Claus in Dijon in 1952, an event which embodied political-religious ritual and consumerist-modernizational conflicts of the then French society. Lévi-Strauss wrote:

the facts that take place before our very eyes and whose theatre is our own society are both easier and more difficult to discern. Easier, because we have observed the continuity of experience, together with all its moments and nuances and more difficult because it is during such rare occasions that we realize the utmost complexity of social changes, even those most focused; and because the seeming reason which we ascribe to the events whose agents we are, are very different from the real causes which ascribe us a certain role in those events. (Lévi-Strauss 2014: 15)

In a similar way, analytically and interpretatively, presents her material Tone Bringa when she deals with religious identity of the Muslims in Bosnia and Herzegovina during the 1980s. She explicitly positions her case study as one of the possible stories and perpetuates this position through the text which we read in a book recently published and translated into Bosnian language:

this is the story about the lives of some (...) people and some aspects of the community in which they lived. Since it occurred at a specific historical moment, it is focused on lives of several typical representatives of one specific rural community at that time. It never aspired to be a story on all that is Bosnia and its people, but it is a detailed study of one ornament on a Bosnian carpet. (Bringa 2009: 3)

24 Tihana Rubic conducted this research as part of the project "City-making: space, culture and identity", financed by the Croatian Science Foundation (No. 2350).

Paul Stubbs

The Institute of Economics, Zagreb

Ageing, transformation and the multiple crises of care in Bosnia-Herzegovina

Azra Hromadzic's important, moving and tragic vignette of Zemka's life and death is an extraordinarily telling account of the multiple crises of care, welfare and ageing in contemporary Bosnia and Herzegovina. Her understanding of what she terms the "semi-absence" of both the family and the state in the context of post-war and post-communist transitions allows her to uncover pafterns, processes, and practices which are almost completely neglected in the vast academic literature on Bosnia and Herzegovina framed in terms of "ethno-nationalism". Her text reveals much more than the "view from above or from nowhere" within a much smaller literature on social policy and social protection in the same country. It is not only that "the services one receives still largely depend on where one lives" (Maglajli^ Holi^ek and Rashidagi^ 2007: 163) in contemporary Bosnia and Herzegovina but that, as in this case, Bihac's cantonal hospital, having supposedly "done everything it could", within the constraints it is no doubt under, felt perfectly within its rights to return responsibility to Zemka's family, at very short notice, inducing a major crisis and, no doubt, contributing to Zemka's death.

The crisis of care discussed in the text is, of course, not concned to Bosnia and Herzegovina. Demographic ageing is a European-wide phenomenon with many countries experiencing the combined impacts of three broad processes: increased life expectancy, although not always increases in healthy life expectancy; low fertility and declining birth-rates; and signiccant out-migration of those of working age. Population decline is, then, ocen combined with increasing dependency ratios and a rise in both the number and proportion of those aged 80 or over, and of those older persons who live for many years in conditions of ill-health, disabil- ity, immobility and, indeed, poverty and social exclusion. Demographic changes undermine the sustainability of traditional insurance-based health and social protection systems which have relied on the assumption that adult working age populations will be large enough, employed in succient numbers and for a succiently long period of time, and paid well enough to contribute towards services and benects for both children and older people, as well as for adults without work and those with disabilities.

Changing family structures, changing expectations of inter-generational rights and responsibilities, and the dispersion of extended families across sometimes long distances add to the challenges. The changing role of the state, massive restructurings and a general undermining of so-called "welfare states", alongside expanded roles for the voluntary, nonproct and private sectors, also need to be considered. These restructurings ocen reproduce older ideas of a division between the "deserving" and the "undeserving", imposing "moralising" and "responsibilising" judgements on those who have failed to care for their own family members, and forcing public health and welfare institutions to frame diccult choices in terms of maximising ecciency and reducing costs.

Beneficiaries are meant to no longer be "passive" recipients of welfare but are expected to be "active" across many domains. Those who live longer should work longer, through increased "cnancial literacy" they should ensure their own material well-being in old age not rely on pay-as-you-go state pensions, and, above all, through "active ageing" should be helped to "stay in charge of their own lives for as long as possible".25 The destruction of what Andrea Muehlebach terms "the welfare-state chronotrope" (Muehlebach 2012: 149), creates a new division between an "active third age" and a "passive" and dependant "fourth age", a complexly gendered crisis of state and family in which "it is no longer self-evident who cares for whom, who provides the income, how it will be distributed among the family members, and whether and how long children and elderly family members have a claim to familial resources to help and support them" (ibid.: 150-151). She traces, however, the use of factual "demographic projections" within a "politics of persuasion" which works "to naturalize a contested process and foreclose critique", akin to a kind of "biological determinism" (ibid.: 160).

In a sense, it is not the processes per se which differ, but the rapidity of the changes in the context of war, large-scale forced migration, and ethnicised welfare arrangements which makes survival and the reproduction of the self and the management of intimate relationships of kin a seemingly constant, never ending, struggle in Bosnia and Herzegovina today. It is also the case, of course, as Andreas Hoft reminds us, that ageing presents very different societal challenges in countries which grew afluent before they grew old compared to countries, including Bosnia and Herzegovina, which have grown old without ever being afluent (Hoff 2011).

In her study of mothers of children with disability in Bijelina, in Bosnia and Herzegovina, -arna Brkovic (2015) argues that "the ambiguous ground of social protection", a system which is experienced as "erratic, unpredictable and mysterious", forces mothers to be ' exible, to mobilise whatever resources they can, including any possible informal contacts, just to get their children a fraction of the services they need. Much as Zemka's daughters, the mothers in Brkovic's ethnography invoke a seemingly lost logic of welfare as a right and a duty of the state in the face of a reiteration of a logic of welfare as limited, discretionary and largely lacking in compassion. In Zemka's daughters' case, these expectations are structured through a lens of memories of social protection under socialism, but also framed by a new "projectisation" of care, and, crucially, what are felt to be moral obligations to the families of "fallen martyrs".

The realities of social protection within Bosnia and Herzegovina, as part of socialist Yugoslavia, as Hromadzic's text shows, were complex and paradoxical, although certainly, improvements in both the coverage and quality of social protection and health care were important markers of Yugoslav modernity. The system of social protection was, however, rather dualistic, in terms of urban and rural populations, and highly variegated along class lines and crucially, in terms of gender. The horrific war of the 1990s, however, tends to overshadow and distort perceptions of the 1980s when, in many parts of socialist Yugoslavia, including Bosnia and Herzegovina, poverty returned for the first time in a generation, impacting dramatically on urban households without connections to the land or without remi) ances from family members living and working abroad (cf. Archer, Duda and Stubbs 2015). How the health and welfare system responded to the crisis of the 1980s, especially the latter part of the 1980s when funding was also reduced, is a key part of the story which is rarely told.

Bosnia and Herzegovina's post-war welfare assemblages, framed as they are by processes of "complex social and political engineering" (Lendvai and Stubbs 2009: 681), remain highly unstable, uneven and contingent. Bosnia and Herzegovina continues to be marked by the emergence of an "intermestic sphere" (Pugh 2000), a hybrid and flexible "crowded playground" (Arandarenko and Golcin 2007) of newly composed and reconstituted actors all seeking, in their different ways, to translate a colonialising and disciplinary apparatus of "reform", "modernisation" and "development" into all manner of more or less workable schemes and projects (cf. Stubbs 2015), many of which are, themselves, time-limited and most of which are in contradiction, implicitly or explicitly, with each other. This intermestic space represents, in a sense, then, yet another kind of "semi-absence" alongside that of the family and the state, albeit with profound biopolitical power, multiplying and reconfiguring ideologies, modalities and practices of care-giving, care-taking and care-receiving which are "fraught, uncertain and provisional" (Hromadzic forthcoming 2016). Although many of these "projects" may be less obviously and directly violent than the Swiss Government's scheme in the late 1990s of building new care institutions to house older people returned to Bosnia and Herzegovina after having being granted temporary refugee status in Switzerland, all help to create new chains of meaning, new hierarchies of power and agency, new forms of inclusion and exclusion, new regimes of blame and of virtue, and new marginalisations, subordinations and silences (Clarke 2004). They are central to the reconfiguration of what Hromadzic terms "simultaneously local, regional and transnational configurations of love, care and abandonment".

It is the invocation of the state's "moral debt" to the families of "fallen martyrs" (sehidska porodica) which illustrates most clearly the incommensurability, or the lack of fit, between structural macro-level political economies and micro-level everyday lives. For it remains the case that, even in the context of neo-liberalising disciplinarities urging that social spending be reduced, rationalised and targeted on "those who need it most", both entities in Bosnia and Herzegovina still spend disproportionately on war veterans and their families, within a much wider set of clientelistic relations of "state capture" and "institutional particularism" in which ruling political parties act as "patronage machines" allocating jobs, cash and services, and other favours, in return for votes (cf. Ferrera 2000; Stubbs and Zrinshcak 2015). What is oftten forgotten in a "top-down" literature on clientelism, however, is that this translation from structure to everyday life is never automatic but itself requires personalised political agency for "symbolic promises" (Iraolo and Gruneberg 2008: 3) to be realised in practice. Lacking the networks or "veze" needed to turn the moral capital of a martyr's family into what might be termed welfare or care capital, Zemka's daughters are forced to rely on research on the internet, a private care home and the goodwill of a distant relative even to obtain a minimum of temporary security for their mother. Any moral claims they have, as their anger turns to ideas of suing the state, are countered by accusations that they selfishly neglected their mother until it was too late, serving to strip them of any remaining "ethical citizenship" (Muehlebach 2012: 159) they may have possessed.

Zemka's story, then, appears as the condensation of all of the "perils" and none of the "pleasures" of ageing discussed from a particular Western feminist positionality by Lynne Segal (2013) in her book "Out of Time". She charts the need for a new narrative of ageing, rejecting a deterministic narrative of bodily decline and cognitive corrosion, without lapsing into an idealistic narrative of resilience, freedom, creativity and beauty, the "successful ageing" much beloved of "lifestyle" gurus and invoked in a responsibilising discourse of "active ageing". Ageing subjects are also, as Segal reminds us, differentiated across gender, class, ethnicity, sexual orientation, ability and, perhaps above all, geography. The "semi-absence" of both the state and the family, and Zemka's embodied positionality, in a particular body, place, and time, reproduces her as a subject who "ages badly", needing care, assistance and support in which too little is provided too late, and at a cost few can afford.

It would not be appropriate to judge Hromadzic's text through a crude lens of "policy relevance". In terms of care for older people in contemporary Bosnia and Herzegovina, it is hard to find more than mere glimpses of "policy otherwise", prefigurative or alternative practices which could "unsetlle dominant policy conceptions (...) (and) open up meaningful spaces for contestation, resistance and positive alternatives that are not only different, but actually make a difference" (Clarke, Bainton, Lendvai and Stubbs 2015: 196). Zemka's story illustrates more clearly than most the need for a new narrative of welfare, a more humane ethics of care, based on "interdependence, mutuality, and human frailty", raising "the social, economic and political value of care" (Williams 2014: 101), rescuing "solidarity" from its embededness in "morals" and "markets" (Muehlebach 2012: 227-8), "making social reproduction and care central to an analysis of social change and the global crisis" (Williams 2014: 87), and suggestive of the need for multi-scalar strategies, policies and politics to overcome these crises.

25 European Commission web site: http://ec.europa.eu/social/main.jsp?catId=1062andlangId=en.

REPLY

Azra Hromadzic

I would like to begin by thanking the editors for inviting such an excellent and diverse group of discussants to respond to my article. The respondents' comments are rich, stimulating, and in a productive tension with each other. My reactions to the reviewers' evaluations are numerous, but here I focus on only three large(er) themes: "responsibility," "continuity," and "methods."

Most of the reviewers address, in one way or another, the following question that is also at the heart of my article: "who ought to care (and how)?" Not surprisingly, different reviewers responded very differently to this question and the challenges it poses - from Stubbs and Danely who recommended that I include additional "semi-absences" (International Community's, Zemka's, our own...) and "semi-recognitions"26 to the "mix of care", to Milenkovic who suggested a different reading/analysis of the main phenomena in this article, mainly through the lens of individual responsibility. However, focusing on Zemka's individual responsibility for her own care, as Milenkovic recommends I do, would not only lead problematically to the masking of the larger - structural, political, and economic - forces and processes as they intersect to produce Zemka's unique predicament,27 but it would also set in motion what Stubbs, in his comments, is asking us not to do:

[R]eproduce older ideas of a division between the "deserving" and the "undeser ving" [individuals], imposing "moralising" and "responsibilising" judgments on those who have failed to care for [themselves and ]their own family members, and forcing public health and welfare institutions to frame difficult choices in terms of maximising efficiency and reducing costs. Beneficiaries are meant to no longer be 'passive' recipients of welfare but are expected to be "active" across many domains.

Milenkovic's suggestion that Zemka, as well as (most) others in the Balkan semi-periphery, take things into their own (individual) hands first of all problematically paints the Balkan populations as democratically/liberally unequipped, almost child-like, thus internalizing and reproducing Balkanist discourses.28 Second, this kind of the rights-based political discourse and policy would require a creation of a difficult and potentially crooked system of classification to determine who are the individuals who were, as Milenkovic writes, "directly affected by the war", and who would thus be deserving of the state's care. In the country where, as Rubic and Petrovic (this issue) remind us, more than 100 000 people lost their lives and 2 700 000 out of 4 000 000 became refugees and/or internally displaced, separating those who were directly impacted by the war is a project doomed to failure that would also diminish the intersubjective nature of (war) experience. Rather than erasing the effects of physical and structural violences on people's lives in the name of individual responsibility, I suggest that we envision a more inclusive and "humane ethics of care, based on interdependence, mutuality, and human frailty" (Stubbs, this issue). This ethic of care would combine such ideals as justice, equality, and individual rights with such principles as care, trust, mutual consideration, and solidarity (Held 2006).29

The second major subject that requires some explication is the issue of continuity and discontinuity between the socialist past and the postsocialist present. Some discussants critique my apparent juxtaposition of the two systems, where I ostensibly privilege the past over the present (this interpretation is especially visible in the essays by Rubic and Petrovic, and Milenkovic).30 My piece, however, highlights both continuities and discontinuities between the socialist and postsocialist experiences. Discontinuities are clear: the war-produced, abrupt destruction of the former state, life projects, and material objects does not need be repeated here.31 But there is at least one major continuity between socialism and postsocialism that is crucial for the main argument of my article: the expectation of family to deliver care. More specifically, in the article, I write:

The paternalistic relationships and self-projections of the Yugoslav state and its citizens, and the "structures of feeling" (Williams 1977) they enticed relied heavily on traditional approaches to family care, however. For example, conventionally, Bosnians, especially Bosnian women, took care of their elderly family members. Similar to many East European countries where the state projected an image of a caring state, in reality "the private sphere of kinship, friends and personal networks became the focus for emotionally inflicted and socially embedded care. (Read 2007: 206)

This is important to stress because it reveals, as the others suggest as well, that the socialist system of care was dualistic, uneven, gendered, and partial (Stubbs, this issue; Podgorelec, this issue), and often rhetorical (Rubic and Petrovic, this issue). What interests me here (and I needed to state this more clearly in the article) is that both socialist and postsocialist regimes of care, regardless of their rhetoric, in practice rely on family for care. As it was mentioned by Rubic and Petrovic, the institution of Bosnian family under socialism was complex, and it witnessed great transformations, including massive migrations from rural to urban settings (see Bringa 1995). And yet, regardless of these significant alterations, the Bosnian socialist family in general was, especially when compared to the present day situation, fairly financially and socially secure and rather geographically compact.32 Today, however, when the official unemployment rate hovers around 27% (63% among youth),33 families are materially incapacitated and commonly cannot afford to take care of their elderly members in need (a point that Podgorelec also underscores in her essay). What is more, since family members are frequently unemployed, they often live off the pensions of their elderly family members. In addition to these material challenges, and due to the burden of the war-produced exile, numerous families were also fragmented by the war and thus physically absent, adding yet another pressure to the already fragile and family-dependent eldercare.34 In conclusion, the "crisis of care" is found in most of the European countries for reasons that Stubbs finely explains in his essay; however, the challenges of this crisis are especially visible and felt in Bosnia-Herzegovina which has "grown old without ever being afluent" (Hoff 2011 cited in Stubbs, this issue) and where the postwar and postsocialist transformations converge especially powerfully and vividly.

Finally, the methods: Some reviewers critique my reliance on one story (Zemka's) and my "lack of reflexivity" in the article. I am in agreement with Rubic and Petrovic when they suggest that relying on an individual story can be a "risky business" because one can easily slip into an anecdotal account (also see Milenkovic, this issue). I also agree with them that to be anthropologically productive, a story has to be placed in its larger context - a task I attempted to accomplish with the discussion of how the war and (post)socialist events converge to produce Zemka's unique predicament.35

It is the comment about reflexivity, and emic and etic positionality, which interest me greatly. I am, of course, aware of the importance of reflexivity in ethnographic and anthropological writing, and I see it as ethically important and analytically productive (when it does not replace ethnographic data with self-reflection, of course).36 I am not sure, however, that reflexivity would necessarily enrich this particular piece. Rather, the inclusion of my personal background in this short piece would direct attention away from Zemka to my own story in ways that are neither productive nor desired, but could divert attention away from the ethics of care and appear as self-centered: To be effective, reflexive interventions need to illuminate or explain something about the field, the encounters in the field, and the interpretations of those encounters. After carefully reading Rubic and Petrovic's comments, however, I still wonder which precise aspects of my analysis or ethnographic encounters suffer due to my "failure" to position myself - via coordinates of nationalism/ethnicity, class and gender - in the text? What is it, according to the authors, that I could not "see" due to my perceived proximity to the field?37 The answers to these questions are important; otherwise, reflexivity would (problematically) become a goal in itself.

In conclusion, I agree that we cannot generalize about Bosnia-Herzegovina or, even worse, the Balkans, from one, in this case, Zemka's experience - my intervention never intended to suggest that. I would personally not use the romanticizing and exotic discourse of "one ornament on a Bosnian carpet" to talk about Zemka's experience in relation to the larger "field," however. Rather, I understand her particular assemblage of care, abandonment, and pathology to emerge from an amalgamation of her unique personal circumstance and historically-informed, complex networks of family, medicine, state, and economy.

26 I very much appreciate Danely 's excellent suggestion to think not only about semi-absences but also about semi-recognitions as productive of new hierarchies and coordinates of acknowledgment.

27 Zemka's situation is, of course, unique, due to the particular way in which these larger forces converge to produce her predicament. These forces are not random, however, but they are historically-informed, uneven systems of regulation of life; by shedding light on Zemka's story, some of these forces and their confluences also become apparent.

28 Relatedly, Milenkovic finishes his commentary by warning against the anthropologists tendency to contribute to "neo-collectivist anti-liberal movements for which we know, as history taught us, that they, in general, provoke fascism in our societies and can represent a Weimarian introduction to new wars, criminal redistribution of private property and destruction of public in the name of the collective". It is puzzling that Milenkovic focuses on the fear of "stealing/redistribution of private property and the destruction of the public in the name of collective" at the historic moment when the artifacts of the Yugoslav industries and public infrastructure in Bosnia-Herzegovina and beyond are being appropriated by the corrupt ethnonationlist politicians/businessmen through the crooked privatization processes and through, what David Harvey (2004) has called, "accumulation through dispossession."

29 My approach to the ethical dimentions of care is inspired by the work of Virginia Held (Ethics of Care 2006). The author invites us to understand the significance of our ties, and thus our responsibility and dependency, to our families and groups. In her book, Held assesses such ties, focusing on caring relations rather than simply on the virtues and responsibilities of individuals.

30 I do believe, however, that we might have some very good reasons to be nostalgic for certain aspects of the socialist past, especially if we compare the present-day and the former standards of living, the relative position in the world, and the availability of social provisions, among others. I do agree, however, with Stubbs, Milenkovic, and Rubic and Petrovic, that a more in-depth, archival research and analysis of the socialist period, especially the 1980s "crisis", is in place, and I will expand this research in my future work.

31 In response to Rubic and Petrovic's comments that people did not "overnight" start living according to the new model, I would just add that to many Bosnian-Herzegovinian people, their lives did, to a large extent "change abruptly, overnight" and that many of them whom I interviewed, could tell the exact date when their lives changed suddenly (i.e., the night of the forceful expulsion from their hometowns; the day when their classmates of "other ethnic group" did not come to school; or the night when the siege began). It was in those moments that the life as they new it ceased to exist, and a new model of living , be it refugee, internal displacement, or life under siege, began. In addition, while the war was unfolding, the process of privatization of public and state property, thus a new model, started to unfold. This process of crooked privatization was, however, overshadowed and distorted by the war.

32 The situation was better, of course, during the early decades of the socialist rule; the unemployment levels steadily increased in the socialist Yugoslavia from 6.6 % in 1965 to 16.1% in 1987 promting an outmigration of workig-age males (see Woodward 1995, pp. 199, 378). The majority these people, worked in Austria, Germany, and other European countries as manual laborers and construction workers, and they regularly returned to their homes and families for weekend visits and holidays.

33 According to the Bosnian Agency for Statistics, the official unemployment rate, calculated on the basis of ILO methodology is 27% (see: http://www.bhas.ba/?option=com_publikacijaandid=1andlang=ba). However, some sources report that the nominal rate of unemployment may be as high as 44% (see: http://www.business.hr/ekonomija/stvarna-nezaposlenost-u-bih-27-postonominalna-cak-44-posto).

34 The gendered nature of (elder) care and the additional burden it puts on women was not covered in this article, but it is the main subject of another article I am currently writing. What is important to emphasize here is that the socialist, work-related migrations were usually male-dominated, meaning that women commonly stayed in Bosnia where they continued to provide - in addition to home-making and child-rearing - eldercare. The war-produced exile, however, displaced both men and women, and it raptured families in ways that often prevented women from providing eldercare.

35 I do agree with the authors (Rubic and Petrovic, and Milenkovic), however, that this aspect of my article could have been better supported with archival research and the inclusion of small, but relevant literature. Since this fieldwork is in its embryotic state, I hope to improve and expand these domains of research and analysis in the future.

36 For example, in my book Citizens of an Empty Nation I reflect painstakingly on my positionality within the field in order to explain the texture of my encounters, evaluations, and interpretations.

37 Relatedly, I am also uncomfortable with the emic and etic distinction - archaic concepts in anthropology, which crudely divide the world between (mostly nationally and 'racially' conceptualized) insiders and outsiders. Is not all ethnographic fieldwork a continuous negotiation and maneuvering of multiple lines of inclusion and exclusion which blur distinctions and are never uniform and singular, and which challenge the emic/etic dichotomy and types of knowledge ("etic/objective" vs. "emic/subjective") that they allegedly produce?

"A GDJE SU ONI BILI DOSAD?" Starenje, skrb i napustanje u jednom bosanskom gradu

Azra Hromadzic

Odsjek za antropologiju, Fakultet Maxwell, Sveuciliste u Syracusi

Clanak je smjesten u Bosnu i Hercegovinu, tocnije u grad Bihac, i etnografski propituje promjene u shvacanju koncepata drzave i obitelji na primjeru praksi brige o starijim osobama. Koristeci etnografske podatke prikupljene tijekom istrazivanja u domu za starije osobe "Vitalis" u Bihacu, te zivotnu sudbinu starije Bosanke koju ovdje zovem Zemka, u ovom clanku tvrdim da se dr zava i obitelj u poslijeratnoj i postsocijalistickoj Bosni i Hercegovini materijaliziraju kao polu-odsutne. Kroz proces razotkrivanja tih mnogostrukih polu-odsutnosti, raskrinkavam i nacine na koje posljedice transformacije poslijeratne i postsocijalisticke drzave te obiteljskih odnosa utjecu na zivote "obicnih" ljudi.

Kljucne rijeci: briga, starenje, drzava, obitelj, polu-odsutnost, socijalizam i postsocijalizam, rat i poslijeratno stanje

"Kriza skrbi" (Phillips i Benner 1995), posebice skrbi za starije osobe, u posljednje se vrijeme javlja kao cesta tema u antropologiji, sociologiji, gerontologiji i drugim akademskim disciplinama, kao i u politici. Mnoge studije ukazuju na razlicite aspekte "krize", ukljucujuci i socio-ekonomski, koji je posljedica produljenja ocekivanog trajanja zivota u privilegiranim dijelovima svijeta; ukazuju i na smanjenje drzavne socijalne i zdravstvene skrbi te na nove oblike obiteljskih odnosa koji nisu u skladu s tradicijskim ocekivanjima o pruzanju skrbi u razlicitim socio-kulturnim kontekstima (vidjeti Ujedinjeni Narodi 2002).

U ovom claku bavim se Balkanom, tocnije Bosnom i Hercegovinom, kako bih prikazala ucinke koje te promjenjive topogracje i modalnosti skrbi imaju na zivote "obicnih" ljudi.1 Tvrdim da su bash na Balkanu tjeskobe oko "poteshkoca starenja" i promjenjive uloge obitelji i drzave u pruzanju skrbi za starije posebno vidljive te dodatno pojacane postsocijalistickim (od 1989. do danas) i poslijeratnim (od 1995. do danas) transformacijama (vidjeti Havelka 2003).

Taj aspekt drushtvene transformacije promakao je vecini znanstvenika s ovoga podrucja.2 Vecina antropoloshkih i srodnih istrazivanja Balkana i posebice Bosne i Hercegovine, ukljucujuci i moja vlastita, analiziraju ovaj prostor prvenstveno kroz prizmu etniciteta, nacionalizma i poslijeratne rekonstrukcije (vidjeti, mecu ostalima, Bieber 2005; Brown 2006; Chandler 1999; Campbell 1999; Coles 2007; Fassin i Pandolc 2010; Hayden 1996; Hromadzic 2015; Jansen 2005; Kurtovic 2011; Sorabji 1995; Veredery 1994; Woodward 1995). Problemi "obicnih ljudi" ukazuju, mecutim, na mnoge druge aspekte koji snazno i kompleksno oblikuju zivote, a ipak ostaju nevidljivi ili marginalizirani u vecini istrazivanja koja se usredotocuju na (etno)nacionalizam (iznimka su, mecu ostalima, primjerice Stubbs 2002; Stubbs i Maglajlic 2012; Zavirshek i Leskoshek 2005).3

U tekstu koji slijedi pokushat cu rasvijetliti neke od domena svakodnevnice koje su zanemarene u istrazivanjima, ali koje bitno odrecuju zivotne sudbine, usredotocujuci se na suprotstavljena ocekivanja i ideologije povezane s konceptima skrbi i odgovornosti na nacine na koje se oni ostvaruju u zivotima obicnih Bosanaca. S tim ciljem fokusirat cu se na zivotnu sudbinu starije zene koju ovdje zovem Zemka,4 i cija borba sa skrbi, odgovornosti i zanemarivanjem jasno ukazuje kako se drzava, dom i egzil (Lamb 2009), napushtanje (Biehl 2005; Bourgois 2009) i drushtvena marginalizacija (Gilleard i Higgs 2011) promishljaju, zive i zami sh ljaju.

Ovim pristupom Zemkinoj prici suprotstavljam se, dakle, "gerontoantropoloshkoj amneziji" (Cohen 1994: 151), koja nastoji romantizirati, ukalupiti, dehistorizirati i depolitizirati stariju zivotnu dob. Naime, smjeshtam ovaj etnografski susret u sferu "politickog" u antropoloshkom, dakle, shirokom i kontekstualiziranom smislu te rijeci. Snazan sadrzaj price koristim kako bih objasnila povijesno uvjetovane oblike skrbi koji se pojavljuju, preklapaju i preoblikuju iz rushevina rata i socijalizma. Nadalje, koristim etnogracju kao hermeneuticki alat kojim cu obuhvatiti i razjasniti ucinke transformirane poslijeratne i postsocijalisticke drzave i novih obiteljskih odnosa na zivote obicnih ljudi. Zemkina je prica stoga prica o izmjeshtenom starenju; suptilno se doticuci njenih fenomenoloshkih (iskustvenih i utjelovljenih), racionalnih/ politickih (hegemonijskih, ideoloshkih i rodnih) i hermeneutickih aspekata (Cohen 1994: 151), u claku ustvrcujem da se i drzava i obitelj u poslijeratnoj i postsocijalistickoj Bosni i Hercegovini pojavljuju kao polu-odsutne: dr zava je birokratski i politicki sveprisutna, ali u biopolitickom smislu sve vishe nestaje, dok je obitelj materijalno prisutna, ali je czicki negdje drugdje. Unutar tih okvira nejednakih i mnogostrukih, politicki i drushtveno stvorenih poluodsustava mozemo postupno razumijevati podrucje starenja i skrbi kao temeljnu dimenziju politickih i drushtvenih praksi u Bosni gdje "su zivoti, po navici, ugrozeni" ( Jasharevic 2011: 109).

"Idem u Ameriku, da zivim sa svojim sinom"

Pocetak je lipnja 2013. godine i u Bihacu, bosanskom gradicu5 smjeshtenom na sjeverozapadu uz granicu s Hrvatskom, topao je dan. Zajedno s nekolicinom shticenika, sjedim u sjeni velikog suncobrana ispred "Vitalisa" - privatnog doma za starije osobe, koji je otvoren prije dvije godine i ima kapacitet od dvadeset kreveta. Automobil, ciju marku i boju ne uspijevam razaznati na jarkom podnevnom suncu, parkira na prilaznom putu "Vitalisa". Lidija, vlasnica doma, naglo ustaje i zuri do ograde kako bi pozeljela dobrodoshlicu novoj shticenici doma, Zemki. Promatram kako sredovjecni mushkarac izlazi s vozackog mjesta i otvara straznja vrata. Mushkarac podize Zemku sa straznjeg sjedishta i njezno je smjeshta u invalidska kolica - mi "parkiramo" Zemku uz susjedni, veliki stol. Nekoliko ostalih shticenika promatraju pridoshlicu sa znatizeljom. Mushkarac koji je doveo Zemku izvaljuje se u jedan od stolaca, obilno se znojeci. Nestrpljivo brishe lice. Bacim pogled prema Zemki - ruke su joj tamnoljubicaste, gotovo crne. Primjecujem da su joj ispod bolnicke spavacice, na kojoj se na nekoliko mjesta vide velike mrlje osushene krvi, stopala jednako crna i natecena.

Covjek, cije ime je Sead, pocinje mi pricati dramaticnu pricu o Zemkinom dolasku u "Vitalis": Zemka je toga dana bila otpushtena iz bihacke Kantonalne bolnice. Dva dana ranije bolnica je nazvala Zemkine tri kceri, koje zive u Njemackoj, i objasnila im da claovi obitelji moraju doci po majku do 14 sati poslijepodne sljedecega dana - bolnica je ucinila sve shto je mogla i sada je bio red na obitelji da preuzme odgovornost i brigu o njoj. Tri kceri - Ekrema, Selma i Adila - udaljene tisucama kilometara i zauzete svojim poslovima i vlastitim nuklearnim obiteljima uspanicile su se, znajuci da nece moci stici u Bihac na vrijeme da bi preuzele brigu o bolesnoj majci. U panici su pretrazivale internet u potrazi za nekom institucijom kojoj bi se mogle obratiti; tako su i otkrile Lidijin privatni dom. Istodobno su kontaktirale najblizeg rocaka, Seada, koji zivi na udaljenosti od dva i pol sata od Bihaca, blizu Jajca, gradica u sredishnjoj Bosni. Rekao im je da ce im rado pomoci, ali da ne moze stici do dva sata popodne sljedecega dana.

Lidiju je dirnula sudbina te obitelji koja je, kako je uskoro saznala, jako patila tijekom i nakon rata. Zeljela je pomoci, ali nije imala slobodnih kreveta. Stoga je nazvala bolnicu i zamolila ih da zadrze Zemku josh jedan dan dok ona sve pripremi za njezin dolazak. Glavna sestra je, prema Lidijinim rijecima, oshtro odvratila: "Ne, mi to ne mozemo uciniti. Mi na njima ne zaracujemo", aludirajuci pritom na to da Lidija zaracuje na tucoj muci. Lidiju je toliko pogodio taj komentar da je zaprijetila da ce pozvati policiju i reci im da drzavna bolnica izbacuje na ulicu osamdesetogodishnju izbjeglicu. Nakon Lidijine prijetnje sestra se smilovala i rekla da ce bolnica zadr zati Zemku pod svojim krovom josh jedan dan.

Dok je Lidija pricala svoju pricu, Zemka me pogledala sa smijeshkom i rekla: "Idem u Ameriku [Sjedinjene Drzave], da zivim sa svojim sinom." Sead je tuzno odmahnuo glavom i shapnuo mi: "Dementna je. Sin joj je ubijen tijekom rata, u Srebrenici." Sead je popio svoje pice, ustao, zagrlio svoju sitnu tetu u krvlju umrljanoj bolnickoj spavacici, te krenuo za Jajce. Uskoro i sama odlazim, duboko potresena. Pet dana poslije, na putu za "Vitalis", ugledam Zemkinu osmrtnicu; njena dzenaza (islamski pogrebni ritual), kako je navedeno na osmrtnici, odrzat ce se sljedecega dana. U dom stizem rano poslijepodne i nalazim Zemkine kceri kako sjede ispred doma i razgovaraju s Lidijom i ostalim shticenicima. Stigle su na ukop svoje majke i sada su tuzne i bijesne. Zale se na drzavu u kojoj "nema ni reda ni sistema", gdje bolnice mogu izbacivati stare i bolesne na ulicu i gdje jedna "shehidska familija" moze dozivjeti neshto takvo. Tuzit ce bolnicu! One zive u Njemackoj i tamo se takvo shto nikada ne bi dogodilo! Lidija, koja je takocer svoje izbjeglicke godine provela u Njemackoj, potvrdno klima glavom. Njezno pokushava utjeshiti obitelj. Sestre naposljetku odlaze. Dok promatramo njihov automobil koji odlazi, Lidija mi shapne: "Ne mogu one njih tuziti. Znash li da je Zemka u bolnicu stigla u groznom stanju? Bila je potpuno zapushtena. Pa, mislim, a gdje su oni [obitelj] bili dosad?"

Zemkina prica je iznimno bremenita - ona uokviruje, otkriva i zaplice mnogostruke afektivne povezanosti i prakticne odnose ljubavi, skrbi i napushtanja kako se oni nanovo oblikuju u poslijeratnom kontekstu, na kraju socijalizma. Zemka je "propala" kroz pukotine u sustavu, naposljetku i umrla, uhvacena u mrezu tih promjenjivih topogracja skrbi i zanemarivanja. Kako bih dosljedno analizirala Zemkinu pricu, smjeshtam je u kontekst poslijeratnog i postsocijalistickog razdoblja. Iako su poslijeratni i postsocijalisticki kontekst nerazmrsivo prepleteni u zivotima ljudi, zbog analiticke jasnoce smjeshtam ih u dva odvojena poglavlja. Prvo se bavim razmjerima poslijeratnog iskustva.

(Poslije)ratni sklopovi: sehidi, zivot i smrt

Zemkina obitelj bila je u epicentru jugoslavenskih ratova tijekom devedesetih. Rat na bosanskom teritoriju zatekao je Zemku u vec poznijem dobu, kada je imala shezdesetak godina, u gradicu Sipovu u kojem je provela vecinu zivota. Sipovo je bilo mijeshani grad - vecina stanovnika bili su Srbi (oko 80%), sa znacajnim postotkom Boshnjaka (oko 18%) i neshto ostalih (prvenstveno Hrvata i Jugoslavena). Takav "mijeshani" sastav stanovnishtva, u kojem razlicite etnicke skupine stoljecima koegzistiraju, bio je tipican za Bosnu i Hercegovinu i za socijalisticku Jugoslaviju opcenito.6

Zemkina je obitelj jedna od onih koje su bile prisiljene napustiti svoj dom vec na samom pocetku ratnih sukoba.7 Na pocetku rata Zemkin jedini sin, Edin, sluzio je obvezni vojni rok u Jugoslavenskoj narodnoj armiji ( JNA) i bio je poslan na bojishte u istocnu Bosnu gdje je pobjegao iz redova JNA i pridruzio se Armiji Bosne i Hercegovine. Nekoliko godina nakon toga, Edina su ubile srpske paravojne snage u Srebrenici, zloglasnom mjestu genocida nad Boshnjacima. Vijest o tom strashnom gubitku Zemkinu obitelj vec je zatekla osakacenu ratom: Zemkine kceri, nakon nekoliko godina izbjeglickog zivota i nagovarane od strane svojih roditelja da napuste ratom opustoshenu Bosnu, emigrirale su u Njemacku, zajedno sa stotinama tisuca izbjeglica iz Bosne i Hercegovine. Zemkin suprug preminuo je tijekom njihovog izbjeglishtva. Zemka, koja je ostala sama, a cija je kuca sada bila dio teritorija i struktura "Republike Srpske", nashla se u Bijelom Brdu,8 mijeshanom srpsko-muslimanskom gradicu u blizini Bihaca, daleko od svojih kceri i od claova shire obitelji, koji su bili rashtrkani od Sipova do raznih dijelova svijeta. U Bijelom Brdu svakodnevno ju je posjecivala medicinska sestra u mirovini, Srpkinja, koja je redovito mijenjala Zemkine zavoje. Iako nitko u "Vitalisu" ne zna tocno kako se Zemka nashla u tom dijelu Bosne i Hercegovine, posljednje godine njena zivota jasno ukazuju na trenutacne kontradikcije vezane uz poslijeratnu drzavu, obitelj i skrb, o cemu snazno svjedoce Lidijine rijeci: "Koja ironija - da te kao izbjeglicu istjeraju Srbi, da ti ubiju sina, a onda da ostanesh sama, u nepoznatom gradu, dok o tebi brine Srpkinja. Nitko ne zna shto ga ceka." Buduci da joj se zdravlje rapidno pogorshavalo, Zemku su naposljetku smjestili u najvecu regionalnu bolnicu u Bihacu. Dok joj je tijelo polako gubilo bitku, njene su se kceri nashle u situaciji tipi c noj za mnoge Bosance i Hercegovce koji z ive kao ratna dijaspora i koji tra ze rjeshenje za svoj transnacionalni problem - skrbi o svojim ostarjelim roditeljima i ostalim claovima obitelji na daljinu. Ti su procesi otkrili "kolektivni skandal"9 i jednu ranjivu zonu kulturne intimnosti (Herzfeld 2005): sve vecu nemogucnost drzave i obitelji u suvremenoj Bosni i Hercegovini da skrbe o svojim starijim sunarodnjacima.

Postsocijalisticke stvarnosti: polu-odsutnost drzave i obitelji10

Vec je tijekom 1950-ih godina socijalisticka Jugoslavija razvila bogatu decentraliziranu mrezu republickih institucija koje su se bavile pruzanjem socijalne skrbi (Zavirshek i Leskoshek 2005: 39). Infrastruktura jugoslavenske socijalne sluzbe bila je dobro razvijena i ostvarena kroz shiroku mrezu lokalnih Centara za socijalnu skrb kao i putem "uobicajenih smjeshtajnih ustanova za dugorocni boravak djece i odraslih" (Stubbs i Maglajlic 2007: 1177). Iako su parametri socijalne zashtite bili poneshto drugaciji u pojedinim jugoslavenskim republikama, u svima je sustav socijalne skrbi ukljucivao neke elemente socijalistickog samoupravljanja, bizmarkijanizma, te ukljucivanja odrecenog broja ne-drzavnih cimbenika, kao shto su vjerske institucije (Stubbs i Maglajlic 2007: 1176).

Kao posljedica takvih odrednica "socijalistickog humanizma" (vidjeti, izmecu ostalih, Cohen i Markovic 1975; Horvat 1982), jugoslavenska drzava, odnosno socijalisticka drzava opcenito, shvacana je kao ocinska (Manning 2007), odnosno zamishljana kao "brizan roditelj koji skrbi o svojim gracanima-djeci" (Dunn 2008: 247; vidjeti takocer Verdery 1996). Ta ideja o briznoj drzavi stvorila je ocekivanja o tome shto bi drzava zapravo trebala osigurati (Dunn 2008): najveca duznost drzave kao "velikog oca" (Zavirshek i Leskoshek 2005: 40) bila je da se "pobrine za drushtvo kao cjelinu" u procesu koji ce, prema socijalistickoj ideologiji, u konacnici dovesti do prestanka bilo kakve potrebe za socijalnom pomoci opcenito, jer ce svi biti zbrinuti.11 Kako bi to postigla, jugoslavenska je drzava putem obuhvatnih regulacijskih tehnologija pocela prikupljati informacije i upustila se u kontrolu bioloshkih uvjetovanosti stanovnishtva. Kao rezultat toga, "vlada je postala odgovorna za zivotne uvjete ljudi od kolijevke pa do groba" (Zavirshek i Leskoshek 2005: 46). U suglasju s ostalim politikama skrbi o gracanstvu, socijalisticki zdravstveni sustav pruzao je univerzalnu medicinsku skrb i decniran je kao "racionalan, progresivan i znanstven" (Read 2007: 204). Ta "univerzalna" prava na socijalnu skrb i zdravstveni sustav bila su kljucna za ideju socijalisticke modernosti i nacin na koji je socijalisticka drzava demonstrirala svoju brigu za gracane (Read 2007: 203). Odgovor Jugoslavena na te novine socijalizma bila je kombinacija "entuzijazma i nade, pomijeshanih sa strahom i nepovjerenjem" (Zavirshek i Leskoshek 2005: 46).

Dok je drzava uspostavila kontrolu i upravljanje nad gotovo svim aspektima skrbi o gracanima, u slucaju skrbi za starije drzava je cvrsto nastojala izbjeci stvaranje izdvojenih (medicinskih) ustanova koje bi se iskljucivo bavile skrbi za starije (Sokolovsky et al. 1991: 322). Naprotiv, decentralizirani socijalisticki sustav usredotocio se na stvaranje obuhvatnih sustava primarne zashtite i zdravstvenih centara koji su bili povezani s lokalnim "samoupravljackim interesnim zajednicama (...), a koji su potekli iz domova narodnog zdravlja" (Sokolovsky et al. 1991: 322). Nadalje, razlicite republike unutar Jugoslavije imale su sasvim razlicite raspodjele domova za starije: 1987. godine Hrvatska je bila prva po broju (120) smjeshtajnih ustanova za starije (domova umirovljenika), dok su u Beogradu, glavnom gradu Srbije i bivshe Jugoslavije, postojala samo dva takva doma (Sokolovsky et al. 1991: 321). Ti nerazmjeri posljedica su razlicitih povijesnih i infrastrukturnih cimbenika te recentnijih demografskih kretanja: primjerice, u Hrvatskoj je infrastruktura skrbi za starije bila mnogo razvijenija dok je Srbija osnovala najveci broj ustanova za djecu bez roditeljske skrbi.12 Takocer, u ruralnim podrucjima Hrvatske bio je snazno prisutan trend iseljavanja mladog stanovnishtva, koje se stoga nije moglo brinuti za svoje ostarjele roditelje (Sokolovsky et al. 1991: 321), shto opet ukazuje na snaznu socio-kulturnu vezu izmecu drzave, obitelji i skrbi za starije osobe.

Paternalisticki odnos i samo-projekcije jugoslavenske drzave i njenih gracana te "strukture emocija" (Williams 1977) koje su oni izazivali bili su, mecutim, duboko utemeljeni na tradicijskim oblicima obiteljske skrbi. Primjerice, Bosanci, posebice Bosanke, tradicionalno su skrbile o starijim claovima obitelji. Slicno kao i u mnogim istocnoeuropskim zemljama u kojima je dr zava odavala dojam brizne dr zave, u stvarnosti su "privatna domena srodstva, prijateljstva i osobnih veza postala temeljem za emocionalno uvjetovanu i drushtveno utemeljenu skrb" (Read 2007: 206). Sve donedavno o starijim su Bosancima czicki i emocionalno skrbila njihova djeca i cesto se pretpostavljalo da ce starci zivjeti s barem jednim od svoje djece, najceshce s najmlacim sinom i njegovom obitelji. Ta ocekivanja temeljila su se na kulturnim stavovima koji su naglashavali prirodu zajednishtva srodnickih i simbiotskih veza mecu generacijama (Simic 1990: 97). Pravni je sustav takocer usvojio ta kulturna ocekivanja: primjerice, claak 150 Ustava bivshe Jugoslavije decnirao je da je skrb za starije odgovornost njihove djece (Tomorad i Galoguza 1984: 306), a claak 190/10 navodi: "claovi obitelji imaju prava i odgovornosti da uzdrzavaju svoje roditelje (...) i da roditelji uzdrzavaju njih, kao izraz obiteljske solidarnosti" (vidjeti Sokolovsky et al. 1991: 321). Ta zakonska prava i institucionalizirane opcije obiteljske skrbi nisu, mecutim, uvijek bili dosljedno provoceni,13 ali su svakako oblikovali svakodnevne diskurse o odgovornosti i skrbi, koji se jasno ishcitavaju u Lidijinom komentaru: "A gdje su oni bili dosad?", implicirajuc i da Zemkine kceri nisu trebale ocekivati da drzava odradi "njihov posao" - skrbi o njihovoj bolesnoj majci. Zbog ratom uzrokovanog izbjeglishtva, mnoge obitelji nisu mogle ispuniti ta ocekivanja o "skrbi iz blizine", shto je rezultiralo velikim pomacima u poslijeratnim i postsocijalistickim shvacanjima skrbi te, usput, otkrilo mnoge nelogicnosti, ideologije i mitove vezane uz pruzanje skrbi, proshle i sadashnje.

Buduci da je poslijeratna drzava razlomljena, a obitelji razjedinjene, "kriza skrbi" je u Bosni i Hercegovini postala sveopca te je razotkrila suprotstavljene ideologije i ocekivanja vezana uz skrb: s jedne strane, (socijalisticka) drzava je projicirala ideju da ona sama pruza potrebnu skrb, a pritom se oslanjala na obitelji koje su morale brinuti o svojim starijim claovima, dok su, s druge strane, obitelji bile te koje su pruzale vecinu skrbi, ali su i dalje usvajale ideologiju paternalisticke drzave. U poslijeratnom razdoblju ta su suprotstavljena ocekivanja i nemogucnost da se ispune vlastite, stvarne i zamishljene, uloge otkrili nedosljednosti u samoj ideologiji odgovornosti i imali za posljedicu mnoge afektivne reakcije i optuzbe za neuspjeh. Obitelj je, bash kao i drzava, stoga iz rata izashla kao polu-odsutna; materijalno prisutna (placali su znatne troshkove privatnog doma za starije)14 i czicki potpuno odsutna (u nemogucnosti da iz blizine pruzi ljubav i skrb). Pa ipak, bez obzira na sve vecu iskljucenost poslijeratne drzave iz biopolitike - poslijeratna drzava je ujedno birokratski sveprisutna i biopoliticki odsutna (ili sve vishe iskljucena) iz skrbi o gracanima - Zemkine su kceri svejedno ocekivale da ce drzava pomoci barem njima, jer su oni "shehidska porodica". Drugim rijecima, poslijeratna Bosna i Hercegovina je, prema njihovim ocekivanjima, imala "moralnu obvezu" (Han 2012: 4) prema Zemkinoj obitelji, jer je obitelj drzavi dala najvecu mogucu zrtvu, u krvi, kako bi osigurala njenu opstojnost tijekom rata. Kada ta moralna obveza nije isposhtovana, nego je potpuno zanemarena od strane drzave - u ovom slucaju Kantonalne bolnice u Bihacu - kceri su osjecale izdaju, nepravdu i, konacno, srdzbu. Ta suprotstavljena ocekivanja o skrbi i reciprocitetu izmecu poslijeratne dr zave i njenih najzasluznijih gracana - obitelji sehida - stvorila su stoga veliku prazninu ispunjenu snaznim osjecajima razocaranja gracana u dijaspori i Zemkinim napushtenim, ispacenim, starim tijelom. Topogracju Zemkinog tijela - napacenog, u modricama, umrljanog krvlju i natecenog - tumacim stoga kao utjelovljeni simbol polu-odsutnosti drzave i obitelji i njihovog snaznog urushavanja u tijelo stare zene u suvremenoj Bosni. Zemkino je iskustvo snazna receksija tih polu-odsutnosti koje su duboko utjelovljene, bolno opipljive i koje upucuju na promjenjive i diferencijalne "pedagogije paznje" (Cohen 2008: 337).

Zakljucak

Zemkina potresna prica o zivotu i smrti na Balkanu ukazuje na ucinke polu-odsutne drzave i polu-odsutne obitelji na starije stanovnishtvo u zemlji. Iskustva te obitelji svakako su jedinstvena u svojim intimnim borbama, patnjama i ranama, a, opet, po mnogo cemu slicna brojnim drugima. To je prica o ratnom izgnanstvu i razaranju zivota, tijela i objekata; o slabljenju, polu-odsutnosti i reformaciji poslijeratne i postsocijalisticke drzave; o obiteljima koje razdvajaju kontinenti; o novim domovima i granicama i o promjenjivim domenama i ocekivanjima od zivota i smrti, skrbi i odgovornosti.

Vecina ljudi koje sam srela u Bosni i Hercegovini dijele neka iskustva i emocije koje su otkrivene u Zemkinoj prici: cesto se zale na loshe zdravlje, na sve slabije zdravstveno stanje svoje obitelji i prijatelja, na prerane smrti mnogih prijatelja i poznanika, na urushavanje zdravstvenih sustava i suzavanje sustava socijalne skrbi i na sve veci teret drushtvenih, moralnih i ekonomskih dugova koji proizlaze iz tih promjena. Ti procesi, iskustva i price oblikuju zivote i smrti ljudi na Balkanu, ali ukazuju i na potrebu da se zajedno raspravlja o onome shto je znanost na ovom podrucju promatrala odvojeno: poslijeratni i postsocijalisticki rezimi skrbi o gracanstvu; neuspjele odgovornosti i ocekivanja koja stvaraju novonastale privatizirane prostore diferencijalne skrbi. Upravo te neujednacene, istodobno lokalne, regionalne i transnacionalne koncguracije ljubavi, skrbi i napushtanja stvaraju jedinstvena, individualna i naoko suprotstavljena, a opet intimno isprepletena iskustva proshlosti i buducnosti, prisustva i odsustva, politike i emocija, te nade i izdaje u suvremenoj Bosni i izvan nje.

1 Termin "obicni ljudi" koristim s posebnim oprezom. Kao shto je naglasila Veena Das (2007), "svakodnevno" je mjesto na kojem se politika odvija na dubokoj razini.

2 Ta "omashka" je usko vezana uz nacine na koje se ono shto se smatra (pouzdanim) znanjem (u ovom slucaju znanjem o Balkanu) zapravo proizvodi uz distribuciju istrazivackih potpora i stipendija.

3 Time, naravno, ne zelim reci da etnonacionalizam nije vazan ljudima na Balkanu. Mecutim, on je samo jedan od brojnih pokretaca - ukljucujuc i siromashtvo, nezaposlenost i korupciju - koji zajednicki oblikuju zivote obicnih ljudi.

4 Sva su osobna imena promijenjena radi zashtite privatnosti osoba ukljucenih u istrazivanje.

5 Podrucje oko Bihaca, poznato i pod imenom Krajina, u kojem zivi oko 300 000 uglavnom Boshnjaka, najsjeverozapadniji je dio zemlje i "zaboravljeno bosansko rati shte" (O'Shea 2012). Taj je kraj pretrpio strashna razaranja tijekom rata 1990-ih. Najveci grad je Bihac, koji je shesti grad po velicini u Bosni i Hercegovini i u kojem zivi oko 50 000 stanovnika. Podruc je je bilo pod opsadom vishe od tri godine, ali ga srpska vojska nikada nije osvojila. Na pocetku rata srpsko je stanovnishtvo Bihaca napustilo grad i iselilo se u druga vecinski srpska podruc ja u zemlji ili u inozemstvo. Rat je zapoceo u lipnju 1992. godine kada je srpska vojska okupirala grad i zapocela snazno granatiranje. Boshnjacka (oko 66% stanovni shtva) i hrvatska (otprilike 8% stanovnishtva) vojska i civili zajednicki su branili grad tijekom trogodi shnje opsade. Nadalje, 1993. je godine sjeverni dio podruc ja pod opsadom, a kojega je vodio biznismen koji je postao politicar, Fikret Abdic, proglasio nezavisnost od bosanske vlade i njene vojske te poceo suracivati sa srpskim snagama. To je dodatno otezalo situaciju na bihackom podrucju, koje je osloboceno u kontroverznoj ofenzivi boshnjacko-hr vatske vojske, ubrzo nakon koje je potpisan mirovni sporazum u Daytonu. Sporazum je donio mir Bosni i Hercegovini i podijelio zemlju na boshnjacko-hr vatsku Federaciju (51% teritorija) i Republiku Srpsku (49% teritorija). Svi entiteti imaju karakteristike drzave unutar vece, kompleksnije dr zave. Federacija Bosna i Hercegovina je podijeljena na deset kantona, a Bihac je administrativno sredishte i najveci grad Unsko-sanskog kantona.

6 Socijalisticka Federativna Republika Jugoslavija bila je federacija shest republika: Slovenije, Hr vatske, Bosne i Hercegovine, Srbije (s dvije autonomne pokrajine, Kosovom i Vojvodinom), Crne Gore i Makedonije. Nastala je nakon Drugog svjetskog rata pod vodstvom karizmaticnog komunistickog voce Josipa Broza Tita i njegove ideologije bratstva i jedinstva - sluzbene politike mecuetnickih odnosa prema kojoj su svi jugoslavenski narodi i narodnosti trebali koegzistirati u miru i njegovati ideje mijeshanih brakova i mec usobne povezanosti.

7 Bosna i Hercegovina postala je nezavisna 6. travnja 1992. Na dan priznanja Bosne i Hercegovine srpske paramilitarne jedinice i Jugoslavenska narodna armija ( JNA) napale su bosanski glavni grad Sarajevo te zapocele rat u Bosni i Hercegovini. Vojska samoproglashene Srpske Republike Bosne i Hercegovine (Republike Srpske) unutar teritorija Bosne i Hercegovine, uz pomoc ljudstva i oruzja iz Srbije, uspjeshno je izvrshila etnicko cishcenje i nasilno razdvojila usko povezane zajednice i zivote (Hayden 1996) te okupirala gotovo 70% teritorija do kraja 1993. godine. Pocinila je i neke od najgorih zlocina nad ne-srpskim stanovni shtvom, ukljucujuci i Zemkinu obitelj.

8 Bijelo Brdo je pseudonim.

9 Larisi Jasharevic zahvaljujem na ovom terminu.

10 Dijelovi ovoga odlomka pojavljuju se i u A. Hromadzic, u tisku 2016. "Acective labor: work, love, and care for the elderly in Bihac " u Brkovic, c., V. celebic ic i S. Jansen, ur. Negotiating Social Relations in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Farnham: Ashgate.

11 Naravno, nisu bash "svi" jednako zasluzili zashtitu i pomoc drzave. Zavirshek i Leskoshek (2005: 47-49) objashnjavaju kako je vlada podijelila ljude na one koji "zasluzuju" i one koji "ne zasluzuju" ili na "nashe" i "ne-nashe", pri cemu su potonji vecinom bili bivshi vlasnici ducana, tvornica i banaka te poneki prezivjeli Zidovi, kojima je nova socijalisticka vlada oduzela imovinu.

12 Paul Stubbs, osobni razgovor, 17. listopada 2014. godine.

13 Tomorad i Galoguza tvrde da bez obzira na to shto starije osobe imaju zakonsko pravo da o njima skrbe njihovi potomci, oni se vrlo rijetko koriste zakonom kako bi osigurali ta prava, jer su svjesni da u takvom odnosu nedostaje emocionalni temelj. Autori takocer tvrde da potomci ponekad i nisu u cnancijskoj mogucnosti da uzdr zavaju svoje roditelje (1984: 306, n1).

14 Privatna skrb za starije osobe iznimno je skupa s obzirom na zivotni standard u Bosni. Mjesecna cijena je izmecu 750 i 1050 bosanskih konvertibilnih maraka (KM), shto iznosi oko 380-535 euro - iznos koji je svakako previsok za vecinu starije populacije Bosne, koja prima prosjecnu mirovinu od oko 350-400 KM (178-204 euro). claovi obitelji koji rade na raznim stranama svijeta mogu samo povremeno posjecivati svoje ostarjele roditelje i srodnike, ali vecinom su se obavezali da im placaju skupu (za lokalne pojmove) skrb.

KOMENTARI

Jason Danely

Odsjek za drustvene znanosti, Sveuciliste Oxford Brookes

Smjestanje izmjestenih fragmenata slomljenih tijela, drzava i obitelji

Clanak Azre Hromadzic izvanredan je primjer etnogracje koja se krece izmecu naoko dalekog i naoko bliskog, otkrivajuci pritom da nishta nikada nije onakvo kakvim se cinilo. Tu je Zemka, ne samo ispaceno i krvlju umrljano tijelo, ne samo zrtva koju je drushtvo odbacilo, nego mjesto prijenosa znacenja, gdje afektivna stvarnost dalekih drugih postaje dekodirana, interpretirana i vrijednosno odrecena. Ako se odmaknemo korak unazad od pitanja kako su skrb i napushtanje prisutni i koje ucinke imaju na topogracju moci/znanja u poslijeratnoj Bosni, mozemo se prije svega upitati zashto bi netko uopce skrbio o nekome kada je ta skrb neizostavno vezana uz mnoge probleme i proturjecnosti? Zashto bi njena obitelj u "ratom uzrokovanom izbjeglishtvu" u Njemackoj (Hromadzic, u ovom broju), brinula ima li za Zemku mjesta u domu? Zashto bi daljnji rocak satima vozio da je tamo dopremi, bez obzira na to shto prema njoj osjeca tek slabu povezanost? Zashto bi drzava skrbila o starijim gracanima kao shto je Zemka?

Ocekivanja o tome tko bi trebao skrbiti o nekome, zashto, te shto je to shto sacinjava dobru skrb, stvaraju napetosti pune labilnih veza, nestabilnih i nesigurnih saveza. Zemkino ostarjelo tijelo i um cine je nesposobnom za bilo kakvo dulje putovanje, a opet, njena izmjeshtenost povlaci je od jedne institucije do druge. Ona nije pokretna, autonomna, ne moze se osloniti na vlastite snage, ne moze birati, riskirati. Mecutim, Zemkina starost i bolest nisu dostatne da objasne njezinu ranjivost; ona je neodvojiva od politike skrbi koja se javlja u postsocijalistickoj, poslijeratnoj Bosni, ali i drugdje, jer svijet opcenito postaje sve stariji.

Hromadzic uvjerljivo prikazuje Zemkinu "topogracju" starenja, taj slijed prekinutih odnosa i izdaja koji istodobno oznacavaju i njenu skrb i njeno napushtanje, "kao utjelovljenog simbola polu-odsutnosti drzave i obitelji" (Hromadzic, u ovom broju). To je ujedno i najveci doprinos toga rada, koji se podudara s etnografskim clacima o skrbi u drugim kontekstima kao shto su Life beside Itself (2013) Lise Stevenson, Precarious Japan (2013), Anne Allison, Giordanova (2014) Practices of Translation and the Making of Migrant Subjectivities in Contemporary Italy i moj vlastiti rad Aging and Loss (Danely 2014). U svim tim slucajevima poluodsutnosti drzave i obitelji ostavljale su za sobom ranjive pojedince u ishcekivanju - zivot je nesiguran i nepredvidljiv, dodatno otezan dislokacijama kao shto su rat i nasilje nad skrbi (usp. Wool 2015). Kao shto je izjavila Lidija, sugovornica Azre Hromadzic: "Nitko ne zna shto ga ceka" (Hromadzic, u ovom broju).

Mozda je Zemkina demencija prikladan nacin da se ispuni taj prostor ishcekivanja. Omogucuje joj utjehu u uvjerenju da ce je njezin sin, cije pogibije u ratu ona nije svjesna, odvesti u Ameriku i pruziti joj i dom i obitelj. Zemkini simptomi cini se, pomiruju jedan set dislokacija (iz bolnice u dom za starije, iz Bosne u Njemacku u slucaju njenih kceri, iz zivota u smrt u slucaju njenoga sina), s drugim (iz sadashnjosti u ne-sadashnjost, iz Bosne u Ameriku, od zanemarivanja do skrbi). Zemka, takocer, utjelovljuje jednu polu-odsutnost.

Taj kontekst ishcekivanja ne zahvaca samo starije osobe, nego i one koji o njima brinu. Ne postoji nikakav cvrsti temelj pravedne, pa cak ni eticke, skrbi na koji bi se mogli osloniti. To je vrlo blisko mojim saznanjima do kojih sam doshao na temelju istrazivanja u Japanu, i iako me cesto pitaju shto je bolje, obiteljska ili institucionalna skrb, znam da odgovor na to pitanje nikada nije jednostavan. U Japanu, kao i u uvjetima koje Hromadzic opisuje, obitelj nije postojana i cvrsta zajednica povezana jedinstvenim obrascima srodstva, niti su drzava i sustav skrbi centralizirani i racionalni. I o obitelji i o drzavi bolje je govoriti kao o "sklopovima" (Hromadzic, u ovom broju) koji stvaraju nestalan i kontradiktoran teren na kojem se ocituje (ne)briga.

Hromadzic nas poziva da zamislimo "razlomljenu drzavu i razjedinjene obitelji" (Hromadzic, u ovom broju). Drzavnu skrb tu ne mozemo jednostavno suprotstaviti obiteljskoj skrbi, kao shto skrb ne mozemo jednostavno okarakterizirati kao zajednicku ili "pluralnu" - jer bi to podrazumijevalo afektivnu i politicku prilagodbu subjektivnosti radi zadovoljavanja etickih principa. Obitelj koja brine o Zemkinoj dobrobiti nije czicki prisutna, a prisutni "skrbnici", cini se, ne brinu. Polu-odsutnosti su ujedno i polu-priznavanja (semi-recognitions) samoga subjekta skrbi. Sto utjece na ta polovicna priznavanja (npr. novac, utjecaj, etnicka pripadnost) i kako se ona tumace na nacin da dobivaju odrecenu vrijednost u kontekstu brige za starije? Sto uopce mozemo uciniti sa subjektom koji moze biti samo djelomicno priznat? Koja je moralna odgovornost obitelji ili drzave u tim slucajevima? Drugim rijecima, tko snosi odgovornost za nasilje koje je pocinjeno nad Zemkom i koje je u konacnici uzrokovalo njenu smrt? Iako su to sve vecinom empirijska pitanja, ona su, prema mom mishljenju, iznimno vazna ako zelimo slijediti argumentaciju autorice Hromadzic i primijeniti je i na druge kontekste.

Naposljetku, etnografija Azre Hromadzic otvara kriticku raspravu o tome koliko smo zapravo uistinu "tu" za druge. Jesu li polu-odsustva koja autorica opisuje uvijek prisutna u odnosima skrbi, posebice u mecugeneracijskim odnosima? Mogli bismo se i upitati je li to uopce kvalitativno drugacije od okolnosti drugosti s kojima se mi antropolozi stalno susrecemo kada pishemo o Drugima? Iako me Zemkina prica, duboko estetska, emocionalno svakako potresla, svjestan sam svoga vlastitog polu-odsustva u odnosu na njeno stanje. citanje toga rada me takocer osupnulo, suocivshi me sa, ne polu-odsustvom, nego stvarnim odsustvom zalovanja za zenom za ciji zivot moram vjerovati da je bio ispunjen, nadahnut i produktivan. Zelimo li produbiti samu ideju polu-odsutnosti, to bi se najbolje moglo uciniti uz navocenje i ukljucivanje aspekata nasilja, zalovanja i narativa (usp. Das 2006; Jackson 2014), na nacine koji bi dodatno rasvijetlili i propitali nashe shvacanje starenja.

Milos Milenkovic

Odeljenje za etnologiju i antropologiju, Filozofski fakultet Univerziteta u Beogradu

Javno je (i) individualno

Uvodni claak Azre Hromadzic predstavlja dobrodoshao prilog, buduci da otvara veoma vaznu temu u etnoloshko-antropoloshkim studijama drzave i njenih institucija u regionu: problem sistemskog umanjivanja, pa i negiranja, udela licne odgovornosti pojedinca za sopstvenu sudbinu, ukljucujuci tu i zdravstveno i socijalno blagostanje, prisutan u savremenim antropoloshkim istrazivanjima povezanosti ekonomije, politike i kulture. Imajuci u vidu nizak stepen urbanizacije pre uspostavljanja komunisticko-socijalisticke drzave koja "brine", i njemu prethodecu haoticnu meshavinu tri drushtvena i drzavna urecenja (stranu kolonijalnu monarhiju koja je kombinovala feudalizam i kompanijski kapitalizam u nastajanju, lokalnu monarhiju s regionalnim ambicijama koja je kombinovala zadruzni komunitarizam s drzavnim kapitalizmom u nastajanju, kao i lokalnu varijantu sherijatskog feudalizma s elementima robovlasnishtva u nestajanju), dakle gotovo zanemarivo prisustvo individualisticke kulture, zemlje bivshe Jugoslavije predstavljaju shkolski primer za analizu koncepata zajednice i pojedinca odnosno njihovog delatnog potencijala, a time i odgovornosti. Ovo posebno kada je o tranzicijskoj/postsocijalistickoj sudbini gracana nashih drushtava rec. Ziveci na teritorijama na kojima je oduvek spoljashnji ili unutrashnji Drugi bio odgovoran/kriv i za kolektivnu i za individualnu sudbinu, gracani bivshih jugoslovenskih republika, pa tako i Bosne o kojoj je ovde speciccno rec, imali su veoma retko sistemski podsticaj, osim retkih liberalnih15 zametaka, da se izgracuju kao odgovorne individue koje svesno snose posledice i ubiru zasluge za svoja dela ili svoja necinjenja. Tako ovaj claak otvara vaznu temu iako joj pristupa ideoloshki pristrasno, shto je legitimno u kritickoj antropologiji, opredeljujuci se za u poslednje vreme uobicajenu levo orijentisanu antropoloshku kritiku razgradnje drzave blagostanja/socijalnog staranja i smanjenja obima i nivoa usluga ukljucenih u iz poreza cnansirana socijalna davanja, pripisane "liberalizmu".

Autorka standardnom kombinacijom teza o krizi drzave blagostanja, prelomljenim kroz narative informanata, prica pricu koju po potrebi i teorijski uoblicava, o tome kako etnografsko istrazivanje moze da informishe, dopuni ali i demantuje standardna objashnjenja tranzicijskih procesa u postsocijalistickim drushtvima. Ipak, autorka ne uocava metodoloshku zamku u koju je etnografski fokus na licne narative uvlaci: a) zamku nostalgije, posebno prisutne u postjugoslovenskim drushtvima, a mozda najpre u bosanskom i b) zamku preuzimanja etnoeksplikativnog, dakle po pravilu znanja inferiornog ekspertskom etnoloshko-antropoloshkom naucnom znanju. Ove dve metodoloshke zamke znacajno zakrivljuju zakljucak ka odgovornosti drzave, nasuprot odgovornosti pojedinca, i ne uzimaju u obzir cinjenje (nacionalizacija, eksproprijacija, koncskacija, prinudno nezakonito oporezivanje, izostanak podsticaja na shtednju i ulaganja) i necinjenje (prepushtanje sopstvene sudbine kolektivu, opravdavanje izostanka licne brige za buducnost stvarnim ili navodnim sistemskim nemogucnostima) pre starosti.16

Osim toga, autorka propushta, shto je inace manir u antropoloshim studijama post-socijalizma, da ponudi analizu stanja koje je prethodilo tekucoj devastaciji drzave socijalnog staranja. Nedostaje opis (ne)uspeha komunizma/realnog socijalizma da ostvari svoja obecanja, a posebno analiza razloga da li je on to uopshte bio u stanju, strukturno posmatrano (osim redistribucije kapitala koji su pojedinci ili preduzeca sticali, u kombinaciji sa zaduzivanjem). Ono shto nedostaje u ovom claku, a o cemu vredi povesti diskusiju ili ponovljeno/ produzeno istrazivanje, jeste diskrepancija izmecu informantskih nostalgicnih narativa o predkapitalistickom socijalnom staranju i naucne istine koja nam je poznata iz izvora i ekspertskih analiza. Nedostaje i temeljnije oslanjanje na postojecu, iako oskudnu, literaturu o starosti, penzijama, osiguranju, posebno o organizovanoj brizi o starima u jugoslovenskom kontekstu kao kljucnom podtekstu ovde iznetog argumenta. Takvo dalje istrazivanje bi nam omogucilo jasniju periodizaciju i kontekstualizaciju promena u javnom gerontoloshkom sistemu nakon razgradnje socijalisticke drzave, imajuci u vidu da je socijalisticka drzava gracanima sistematski oduzimala zaracena sredstva, koja dakle nisu mogli da ulazu u penzione i osiguravajuce fondove, istodobno im stvarajuci zavisnost od dugorocno ekonomski neodrzivog javnog sistema socijalne zashtite, s katastrofalnim posledicama po pojedinacne sudbine, posebno onih gracana koji nisu uspeli da izgrade mreze socijalne podrshke tokom tranzicijskih godina. U tom smislu, bilo bi ne samo akademski interesantno vec i drushtveno korisno kada bi autorka preciznije decnisala procese koje pominje, imenovala aktere nedostajucih reformi koje priziva i uskladila tip analize sa zakljuckom koji nudi, imajuci u vidu to da se zakljucci - isuvishe opshti i veoma polemicki plodni - nedokumentovano nadovezuju na prethodno iznetu analizu. Autorka nije dokazala, vec podrazumeva, da je sistem socijalne zashtite, a posebno gerontoloshki, u bivshoj Jugoslaviji i Bosni posebno a) bio funkcionalan i b) da je bilo kakav slican sistem u savremenoj Bosni odrziv.

Claak predstavlja doprinos shirenju debate o sociokulturnim posledicama, ukljucujuci i ekonomske i pravne, konceptualizacije uloge drzave u zivotu pojedinca, kakva nam je u postjugoslovenskim etnologijama/antropologijama neophodna, posebno imajuci u vidu sklonost antropologa da pristupaju neokolektivistickim antiliberalnim pokretima za koje, istorija nas uci, znamo da po pravilu provociraju fashizam u nashim drushtvima i mogu predstavljati vajmarovski uvod u nove ratove, pljackashku redistribuciju privatne imovine i unishtavanje javnog u ime kolektivnog. Upravo brkanje javnog i kolektivnog, prisutno i u ovom claku, predlazem za dalju polemiku ukoliko se za nju ukaze prilika.

15 Drushtveni zivot pojma "liberal, liberalno" mogao bi biti ne samo prilika za antropolshku polemiku vec i za multilateralni projekat, imajuci u vidu znacaj sociokulturne promene nastale promenom politickog i ekonomskog urecenja ex-Yu drzava i drushtava tokom decenija za nama. Ovde ga koristim u njegovom izvornom znacenju - poshtovanje individualnih sloboda - a ne u njegovom prevashodno americkom znacenju ("socijalizam") ili pretezno balkanskom znacenju ("antisocijalizam").

16 Ovo se, podrazumeva se, ne odnosi na situacije u kojima su zrtve rata bile prinucene da obezbede golu egzistenciju i, samim tim, nisu ni mogle da brinu unapred o kvalitetu zivota u starosti. Izuzev osoba koje su bile neposredno izlozene ratnim dejstvima,u claku iznet argument se odnosi na sve osobe koje su poslednjih decenija zivele u nashim drushtvima i to je problem na koji ovde ukazujem. Argument, iznet u ovom claku, ne odnosi se na sve nas i ne moze se koristiti kao osnova za razumevanje/opravdanje bilo cije pozicije osim pozicije osoba koje su neposredne ratne zrtve.

Sonja Podgorelec

Institut za migracije i narodnosti, Zagreb

"Dom bi nam trebao, ali bi bilo ruzno dati roditelja u dom, sramota!" Formalna i neformalna skrb za starije u Hrvatskoj

Od kraja 20. i u prvim desetljecima 21. stoljeca, promatramo li europski prostor, sve je prisutnija nesigurnost po pitanju toga kako se nositi s drushtvenim i ekonomskim promjenama koje slijede iz sve zrelije demografske strukture drushtva. Uz ubrzano starenje stanovnishtva, sve veci broj starijih koji (sve duze) zive sami i u starosti trebaju tucu pomoc, znanstvena pozornost usmjerena je na (ekonomski) odrzive i (drushtveno) potrebne vrste i modalitete skrbi. Znanstvenici pokushavaju odgovoriti na pitanja postaju li brojni stariji ljudi (pre)tezak teret suvremenoj obitelj (josh uvijek glavnom nositelju neformalne skrbi) i ekonomski sve ceshce nedovoljno jakoj drzavi (nositelju formalnih oblika skrbi) (Sundström i Johansson 2005; Podgorelec i Klempic 2007). Mijenjaju li se, pritom, ocekivanja drushtva od pojedinih claova obitelji, prije svega zene kao glavnog pruzatelja skrbi (s obzirom na njezinu radnu karijeru), odnosno razina mecugeneracijske solidarnosti claova? Mijenjaju li se ocekivanja starijih o tome tko bi trebao biti glavni pruzatelj skrbi? Sto za kvalitetu zivota starijih znaci sve veca komercijalizacija skrbi?

Usporedbe podataka triju zadnjih popisa stanovnishtva pokazuju "da stanovnishtvo Hrvatske obiljezavaju brzo starenje i visoki stupanj ostarjelosti" (Nejashmic i Toskic 2013: 92), odnosno prema prosjecnoj dobi stanovnishtva koja je iznosila 41,7 godina (2011) Hrvatska "spada u red europskih zemalja s najvecom ostarjeloshcu populacije" (Zivic, Turk i Pokos 2014: 248). Rast udjela stanovnika starih 65 i vishe godina, uz povecanje udjela skupine starijih starih ljudi (80 i stariji), mecu kojima je i najveci broj bolesnih i potrebnih tuce njege i skrbi, predstavlja veliki izazov za sustav zdravstva, socijalne skrbi i mirovinski sustav zemlje, posebice u ruralnim podrucjima u kojima je razina institucionalne i izvaninstitucionalne skrbi daleko manje razvijena u odnosu na urbane dijelove zemlje.

Komentar na raspravu Azre Hromadzic o "krizi skrbi" za starije u Bosni i Hercegovini u drugom desetljecu 2000-ih, zamishljen je kao svojevrsna nadopuna tema u kojima autorica spominje neke probleme i podatke vezane uz skrb o starima u Hrvatskoj. Tocnije, na temelju istrazivanja provedenih uglavnom u ruralnim prostorima Hrvatske, pokushat cemo podastrijeti neke uzorke skrbi za starije u Hrvatskoj i naznaciti pocetak promjena u ocekivanjima potencijalnih primatelja prema pruzateljima skrbi.

Migracije - ogranicavajuci uvjet pruzateljima neformalne skrbi

Stanovnishtvo Bosne i Hercegovine te Hrvatske, bez obzira na to o kojoj je generaciji rijec, mladima ili starima, dijele posljedice razdoblja zajednicke povijesti koja je znacajno utjecala na nacin njihova zivota danas. Za vecinu pojedinaca (obitelji) posljedice su, prije svega, razne vrste gubitaka koje se ogledaju u padu ekonomskog statusa (nerijetko i siromashtvu), promjeni kvalitete drushtvenih mreza (uglavnom njihovom suzavanju) i promjeni drushtvenih normi i temeljnih vrijednosti (na razini drzave, lokalne zajednice i obitelji). S obzirom na razinu tempa starenja jednog ili drugog drushtva, probleme vezane uz nacin zivota suvremene obitelji i uzroke promjena odnosa zajednice i drzave prema skrbi o starijima nuzno je promatrati i u kontekstu migracija. Naime, znatan dio stanovnishtva u radno-aktivnoj dobi (posebice od kraja 1960-ih) sudjelovao je u migracijama potaknutim najceshce ekonomskim razlozima, koje su u posljednjih 25 godina osnazene brojnim dobrovoljnim i/ili prisilnim seljenjima ciji su uzroci, prije svega, raspad zajednicke drzave i rat (1990-ih) vocen na teritorijima obiju zemalja te politicke, gospodarske i drushtvene posljedice ratnih razaranja, zlocina nad stanovnishtvom i razni oblici (najceshce gospodarskog) kriminala. Svi navedeni razlozi jasno se ocitavaju u izmijenjenim uvjetima skrbi za starije u obje drzave.

Javne politike u Hrvatskoj sklone su probleme vezane uz starenje drushtva i skrb o starijima potrebnima tuce pomoci i njege maskirati izjednacavanjem problema s (pre)velikim brojem umirovljenika u odnosu na broj zaposlenih, koji predstavlja nepremostiv materijalni teret za ekonomiju drushtva u krizi. Mecu umirovljenicima, kao i u drugim tranzicijskim drzavama na prostoru bivshe SFR Jugoslavije, veliki je dio onih koji su s trzishta rada izishli daleko prije dobne granice za starosno umirovljenje (60 ili 65 godina), dakle prije prelaska praga iz razdoblja kasne zrelosti u razdoblje mlade starosti. Uzrok gomilanja (i mladih) umirovljenika posljedica je, u prvom redu, prijelaza iz planske u trzishnu ekonomiju i pretvorbe vlasnishtva koja je tu promjenu pratila, zatim rat i njegove posljedice te vishedesetljetna pogreshna gospodarska politika.

Hromadzic, uz raspravu o aspektima (nedovoljne) prisutnosti drzave u skrbi za stare i nemocne, vec samim naslovom rada, "A gdje su oni bili dosad?", naznacuje tezinu posljedica transformacije bosansko-hercegovackog drushtva, posebice na razini odnosa unutar obitelji. Obitelj i lokalna zajednica i u Bosni i Hercegovini i u Hrvatskoj od 1990-ih do danas bile su i josh su uvijek izlozene raznim vrstama uglavnom negativnih pritisaka. Primjerice, (ne)mogucnost zaposhljavanja, odnosno gubitak velikog broja radnih mjesta i visoka nezaposlenost pretezno mladih (uzrok znatnog osiromashenja velikog dijela stanovnishtva u obje zemlje), promjena strukture obitelji koja je glavni pruzatelj skrbi svojim claovima (sve manji broj djece, a sve vishe ostarjelih), znacajno iseljavanje mladih, posebice iz ruralnih podrucja, a s ulaskom Hrvatske u Europsku uniju (omogucavanjem zaposhljavanja hrvatskim gracanima u nekim drzavama EU) sve znacajnije iseljavanje i iz urbanih dijelova zemlje. Iskustvo seljenja utjece na promjenu nacina zivota claova obitelji koji u migraciji sudjeluju, ali i na ocekivanja onih, najceshce starijih, koji ostaju. Promatramo li Hrvatsku u kontekstu ratnih raseljavanja, dio stanovnishtva, i Hrvata i Srba, nije se nakon mirne reintegracije, odnosno infrastrukturne i stambene obnove porushenih objekata vratio u Hrvatsku. "Dugotrajnost prognanishtva i izbjeglishtva ucinila je da se dio (...) posebice mladih stanovnika prilagodio zivotu u novoj sredini i ne zeli se vratiti" (Klempic Bogadi i Lajic 2014: 448). Dakle, u vecem broju vratili su se uglavnom stariji pa istrazivanja potvrcuju da je "cak 30 posto povratnicke populacije [je] starije od 65 godina", a s obzirom na kvalitetu zivota [i mogucnost dobivanja bilo kojeg oblika neformalne pomoci] posebice su ugrozena brojna staracka samacka kucanstva cija je prosjecna starost 70 godina (Mesic i Bagic 2011: 85-87). Znatan dio povratnika vratio se u nerazvijena, periferna ruralna podrucja, u kojima je nedovoljno razvijena zdravstvena zashtita i gdje uglavnom nedostaju svi oblici formalne skrbi.

Organizacija formalne skrbi - prisutnost drzave

Hromadzic navodi da je Hrvatska u bivshoj drzavi imala najshiru mrezu institucionalne skrbi za starije gracane. Sto se dogaca s tim sustavom danas? Prema podacima Ministarstva socijalnog rada i mladih za 2015. institucijski smjeshtaj starih gracana Hrvatske organiziran je u okviru 226 ustanova za starije i nemocne (drzavni i zupanijski domovi te sve veci broj domova drugih osnivaca i pravnih osoba koje pruzaju smjeshtaj bez osnivanja doma: udruge, vjerske zajednice i dr.). U domovima za starije i nemocne smjeshteno je 17 53617 starijih osoba. Usporecujuci brojke s podacima od prije deset godina18 biljezi se kontinuirano shirenje mreze institucionalne skrbi (posebice broj komercijalnih vrsta smjeshtaja) kao i rast broja (udjela)19 starijih gracana smjeshtenih u domove za starije i nemocne. Uz institucionalnu pokrivenost, podjednako je vazna, i to posebice za ruralne sredine, organizacija izvaninstitucijskih oblika skrbi pa je tako prema podacima za 2015. godinu 5 65520 starijih i nemocnih osoba smjeshteno u obiteljske domove i udomiteljske obitelji.

Meðugeneracijska solidarnost - prisutnost clanova obitelji

Za starije ljude u ruralnim podrucjima u kojima se visoka razina aktivnosti zadrzava do u duboku starost21 (Podgorelec 2008; Podgorelec i Klempic Bogadi 2013; Klempic Bogadi in Podgorelec 2014) i u kojima su josh uvijek glavna ocekivanja stanovnishtva da ce, kada za to doce vrijeme, skrb o ostarjelom clau obitelji preuzeti na prvom mjestu bracni partner, a onda djeca (od kojih je najveci broj odselio i zivi u drugim dijelovima Hrvatske ili u inozemstvu) ili neki drugi blizi cla obitelji, od iznimne je vaznosti osiguranje pomoci i njege u domovima22 starijih osoba. Izuzetno su se ucinkovitim pokazali razni izvaninstitucijski programi poput "Pomoci u kuci starijim osobama" i "Dnevni boravak i pomoc u kuci starijim osobama", kojima je obuhvaceno josh 15 550 starijih osoba, i to vecinom u ruralnim, nerijetko izoliranim i snazno depopuliranim podrucjima Hrvatske. Jedan od takvih programa provodi se zaposhljavanjem gerontodomacica koje svakodnevno obilaze domove starijih i nemocnih stanovnika. Ogledni program provodi(o) se na malim shibenskim otocima, a njime su obuhvacene vecinom starije osobe u samackim kucanstvima, teze bolesne i funkcionalno slabije sposobne, u visokoj starosnoj dobi, bez djece ili s odseljenom djecom (Podgorelec i Klempic Bogadi 2013). Ocjena je djelatnika shibenskog Centra za pomoc i njegu da je u posljednjih shest godina vecina starijih kojima su pruzane usluge u okviru njihova doma, ostala zivjeti na otocima do visoke dobi (prosjek izmecu 75 i 80 godina), duze funkcionalno sposobni i samostalni nego osobe iste dobi u gradu.

Ocekivanja (potencijalnih) primatelja skrbi

Utjecu li navedene drushtvene promjene na stavove potencijalnih primatelja, ali i pruzatelja skrbi? Postupna promjena u ocekivanjima o tome tko bi, uz obitelj, trebao biti aktivan nositelj skrbi u starosti odraz je promjene u zivotnom stilu novih generacija. Posebice kada je rijec o ruralnim prostorima, koji su bili izlozeni ratnim razaranjima ili perifernim prostorima malih hrvatskih otoka, teshka gospodarska situacija, materijalno osiromashenje stanovnishtva, nedovoljan broj institucija za socijalnu i zdravstvenu skrb za stare i nemocne te neadekvatna (ili nepostojeca) organizacija izvaninstitucijske skrbi josh uvijek iziskuju jaku mecugeneracijsku solidarnost roditelja i djece (Podgorelec 2008; Knodel et al. 2010; Heylen 2010; Klempic Bogadi i Podgorelec 2011). Jedan od sugovornika (M, 75), razmishljajuci o potencijalnoj nemoci, kaze: "Bojim li se starosti? Racunam na djecu, nadam se. Sretan sam shto ih imam!"

Medugeneracijska potpora izrazava se uzajamnim djelovanjem, ljubavlju ili pomoci u obliku novca i usluga. Dio ispitanika u srednjoj i starijoj zrelosti i dalje osjeca da je odgovornost za skrb o ostarjelim roditeljima iskljucivo njihova, zbog cega su se pojedinci odlucili i prije umirovljenja u gradovima (u koje su odselili zbog shkolovanja i/ili zaposlenja) vratiti u svoja mjesta (na otocima) kako bi skrbili za roditelje (Podgorelec i Klempic Bogadi 2013).

I dok mladi claovi obitelji (odrasla djeca) sve cesce prihvacaju mogucnost da bi se u pomoc, njegu i skrb, kada je oni ne mogu23 (ili ne bi mogli) pruziti, djelomice ukljuila i drzava (institucije), stariji i dalje skrb uglavnom ocekuju od claova neposredne obitelji pa tako sugovornici navode: "Nekada su se u obitelji brinuli za starije, a danas, sramota, za tebe bi se trebao brinuti stranac u nekom domu" (M, 82 g.) ili "[Nekada] nije nam trebao dom jer je bila mladost koja je sa starim svitom zivila" (Z, 87). Pomoc se ocekuje na prvom mjestu od bracnih partnera i odrasle djece, a potom drugih claova obitelji, prijatelja i susjeda (Sundström i Johansson 2005; Podgorelec 2008). Ipak, nacin zivota sve veceg broja starijih koji zive sami, a djeca im ne zive u blizini, dovodi do postupne promjene stavova prema ocekivanjima o tome tko sve treba biti pruzatelj skrbi, pri cemu institucijski smjeshtaj ili neki oblik izvaninstitucijske skrbi postaje prihvatljiviji nego nekada:

Ima puno starih ljudi. Al nema niko a da se neko o njemu ne brine. Ako bash su stari, onda imaju starosni dom tamo, ki nima nikoga. Je starih, ma nema nezbrinutih, kako bih rekla. (Z, 86)

Najprije sam zadovoljan shto me dragi bog cuva da sam josh zdrav. I sutra, pazite, padnesh u krevet, ko ce te? Djeca su daleko! (M, 77)

Najbolje je, "aj, dome, domicu", kako ono se rece, poslovica, najlepshe je doma ako je moguce. Ali mi ni moguce doma bit. Nima ni suseda, ni ni sh, a shta cu sama doma? (Z , 94)

Danashnji mladi stari zamjecuju postupnu promjenu ocekivanja prema institucijskoj skrbi u odnosu na raniju generaciju navodeci:

Ljudi na dom gledaju kao na zadnju postaju u zivotu. Ali ja mislim da to ne bi trebalo tako gledat, nego trebalo bi biti sretan da mozesh kao covjek umrijeti... to je prije bila sramota, a sad je manje nego prije. Bolje da je tamo na sigurnom, bimo rekli, nego da je doma i da mu se dogodi neshto. Jer danas kad mladih nema, nema ko... Ne znam, moja je mama uvijek govorila: "Valjda me necete stavit u staracki dom." Ta generacija nije to prihvacala. (Z , 6 7 )

Umjesto zakljucka

Neformalna skrb i dalje je glavni oblik skrbi za starije stanovnishtvo Hrvatske. Samacka kucanstva sve su ceshca u ruralnim podrucjima Hrvatske, koja su i najslabije pokrivena formalnim oblicima skrbi za starije. Za starije osobe koje zive same i koje nemaju u blizini nekog claa obitelji koji bi im mogao pruziti podrshku i pomoc kada je zatrebaju, najprihvatljivija formalna vrsta pomoci ili skrbi je ona koju mogu dobiti unutar svoga doma. Djeca, s jedne strane, koja su, uz bracne partnere, i dalje glavni pruzatelji skrbi, ali i njihovi ostarjeli roditelji, zele imati mogucnost izbora dobivanja pomoci u nekom obliku organizirane (formalne) skrbi od strane drzave, kojoj zbog ekonomske slabosti osiguravanje takve skrbi sve ceshce predstavlja problem.

17 Sto cini 2,31% ukupne populacije starijih i nemocnih osoba.

18 Prema podacima Ministarstva zdravstva i socijalne skrbi, krajem 2006. u domovima za stare i nemocne bilo je smjeshteno 12 233 starijih osoba ili 1,8% stanovnishtva u dobi od 65 i vishe godina.

19 Povecanje udjela je josh znacajnije ako se uzme u obzir starenje ukupnog stanovnishtva.

20 Ili 0,75% ukupne populacije starijih, shto s onima smjeshtenima u domove za starije i nemocne cini preko 3% ukupne starije populacije.

21 Sto nerijetko dovodi do potrebe za tucom njegom i skrbi sve kasnije u zivotu pojedinca i ta skrb traje krace nego nekada (Sundström i Johansson 2005).

22 Organiziranu pomoc i njegu, prema podacima za 2015., u okviru svojih domova dobiva ukupno 5 083 starijih gracana Hrvatske.

23 Mnogi su odselili iz svojih sela i malih mjesta, kao i u primjeru Zemke i njezine obitelji. Ovdje nam nije u prvom planu razlog seljenja, premda nije zanemariv, vec cinjenica da stariji sve ceshce ostaju sami.

Tihana Rubic24

Odsjek za etnologiju i kulturnu antropologiju, Filozofski fakultet Sveucilista u Zagrebu

Zeljka Petrovic Osmak

Etnografski muzej, Zagreb

Napustanje i/ili povezanost: promisljanje srodstva, starenja i transformacija

Azra Hromadzic u svojemu tekstu na osnovi etnografskoga primjera vrshi analizu i interpretaciju. Okosnica je kratka, ali etnografski bogata obiteljska situacija u kojoj osamdesetogodishnja starica, udovica i majka cetvoro djece, triju odraslih zivucih kceri i jednoga, u zadnjemu ratu u Bosni, smrtno stradaloga sina, biva iz bolnickog lijecenja u teshkom zdravstvenom stanju premjeshtena u privatni dom umirovljenika u kojem, nekoliko dana po dolasku, umire. Po njezinoj smrti kceri, koje od progonstva 1990-ih godina ne zive u Bosni, nego u Njemackoj, dolaze u dom umirovljenika i emocionalno uzavrelom raspravom iznose razocaranost i pogocenost bosanskim zdravstvenim sustavom koji je, nakon lijecnicke obrade u javnoj bolnici, staricu otpustio, nevoljko je zadrzavshi tek dan i niposhto duze.

Ta obiteljska situacija, zabiljezena promatranjem i razgovorom s protagonistima, relevantan je primjer za analizu i tumacenje obiteljskih, drushtvenih, politickih i socijalnih odnosa. Autorica govori o drushtvenim vrijednostima vezanim uz drzavu i obitelj kao institucijama brige za starije osobe, te o drushtvenim ocekivanjima koja se odrazavaju primjerice u komentaru upraviteljice privatnog doma za starije, upucenog istrazivacici, a koji se odnosio na claove obitelji preminule starice: "A gdje su oni bili dosad?" Ta prica pokazuje kako zivotna situacija moze biti pokretac posljedicnih prijepornih obiteljskih i drushtvenih odnosa. Ilustrativan je etnografski primjer jer sadrzava intimne i slojevite podatke o mishljenjima, postupcima i vrijednostima.

Starenje - kao iskustvo i kao koncept - je nedovoljno etnoloshki i kulturnoantropoloshki istrazeno i problematizirano. Smatramo kako nema univerzalnoga iskustva starenja, premda postoje odrecene "opce" transformacije vezane uz stariju generaciju na shirem planu: npr. suvremeni demografski i socijalnopoliticki izazovi poput starenja populacije ili produzenoga zivotnog vijeka, krize socijalne sigurnosti te "klasicnih" mirovinskih i obiteljskih sustava. Tu su i razni regionalni izazovi sve veceg broja starijih ljudi koji zive sami (npr. odnedavna vrlo izrazen problem u Kini), kao i (npr. u Sjedinjenim Americkim Drzavama) postojanje moralno problematicnih politika raspodjele zdravstvenih resursa eksplicitno na osnovi dobi (pri cemu su starije osobe na gubitku) itd.

U smislu vaznosti promishljanja svih tih i drugih procesa vezanih uz starenje, prilog Azre Hromadzic smatramo etnografski iznimno relevantnim. Mecutim, u nastavku nasheg komentara ukazujemo i na odrecene problematicne tocke u analizi i interpretaciji.

Etnoloshka i kulturnoantropoloshka tumacenja koja se formiraju na razini primjera, nerijetko mogu skliznuti u "zamku" kada se interpretacija temeljena na anegdotalnom primjeru postavlja na shiru razinu. Autorica u svom radu, kako istice u uvodnom dijelu, promatra i problematizira brigu za starije osobe u ratnoj i poratnoj Bosni i Hercegovini. U dijakronijskoj perspektivi tumacenja i podaci odnose se na socijalisticko, postsocijalisticko i suvremeno razdoblje, a u jednom se dijelu rada autorica dotice i predsocijalistickoga doba - tumaceci karakteristike institucije "tradicijske" obitelji, njezinih unutarnjih odnosa i vrijednosti.

Suprotstavljajuci temeljno dva razdoblja - socijalisticko - kada je formalno-institucionalna briga za starije osobe, prema autorici, postojala, te postsocijalisticko, ratno i poratno - kada ti raniji obrasci brige, prema autorici, dozivljavaju krizu i postupno ishcezavaju, autorica etnografsku pricu koja je okosnica njezina rada tumaci na nacin da je i "sudbina" te starice u postsocijalistickom i poslijeratnom kontekstu, takva kakva jest, bila neminovna. Rijecju, da je direktan odraz tijekova degradacije formalno-institucijskih, ali i obiteljskih vidova skrbi i podrshke, uzrokovane ponajvishe oshtrim rezom koji je ucinio rat devedesetih godina 20. stoljeca, raselivshi obitelji i rastrgavshi (neposredne, czicke) veze: "zbog ratom uzrokovanog izbjeglishtva, mnoge obitelji nisu mogle ispuniti ta ocekivanja o 'skrbi iz blizine', shto je rezultiralo velikim pomacima u poslijeratnim i postsocijalistickim shvacanjima skrbi..." (Hromadzic, u ovom broju).

Premda nam se ta teza moze uciniti bliskom, ona zahtjeva kompleksnije propitivanje makroprocesa, izmecu ostalih onih koji su se odvijali tijekom 20. stoljeca na planu socijalne sigurnosti - one koju je pruzala Drzava, i one koju je pruzala obitelj - te njihova mecusobnog odnosa. Skrb za starije u socijalizmu i skrb za starije u postsocijalistickom/poslijeratnom razdoblju donose se kao dva dijametralno razlicita okvira u tekstu te se polazi od cinjenice da ih ukupno odlikuje diskontinuitet. Rat je nesumnjivo donio rezove, promjene i stradanja. Numericki pokazatelji to dodatno potvrcuju - procjenjuje se da je u posljednjem ratu na teritoriju Bosne i Hercegovine izgubljeno "oko 100.000 ljudi, a oko 2.700.000 je prognano" (Grbic Jakopovic 2011: 317-318). U mnogim je europskim zemljama tih godina izrazen upravo takav val emigracija, prognanika i izbjeglica iz Bosne, pa tako, primjerice, cnska antropologinja Laura Hucunen pishe o transformacijama na planu drushtvene i etnicke strukture u Finskoj devedesetih godina 20. stoljeca, cime pokazuje razmjere useljavanja uslijed ratnih okolnosti devedesetih godina u tu zemlju: "Gotovo svi Bosanci u Finskoj stigli su kao izbjeglice tijekom ili neposredno nakon rata u Bosni i vecinom su Bosanci Muslimani/Boshnjaci ili mijeshanoga podrijetla" (Hucunen 2008: 236). Ratni sukob u zemljama bivshe Jugoslavije stvorio je okruzenje koje "proizvodi maksimalnu nesigurnost pripadnika svih dobnih skupina" (Podgorelec 2008: 31).

Medutim, osim diskontinuiteta, postoje i kontinuiteti, jer ljudi nisu "preko noci" na svim razinama 1990-ih godina poceli zivjeti prema novom modelu. Naime, Bosna i Hercegovina je, poput ostalih zemalja regije, tradicionalno iseljenicka zemlja (capo i Jurcevic 2014: 18). Migracije (politicke, ekonomske...) kontinuum su njezinih i ratnih i mirnodopskih razdoblja. Uslijed migracija obiteljska bi zajednica iznova iznalazila mehanizme vlastitog odrzanja (ekonomskog, simbolickog i dr.) cak i tada kada ne bi dijelila isti czicki prostor. Moderna antropologija vec dugo poznaje koncept dislociranosti i transnacionalnih drushtvenih prostora - onih "koji nadrastaju jedno czicko mjesto i ostvaruju se u procesima suvremene migracije, izmijeshtanja i umijeshtanja" (capo i Gulin Zrnic 2011: 13; usp. Vuorela 2008). Ti se "prostori" interpretiraju prije kao prilagodba i transformacija, nego kao degradacija drushtvenih (mahom obiteljskih) veza i odnosa:

(t)emeljem transnacionalne paradigme istrazivaci pocinju promatrati migrante unutar transnacionalnih drushtvenih polja koja stvaraju izmecu i ponad mecudrzavnih granica odr zavajuci guste, vishestruke drushtvene odnose koji povezuju njihova drushtva, podrijetla i prijama (...) [Veze i odnosi] povezuju dva ili vishe prostora i ljude koji u njima zive, kao i od kruzenja stvari, novca i usluga izmecu tih dvaju prostora lociranih u dvije drzave (...).

Buduci da se ta intenzivna razmjena zbiva na razini obitelji i rodbinskih mreza te lokaliteta u kojima zive (...) [govorimo o] o paralelnim vishestrukim razinama socijalnih mreza. (capo i Jurcevic 2014: 24)

U okolnostima stalnih emigracija obitelji su izazove i promjene u strukturi obitelji, te dijelom i dezintegracije ("tradicijskih" odnosa), dozivljavale i prije zadnjega rata. Dezintegracija tradicionalnih institucija, primjerice trogeneracijskog domacinstva, kako uocava norveshka socijalna antropologinja Tone Bringa (2009: 49), odvijala se u Bosni i u desetljecima prije 1990ih godina, pa i u zemljama "zapadne demokracije" (usp. Podgorelec 2008: 31). Te procese biljezimo npr. i polovinom 1970-ih godina, otkada se "svakodnevni odnosi odvijaju (...) s vishim stupnjem otvorenosti i nesigurnosti" (Podgorelec 2008: 31). U tom smislu, istaknuta sadrzajna distinkcija socijalizam-postsocijalizam, prijeratni i poslijeratni kontekst, tek je jedan od mogucih aspekata duboke kompleksnosti (transformacija i opstojnosti) drushtvenih (napose obiteljskih) odnosa.

S druge strane, unatoc uvrijezenom poimanju socijalistickoga razdoblja kao razdoblja socijalne "sigurnosti", imamo tek uzi okvir, 1950-e i 1960-e godine, koji bismo mogli nazvati "zlatnim dobom" (Grandits 2010: 25) "sigurnosti" - drzave blagostanja - i to u shirem, europskom, kontekstu (ibid.). Primjerice, od toga razdoblja do danas traje proces destabilizacije socijalne drzave i drzave blagostanja, koji se dodatno ubrzao od kraja 1980-ih godina, narocito u zemljama s intenzivnim politicko-ekonomskim restrukturiranjem, na prijelazu iz socijalizma u novi ekonomsko-politicki sustav. Zelimo istaknuti da cak ni u spomenutom "zlatnom dobu" sektori poput stambenog, zdravstvenog, industrijskog, socijalnog i dr. na prakticnoj, izvedbenoj razini, nisu korelirali diskursu: unatoc ideologiji i teznji, resursi su uvijek bili skromni i limitirani. Dakle, dio u kojemu Hromadzic govori o ranijoj zbrinutosti, sigurnosti i drzavi koja brine o svojim stanovnicima, poput "velikog oca", ticao bi se ipak vishe diskursa, nego same prakse pa nam se cini da je i razlika izmecu dvaju supostavljenih razdoblja u tekstu predimenzionirana. Konacno, obitelj je u tom kontekstu, posljedicno, uvijek prisutna kao izvor podrshke, brige i pomoci (socijalne sigurnosti), "emocionalno uvjetovana i drushtveno utemeljena skrb" kako u socijalizmu, tako i u postsocijalizmu (usp. Heady 2010; Grandits 2010; Rubic i Leutloc 2015), ali uvijek dakako i sa svojim unutarnjim nesuglasjima i izazovima.

Zeljeli bismo kratko komentirati i svoja ocekivanja iz autoricine najave u sazetku teksta, koja su nas zaintrigirala te koja indiciraju i neka nasha istrazivanja (npr. Rubic 2012), kako ce u radu biti kritickih osvrta i pozicioniranja prema pojmu "obicnih ljudi", kako Hromadzic najavljuje: "Termin cobicni ljudi' u ovome radu koristim s posebnim oprezom. (...) csvakodnevno' je mjesto na kojem se politika odvija na dubokoj razini." Smatramo kako su "obicni ljudi" prije svega (uvrijezena) diskurzivna kategorija u kolektivnim predodzbama i naracijama, i da nose implicitna znacenja i potencijal politizacije. Mecutim, u tekstu nismo detektirale najavljeni kriticki odmak, vec autoricinu uporabu problematicnih pojmova poput: "vecina ljudi", "obicni ljudi", "obicni Bosanci".

Ukoliko postoje ambicije da se stvari tumace na shiroj razini od obiteljskih odnosa, a u tekstu postoje, tada je jedan obiteljski primjer, tj. suvremeni i recentni isjecci obiteljskoga zivota, ipak nedovoljno ekstenzivan i trazi dodatna i shira etnografska istrazivanja i drugih obiteljskih i pojedinacnih prica, kojima bi se pri analizi i interpretaciji direktno nadishla anegdotalna razina. Analizirati jedan primjer je posve legitiman metodoloshki postupak, ali zahtjeva ekstenzivniji studijski i arhivski rad (usp. Vuorela 2008). Imajuci u vidu kompleksnost tema koje se u radu nastoje zahvatiti te autoricinu pretenziju tumacenja procesa i dogacaja shirih od obiteljskoga primjera, cini nam se da tako postavljen interpretativni i analiticki cilj zahtjeva i dodatan etnografski ili studijski materijal.

Rad bi, mishljenja smo, sadrzajno obogatila naznaka, pa i problematiziranje, izazova vlastite emske/etske istrazivacke pozicije u bavljenju "vlastitim" nacionalnim drushtvenim, kulturnim, ekonomskim i politickim okruzenjem kao istrazivackim "terenom". Na kojim razinama je ta pozicija etska, a na kojima emska? Prisjetimo se Claude Lévi-Straussovih opservacija o vlastitoj istrazivackoj poziciji u Francuskoj pedesetih godina 20. stoljeca kada svjedoci, zajedno sa svojim sugracanima - suvremenicima dogacanju javnoga pogubljenja Djeda Mraza 1952. godine u Dijonu, dogacanju koje utjelovljuje politicko-religijsko-ritualne i konzumeristicko-modernizacijske prijepore ondashnjega francuskog drushtva. Lévi-Strauss pishe:

(...) cinjenice koje se odvijaju pred nashim ocima i kojima je teatar nashe drushtvo u isti je mah lak she i teze rasucivati. Lakshe zbog toga shto je ocuvan kontinuitet iskustva, sa svim njegovim momentima i njihovim nijansama i teze zato shto u takvim i vrlo rijetkim prilikama uocavamo krajnju slozenost drushtvenih preobrazbi, cak i onih najusmjerenijih; i zato shto su prividni razlozi koje pripisujemo dogacajima ciji smo akteri vrlo razliciti od stvarnih uzroka koji nam u tim dogacajima pridaju odrecenu ulogu. (Lévi-Strauss 2014: 15)

Na slican nacin, analiticki i interpretativno, u prezentaciji materijala oprezno, pristupa i Tone Bringa baveci se religijskim identitetom muslimana u Bosni i Hercegovini osamdesetih godina 20. stoljeca. Ona studiju uvodno eksplicitno pozicionira kao jednu od mogucih prica te tu poziciju dosljedno provodi kroz tekst koji citamo u knjizi nedavno objavljenoj i prevedenoj na bosanski jezik:

(o)vo je prica o zivotima nekih od (...) ljudi, i nekim aspektima zajednice u kojoj su ziv jeli. Buduc i da se desila u jednom naroc itom povijesnom trenutku, ona je usredotocena na zivote nekoliko izrazitih predstavnika jedne speciccne seoske zajednice u tom vremenu. Ona ne tezi da bude pripovijest o svemu shto jeste Bosna i njen narod, ali jeste detaljna studija jedne share na bosanskom cilimu. (Bringa 2009: 3)

24 Tihana Rubic istrazivanje je provela u okviru projekta "City-making: space, culture, and identity / Stvaranje grada: prostor, kultura i identitet", koji cnancira Hrvatska zaklada za znanost (br. 2350).

Paul Stubbs

Ekonomski institut, Zagreb

Starenje, transformacije i mnogostruke krize skrbi u Bosni i Hercegovini

Skica iz zivota i smrti gospo2e Zemke, koju nam predstavlja autorica Azra Hromadzic, vazna je, potresna i tragi.na i iznimno nam mnogo govori o mnogostrukim krizama skrbi, socijalnoj pomoci i starenju u suvremenoj Bosni i Hercegovini. Autori.ino tuma.enje onoga sto naziva "polu-odsutnostima" i obitelji i drzave u kontekstu poslijeratnih i postkomunisti.kih tranzicija, omogucava joj da otkrije obrasce, procese i prakse koji gotovo potpuno nedostaju u bogatoj znanstvenoj literaturi posvecenoj Bosni i Hercegovini, koja je kruto usmjerena na "etno-nacionalizam". Njen tekst otkriva mnogo vise od "pogleda odozgo ili pogleda od nikud" unutar vrlo skromne literature o socijalnoj politici i socijalnoj zastiti u toj zemlji. Ne radi se samo o tome da "skrb koja je nekom dostupna jos uvelike ovisi o tome gdje osoba zivi" (Maglajlic Holicek i Rasidagic 2007: 163) u suvremenoj Bosni i Hercegovini, nego o tome da, kao sto je ovdje slucaj, bihacka Kantonalna bolnica, nakon sto je navodno "u.inila sve sto je mogla", smatra da ima potpuno pravo odgovornost prebaciti na Zemkinu obitelj, u vrlo kratkom vremenu, pri tom izazvavsi veliku krizu i, nesumnjivo, pridonijevsi Zemkinoj smrti.

Kriza skrbi o kojoj se raspravlja u tekstu ne desava se, naravno, samo u Bosni i Hercegovini. Demografsko starenje fenomen je koji zahvaca cijelu Europu i u mnogim zemljama vidljivi su u.inci triju zajednickih procesa: povecanog ocekivanja trajanja zivota, iako ne nuznoi godina dobrog zdravlja; niska reproduktivnost i sve manji broj novoro2enih; te znacajna emigracija radno sposobnog stanovnistva. Smanjenje broja stanovnistva se, dakle, .esto podudara sa sve vecim brojem stanovnistva ovisnog o tu2oj njezi, povecanjem broja i omjera osoba starijih od osamdeset godina, te povecanjem broja osoba koje godinama zive u uvjetima loseg zdravlja, nemoci, nepokretnosti i, zapravo, siromastva i drustvenog isklju.ivanja. Demografske promjene ugrozavaju odrzivost uobi.ajenih zdravstvenih sustava i sustava socijalne skrbi koji su bili bazirani na osiguranju jer su se oslanjali na pretpostavku da ce populacija radno sposobnog stanovnistva biti dovoljno brojna, da ce dovoljan broj zaposlenih raditi dovoljno dugo za dovoljno velike naknade i time osigurati davanja i povlastice za djecu i za starije osobe kao i za nezaposlene odrasle osobe i osobe s posebnim potrebama.

Promjene u strukturi obitelji, u o.ekivanjima me2ugeneracijskih prava i odgovornosti, te raseljavanje prosirenih obitelji na ponekad vrlo velike udaljenosti, jos su dodatno uvecali navedene izazove. Promjenjiva uloga drzave, sveobuhvatno restrukturiranje i opcenito raspadanje tzv. "drzava blagostanja", zajedno sa sve vecom ulogom dobrovoljnih, neprofitnih i privatnih sektora, tako2er su .imbenici koje treba uzeti u obzir. Ta restrukturiranja .esto reproduciraju starije ideje o podjelama na one koji "zasluzuju" i one koji "ne zasluzuju", te time namecu "moralizirajuce" i "otreznjujuce" osude onima koji se nisu bili u stanju brinuti za .lanove vlastite obitelji, sto sve tjera institucije javnog zdravstva i socijalne skrbi da donose teske odluke time da maksimaliziraju u.inke i smanje troskove.

Korisnici pomoci vise ne bi trebali biti "pasivni" primatelji naknada, vec se od njih o.ekuje da su "aktivni" na mnogim poljima. Oni koji dulje zive trebali bi dulje i raditi, putem "financijske pismenosti" trebali bi osigurati vlastitu financijsku dobrobit u poznijim godinama, a ne oslanjati se na unaprijed uplacene drzavne penzije te, ponajprije, putem "aktivnog starenja" trebalo bi im se omoguciti da "upravljaju svojim zivotom sto je dulje moguce".25 Nestajanje onoga sto Andrea Muehlebach naziva "kronotropnim djelovanjem drzave blagostanja" (Muehlebach 2012: 149) stvara nove podjele izme2u "aktivne trece dobi" i "pasivne" i zavisne "cetvrti dobi", kompleksnu krizu drzave i obitelji, koja je ovisna o rodu, a u kojoj "nije vise sasvim ocigledno tko se brine o kome, tko osigurava prihod, kako je on raspodijeljen po clanovima obitelji i je li i kako dugo djeca i stariji clanovi obitelji imaju pravo na obiteljske prihode za pomoc i podrsku" (ibid.: 150-151). Muehlebach, me2utim, smjesta upotrebu cinjenicnih "demografskih pretkazanja" unutar "politike uvjeravanja" kojoj je svrha "neutralizirati prijeporni proces i sprije.iti kritiku", slicno nekom obliku "bioloskog determinizma" (ibid.: 160).

Zapravo, nisu procesi oni koji su se razlikovali sami po sebi, vec su brzina promjena u kontekstu rata, prisilna migracija velikoga broja ljudi i etni.ka podloga ratnih sukoba bili faktori koji su utjecali na to da su prezivljavanje i ponovno stvaranje vlastitog sebstva kao i upravljanje intimnim obiteljskim i srodni.kim odnosima, naoko stalni, trajni prijepori u suvremenoj Bosni i Hercegovini. Tako2er je klju.an .imbenik i taj, na sto nam ukazuje Andreas Ho" , da starenje predstavlja sasvim razli.it drustveni izazov u zemljama koje su postale bogate prije nego sto su ostarjele u usporedbi sa zemljama, a to uklju.uje i Bosnu i Hercegovinu, koje su ostarjele, a da nikada nisu bile bogate (Ho" 2011).

U svom istrazivanju majki djece s posebnim potrebama u Bijeljini, u Bosni i Hercegovini, -arna Brkovic (2015) tvrdi da "zbunjujuca sfera socijalne zastite", sustava koji se dozivljava kao "pun pogresaka, nepredvidljiv i tajnovit", prisiljava majke da budu snalazljive, da mobiliziraju sve resurse koji su im dostupni, uklju.ujuci i moguce neformalne kontakte, samo kako bi svojoj djeci osigurale djelic onoga sto im uistinu treba. Kao i Zemkine kceri, majke iz etnogra fije autorice Brkovic oslanjaju se, cini se, na izgubljenu logiku socijalnog blagostanja kao prava i duznosti drzave, a suocene s opetovanim nametanjem logike socijalnog blagostanja kao onoga koje je ograniceno, diskrecijsko i kojem nedostaje samilosti. U slu.aju Zemkinih kceri, ta ocekivanja su strukturirana kroz prizmu sjecanja na socijalnu zastitu kakva je bila u socijalizmu, ali oblikovana novom "projektizacijom" skrbi i, najvaznije, onime sto se smatralo moralnom obvezom prema "obiteljima sehida".

Socijalna zashtita u Bosni i Hercegovini, josh kao dijelu socijalisticke Jugoslavije, kao shto pokazuje tekst autorice Hromadzic, bila je zamrsheni sustav pun paradoksa, iako su poboljshanja u dostupnosti i kvaliteti socijalne zashtite i zdravstvenog sustava neupitno bili vazni pokazatelji jugoslavenske modernosti. Sustav socijalne zashtite bio je, mecutim, poprilicno dualistican, u smislu urbanog i ruralnog stanovnishtva, te znacajno varijabilan u odnosu na klasu i, najvishe, u odnosu na rod. Uzasan rat koji se vodio tijekom 1990-ih je, mecutim, na neki nacin zasjenio i iskrivio percepcije o 1980-ima kada se, u mnogo dijelova socijalisticke Jugoslavije, ukljucujuci i Bosnu i Hercegovinu, siromashtvo ponovo vratilo i to prvi put u toj generaciji i vrlo loshe utjecalo na urbana domacinstva koja nisu imala nikakve veze sa zemljoradnjom niti su im stizale novcane poshiljke od claova obitelji koji su zivjeli u inozemstvu (usp. Archer, Duda i Stubbs 2015). Kako su zdravstveni sustav i sustav socijalne skrbi odgovorili na tu krizu iz 1980-ih, posebice kasnih 1980-ih kada je bilo i sve manje cnanciranja, kljucan je dio slagalice o kojem se zapravo rijetko govori.

Poslijeratna kriza skrbi u Bosni i Hercegovini, uvjetovana procesima "kompleksnog drushtvenog i politickog inzenjeringa" (Lendvai i Stubbs 2009: 681), ostaje i dalje vrlo nestabilna, promjenjiva, te ovisi o raznim okolnostima. Bosnu i Hercegovinu i dalje karakterizira pojava "jake povezanosti mecunarodne i domace sfere" (Pugh 2000), hibridnog i ceksibilnog "krcatog igralishta" (Arandarenko i Golcin 2007) punog novo stvorenih i rekonstruiranih aktera koji svi nastoje, na razlicite nacine, preobraziti kolonizirajuci i disciplinirajuci aparat "reformi", "modernizacije" i "razvoja" u svu silu manje ili vishe odrzivih programa i projekata (usp. Stubbs 2015), od kojih su mnogi, sami po sebi, vremenski ograniceni i u kontradikciji su, direktnoj ili indirektnoj, jedni s drugima. Taj vezani mecunarodno-domaci prostor predstavlja, na jedan nacin, zapravo josh jednu "polu-odsutnost", zajedno s onima obitelji ili drzave, iako poduprtu znacajnom biopolitickom moci, mnogostrukim i promjenjivim ideologijama, modalitetima i praksama pruzanja, osiguravanja i primanja skrbi koji su "zamrsheni, nepouzdani i privremeni" (Hromadzic u tisku 2016). Iako su mnogi od tih "projekata" vjerojatno manje ocigledno i neposredno nasilni kao shto je to bio slucaj s projektom shvicarske vlade iz kasnih 1990-ih, koja je gradila nove domove za starije koji su bili namijenjeni starijim osobama koje su se vratile u Bosnu i Hercegovinu nakon shto im je u Svicarskoj odobren privremeni status izbjeglica, svi ipak stvaraju nove nizove znacenja, nove hijerarhije moci i institucija, nove oblike ukljucivanja i iskljucivanja, nove poretke krivnje i vrline, nove marginalizacije, subordinacije i tishine (Clarke 2004). Oni su sredishnji za razumijevanje onoga shto Hromadzic naziva "istodobno lokalne, regionalne i transnacionalne koncguracije ljubavi, skrbi i napushtanja".

Upravo je zazivanje drzavnog "moralnog duga" obiteljima palih mucenika, shehidskim porodicama, ono shto najbolje pokazuje nesumjerljivosti, ili nepoklapanja, izmecu strukturalnih politickih ekonomija na makro razini i mikro razine svakodnevnog zivota. Jer i dalje se dogaca da, cak i u kontekstu neoliberalne discipliniranosti koja trazi da se javna potroshnja smanji, racionalizira i usmjeri na "najpotrebitije", oba entiteta u Bosni i Hercegovini josh troshe velike sume na ratne veterane i njihove obitelji, unutar mnogo shireg konteksta klijentistickih odnosa "drzavnog celicnog zagrljaja" i "institucionalnog partikularizma" u kojem vodece politicke stranke funkcioniraju kao "zashtitnicka mashinerija" koja dodjeljuje radna mjesta, gotov novac i skrb, te ostale usluge, u zamjenu za glasove (usp. Ferrera 2000; Stubbs i Zrinshcak 2015). Mecutim, ono shto se cesto zaboravlja u literaturi koja nudi "pogled odozgo" na klijentizam jest da taj prijelaz iz strukture u svakodnevni zivot nije automatski, vec da sam po sebi zahtijeva da se personalizirana politicka agenda "simbolicnih obecanja" (Iraolo i Grunenberg 2008: 3) ostvari u praksi. U nedostatku drushtvenih mreza ili "veza" koje su potrebne da bi moralni kapital obitelji mucenika pretvorile u ono shto bi se moglo nazvati kapitalom blagostanja ili skrbi, Zemkine kceri su prisiljene oslanjati se na pretragu interneta, privatni dom i dobru volju daljnjeg rocaka kako bi dobile tek minimum kratkotrajne zbrinutosti svoje majke. Sva moralna prava koja su mislile da imaju, a zbog cega njihov bijes prerasta u ideju da tuze drzavu, dovedena su u pitanje optuzbama da su same vrlo sebicno zapostavljale svoju majku dok nije bilo prekasno, cime su im izmakla sva "eticka gracanska prava" (Muehlebach 2012: 159) koja su mislile da imaju.

Cini se da je Zemkina prica, zapravo, sazetak svih loshih i niti jedne dobre strane starenja koje s pozicije zapadnjacke feministicke kritike promatra Lynne Segal (2013) u svojoj knjizi Out of Time. Ona naznacava potrebu za novim diskursom o starenju, odbacujuci pritom deterministicki diskurs tjelesnog propadanja i kognitivne korozije, a bez da upadne u zamku idealistickog narativa pomirenja, slobode, kreativnosti i ljepote, narativa "uspjeshnog starenja", koje jako vole isticati suvremeni "gurui zivotnog stila" i na koji se pozivaju i diskursi o "aktivnom starenju" kojima nas se poziva na odgovornost. Osobe koje stare se takocer, kako nas podsjeca Segal, razlikuju po rodu, klasi, etnicitetu, seksualnoj orijentaciji, mogucnostima i, mozda prije svega, zemljopisnom polozaju. "Polu-odsutnost" drzave i obitelji i Zemkina utjelovljena pozicioniranost u njenom tijelu, mjestu i vremenu, pretvara je u subjekta koji "loshe stari", koji treba skrb, pomoc i podrshku i kojem je premalo prekasno ponuceno i za cijenu koju si rijetki mogu priushtiti.

Tekst autorice Hromadzic ne bi trebalo promatrati samo kroz prizmu mogucih promjena u politici. U smislu konteksta skrbi za starije osobe u suvremenoj Bosni i Hercegovini, teshko je pronaci neshto vishe od pocetnih uvida u "ostale politike", buduce ili alternativne prakse koje bi mogle "staviti u pitanje dominantne politike (...) (i) otvoriti smislen prostor za prijepore, otpore i pozitivne alternative koje nisu samo razlicite, vec koje same mogu uciniti razliku" (Clarke, Bainton, Lendvai i Stubbs 2015: 196). Zemkina prica mnogo jasnije nego ostale ukazuje na potrebu za novim narativom socijalne pomoci, humanije etike skrbi koja se temelji na "mecuovisnosti, zajednishtvu i ljudskoj ranjivosti", te podize "drushtvene, ekonomske i politicke vrijednosti skrbi" (Williams 2014: 101), spashavajuci "solidarnost" od njene utopljenosti u "moralu" i "trzishtima" (Muehlebach 2012: 227-228), "cineci drushtvenu reprodukciju i skrb temeljima za analizu drushtvene promjene i globalne krize" (Williams 2014: 87), upucujuci na potrebu za mnogostrukim strategijama, projektima i politikama kako bi se nadishle navedene krize.

25 Web stranica Europske Komisije: h) p://ec.europa.eu/social/main.jsp?catId=1062andlangId=en.

O SVRT NA KOMENTARE

Azra Hromadzic

Na pocetku zelim zahvaliti urednicama shto su odabrale uistinu izvrsnu i raznorodnu skupinu diskutanata koji su komentirali moj claak. Komentari su im sadrzajni i poticajni te se mecusobno nalaze u jednom produktivnom nesuglasju. Moji odgovori na njihove ocjene su brojni, ali ovdje cu se usredotociti na tri velike teme: "odgovornost", "kontinuitet" i "metode".

Mnogo diskutanata se osvrnulo, na ovaj ili onaj nacin, na pitanje koje je zapravo temelj moga claka: tko bi trebao pruziti skrb (i kako)? Ocekivano, razliciti diskutanti nude sasvim razlicite odgovore na to pitanje i na izazove koje ono postavlja - od Stubbsa i Danelyja, koji su preporucili da ukljucim i dodatne "polu-odsutnosti" (mecunarodne zajednice, Zemke, nashu vlastitu...) i "polu-priznavanja"26 tom cijelom "kontekstu skrbi", pa do Milenkovica, koji je predlozio sasvim drugacije citanje/analizu glavnog fenomena kojim se claak bavi, vecinom kroz prizmu individualne odgovornosti. Mecutim, fokusiranje na Zemkinu individualnu odgovornost za vlastitu skrb, shto predlaze Milenkovic, bilo bi vrlo problematicno i prikrilo bi shiru - strukturnu, politicku i ekonomsku - situaciju i procese koji su se poslozili u uzrokovanju Zemkine individualne patnje,27 ali bi pokrenulo i ono shto me Stubbs, u svojem komentaru, molio da ne cinim:

Reproduciram starije ideje o podjelama na one koji "zasluzuju" i one koji "ne zasluzuju", te time namecem "moralizirajuce" i "otreznjujuce" osude onima koji se nisu bili u stanju brinuti za claove vlastite obitelji, shto sve tjera institucije javnog zdravstva i socijalne skrbi da donose teshke odluke i njima maksimaliziraju ucinke i smanje troshkove. Korisnici pomoci vishe ne bi trebali biti "pasivni" primatelji naknada, vec se od njih ocekuje da su "aktivni" na mnogim poljima.

Milenkovicev prijedlog da Zemka, kao i (svi) ostali na balkanskoj polu-periferiji, uzmu stvari u svoje (vlastite) ruke vrlo problematicno oslikava balkansko stanovni shtvo kao demokratski/liberalisticki nemushto, gotovo djecje neupuceno, te time samo internalizira i perpetuira balkanisticke diskurse.28 S druge strane, takva politika i politicki diskurs koji su temeljeni na raspodjeli prava stvorili bi zamrshen i potencijalno korumpirani sustav klasickacije koji bi decnirao tko su ti pojedinci koji su, kako Milenkovic kaze, bili neposredno izlozeni ratnim stradanjima, pa stoga i zasluzili drzavnu skrb. U zemlji u kojoj je, kako nas u ovom broju podsjecaju Rubic i Petrovic, 100 000 ljudi izgubilo zivote i 2 700 000 od 4 000 000 postalo izbjeglice ili protjerano, odvajanje onih koji su neposredno bili izlozeni ratu projekt je koji je unaprijed osucen na propast i koji bi ujedno negirao intersubjektivnu prirodu (ratnoga) iskustva. Umjesto da pokushavamo izbrisati ucinke czickog i strukturalnog nasilja na zivote ljudi u ime odgovornosti pojedinca, predlazem da pretpostavimo jednu inkluzivniju i "humaniju etiku skrbi koja se temelji na mecuovisnosti, zajednishtvu i ljudskoj ranjivosti" (Stubbs, u ovom broju). Takva etika skrbi objedinjavala bi ideale kao shto su pravda, jednakost i prava pojedinaca i principe kao shto su skrb, povjerenje, mecusobno poshtivanje i solidarnost (Held 2006).29

Druga velika tema koja zahtijeva dodatna pojashnjenja je kontinuitet i diskontinuitet izmecu socijalisticke proshlosti i postsocijalisticke sadashnjosti. Neki diskutanti kritizirali su moje prividno suprotstavljanje tih dvaju sustava, u kojem navodno privilegiram proshlost u odnosu na sadashnjost (takvo tumacenje posebno je vidljivo u tekstovima autora Rubic i Petrovic te Milenkovic).30 Moj claak, mecutim, naglashava i kontinuitete i diskontinuitete izmecu socijalistickih i postsocijalistickih iskustava. Diskontinuiteti su jasni: ratom izazvan nagli raspad bivshe drzave, zivljenih sudbina i materijalnih objekata, elementi su koje ovdje ne moram ponavljati.31 Ali postoji barem jedan veliki kontinuitet izmecu socijalizma i postsocijalizma koji je kljucan kao potpora glavnom argumentu moga claka: ocekivanje da obitelj osigura skrb. Tocnije, u claku navodim:

Paternalisticki odnos i samo-projekcije jugoslavenske drzave i njenih gracana i "strukture osjecaja" (Williams 1977) koje su oni izazivali, bili su, mecutim, duboko utemeljeni na tradicijskim oblicima obiteljske skrbi. Primjerice, Bosanci, posebice Bosanke, tradicionalno su skrbile o starijim claovima obitelji. Slicno kao i u mnogim istocnoeuropskim zemljama u kojima je dr zava odavala dojam brizne drzave, u stvarnosti su "privatna domena srodstva, prijateljstva i osobnih veza postala temeljem za emocionalno uvjetovanu i drushtveno utemeljenu skrb". (Read 2007: 206)

To je vazno naglasiti jer potvrcuje, a i drugi su slicno predlagali, da je socijalisticki sustav skrbi bio dualisticki, neujednacen, rodno uvjetovan i parcijalan (Stubbs, u ovom broju; Podgorelec, u ovom broju), i cesto samo proklamatoran (Rubic i Petrovic, u ovom broju). Ono shto ovdje smatram najvaznijim (i to sam mozda trebala jasnije naglasiti u svom claku) jest da su se i socijalisticki i postsocijalisticki rezimi skrbi, bez obzira na njihovu retoriku, u praksi oslanjali na obitelj kao izvor skrbi. Kao shto naglashavaju Rubic i Petrovic, institucija bosanske obitelji u vrijeme socijalizma bila je vrlo kompleksna i bila je svjedokom velikih transformacija, ukljucujuci masivne migracije iz ruralnih u urbana podrucja (vidjeti Bringa 1995). No, bez obzira na te znacajne promjene, bosanska obitelj u socijalizmu je opcenito bila, posebno u usporedbi s danashnjom situacijom, cnancijski i socijalno mnogo bolje zbrinuta te zemljo pisno kompaktna.32 Danas, mecutim, kada se sluzbeni podaci o stopi nezaposlenosti krecu oko 27% (63% mecu mlacim stanovnishtvom),33 obitelji su cnancijski onemogucene i najceshce si ne mogu priushtiti da skrbe o svojim potrebitim starijim claovima (shto jasno navodi i Podgorelec u svom tekstu). Stovishe, buduci da su claovi obitelji cesto nezaposleni, oni zapravo zive od mirovina svojih starijih claova. Uz sve te cnancijske izazove i zbog problema koji su nastali zbog ratom prouzrocenog izbjeglishtva, mnogobrojne je obitelji rat razdvojio i claovi su czicki odsutni, shto dodatno otezava skromnu i o obiteljima ovisnu skrb o starijima.34 Zakljucno, "kriza skrbi" prisutna je u vecini europskih zemalja zbog razloga koje Stubbs vrlo lijepo objashnjava u svom tekstu; mecutim, speciccni izazovi te krize posebno su vidljivi i prisutni u Bosni i Hercegovini, koja "je ostarjela, a da nikada nije bila bogata" (Hoc 2011 prema Stubbsu, u ovom broju) i u kojoj su se poslijeratni i postsocijalisticki kontekst vrlo ocigledno i mo c no spojili.

Naposljetku i o metodama: neki diskutanti kritiziraju moje oslanjanje na samo jednu pricu (Zemkinu) te moj "nedostatak receksivnosti" u claku. Slazem se s Rubic i Petrovic kada tvrde da oslanjanje na jednu individualnu pricu moze biti "riskantno", jer je vrlo lako skliznuti u anegdotalan prikaz (vidjeti i Milenkovic, u ovom broju). Slazem se s njima i da prica, kako bi bila antropoloshki produktivna, mora biti postavljena u shiri kontekst - i to sam nastojala postici raspravom o ratu i (post)socijalistickim aspektima koji su se poslozili kao uzroci Zemkine individualne patnje.35

Komentar o receksivnosti i emskoj i etskoj poziciji me zapravo najvishe interesira. Naravno da sam svjesna vaznosti receksivnosti u etnografskom i antropoloshkom pisanju i smatram da je eticki vazno i analiticki produktivno (naravno, kada ne zamjenjuje etnografske podatke vlastitim receksijama).36 Nisam, mecutim, sasvim uvjerena da bi receksivnost nuzno obogatila moj uvodni tekst. Naprotiv, ukljucivanje moje osobne povijesti samo bi preusmjerilo paznju od Zemkine na moju vlastitu pricu na nacin koji ne bi bio niti produktivan niti pozeljan, a mogao bi i odvratiti paznju od etike skrbi te se ciniti samodopadnim. Da bi bile efektivne, receksivne intervencije moraju neshto rasvijetliti ili pojasniti neshto o terenu, susretima na terenu i tumacenjima tih susreta. Nakon shto sam vrlo pazljivo procitala komentar autorica Rubic i Petrovic i dalje se pitam koji je to tocno aspekt moje analize ili etnografskog susreta manjkav zbog mog "neuspjeha" da pojasnim svoju poziciju - kroz koordinate nacionalizma/ etniciteta, klase ili roda - u tekstu? Sto je to, prema autoricama, shto ja nisam "vidjela" zbog svoje navodne bliskosti s terenom?37 Odgovori na ta pitanja uistinu su vazni; u suprotnom bi receksivnost (problematicno) mogla postati sama sebi svrhom.

I za kraj, slazem se da ne mozemo generalizirati situaciju u Bosni i Hercegovini ili, josh gore, na Balkanu iz jednog, u ovom slucaju Zemkinog, iskustva - to mi nije ni bila namjera u tekstu koji sam ponudila. Osobno, ne bih koristila romanticarski i egzoticni diskurs poput "jedna shara na bosanskom cilimu" kako bih opisala Zemkino iskustvo u odnosu na shiri "kontekst". Naprotiv, smatram da je njena individualna kombinacija skrbi, napushtanja i patologije proizashla iz spoja njenih osobnih okolnosti i povijesno uvjetovane, kompleksne mreze obitelji, medicine, drzave i ekonomije.

26 Izuzetno cijenim Danelyjev izvrstan prijedlog da uz polu-odsutnosti ukljucim i polu-priznavanja u promishljanje novih hijerarhija i koordinata priznavanja.

27 Zemkina situacija je, naravno, jedinstvena, zbog speciccnog nacina na koji su se veliki cimbenici poslozili i uzrokovali njenu patnju. Ti cimbenici nisu, mecutim, slucajni; oni su povijesno uvjetovani, neregulirani sustavi regulacije zivota; analiza Zemkine price razotkriva neke od tih c imbenika i njihova stjecishta.

28 U vezi s time, Milenkovic zavrshava svoj komentar upozoravajuci na antropologe koji pridonose "neo-kolektivistickim antiliberalnim pokretima za koje, povijest nas uci, znamo da po pravilu provociraju fashizam u nashim drushtvima i mogu predstavljati vajmarovski uvod u nove ratove, pljackashku redistribuciju privatne imovine i unishtavanje javnog u ime kolektivnog". cudno je da se Milenkovic usredotocuje na strah od "pljackashke redistribucije privatne imovine i unishtavanja javnog u ime kolektivnog" u povijesnom trenutku kada se objekti jugoslavenske industrije i javne infrastrukture u Bosni i Hercegovini i izvan nje prisvajaju od strane etno-nacionalistickih politicara/biznismena putem korumpirane privatizacije i onoga shto je David Harvey (2004) nazvao "stjecanjem putem otimanja".

29 Moj pristup etickim dimenzijama skrbi inspiriran je radom Virginie Held ( Ethics of Care 2006). Autorica nas poziva da promislimo o nashim odnosima, pa stoga i nashim odgovornostima i vezanostima, nashim obiteljima i drushtvenim skupinama. U svojoj knjizi Held propituje te veze, usredotocujuci se na odnose skrbi, a ne samo na vrline i odgovornosti pojedinaca.

30 Vjerujem, mecutim, da imamo dobrih razloga da budemo nostalgicni, barem prema nekim aspektima socijalisticke proshlosti, posebice ako usporedimo sadashnji i zivotni standard u proshlosti, relativni polozaj u svijetu, te dostupnost socijalne pomoci, izmecu ostalog. Slazem se, mecutim, sa Stubbsom, Milenkovicem i autoricama Rubic i Petrovic da je detaljnije arhivsko istrazivanje i analiza socijalistickog razdoblja, posebice krize 1980-ih, svakako potrebna i svoja cu buduca istrazivanja produbiti u tom smjeru.

31 U odgovoru na komentar autorica Rubic i Petrovic da ljudi nisu "preko noc i" poceli zivjeti prema novom modelu, zeljela bih dodati da su se mnogima u Bosni i Hercegovini zivoti uistinu, u velikoj mjeri, "promijenili naglo, preko noci" i da su mnogi koje sam interv juirala mogli decnirati tocan datum kada su im se zivoti promijenili (primjerice, noc kada su nasilno prognani iz svojih gradova, dan kada se njihovi prijatelji iz razreda "druge etnicke pripadnosti" nisu vishe pojavili u shkoli ili noc kada je pocela opsada). Upravo je u tim trenucima zivot kakav su poznavali prestao postojati, a novi model zivota, njih kao izbjeglica, prognanika ili pod opsadom, je zapoceo. Takocer, usporedo s ratom, poceo se odvijati proces privatizacije javne i drzavne imovine, dakle, sasvim novi model. Taj proces korumpirane privatizacije, mecutim, bio je prikriven i iskrivljen ratom.

32 Situacija je, naravno, bila mnogo bolja u pocetnim desetljecima socijalistickog razdoblja; broj nezaposlenih u socijalistickoj Jugoslaviji polako je rastao od 6.6% 1965. godine do 16.1% 1987. godine kada se promovirala radna migracija mushkaraca srednje zivotne dobi (Woodward 1995: 199, 378). Vecina tih ljudi radila je u Austriji, Njemackoj i drugim europskim zemljama kao manualni radnici i radnici u gracevinarstvu, a vracali su se kuci svojim obiteljima vikendima i praznicima.

33 Prema podacima Agencije za statistiku Bosne i Hercegovine, sluzbeni podaci o stopi nezaposlenih, izracunati po ILO metodologiji su 27% (vidjeti: hc p://www.bhas.ba/?option=com_publikacijaandid=1andlang=ba). Mecutim, neki izvori javljaju da nominalna stopa nezaposlenih doseze cak 44% (vidjeti: hc p://www.business.hr/ekonomija/stvarna-nezaposlenost-u-bih-27-posto-nominalna-cak-44-posto).

34 Ovaj se tekst nije bavio rodnim aspektom skrbi (o starijima) i dodatnim teretom koji on predstavlja za zene, shto je glavna tema jednog drugog claka koji upravo pishem. Vazno je istaknuti da su socijalisticke radne migracije uglavnom ukljucivale mushkarce, shto znaci da su zene vecinom ostajale u Bosni gdje su i dalje - uz brigu o kucanstvu i odgoju djece - skrbile i o starijima. Ratno izbjeglishtvo je, mecutim, prognalo i mushkarce i zene, a obitelji je rastrgalo na takve nacine da zene cesto nisu bile u mogucnosti skrbiti o starijima.

35 Slazem se, mecutim, s autorima (Rubic i Petrovic te Milenkovic) da je taj dio claka mogao biti bolje poduprt arhivskim istrazivanjem i korishtenjem malobrojne, ali relevantne literature. Buduci da je ovo terensko istrazivanje tek u povojima, u buducnosti se nadam poboljshati i proshiriti te aspekte istrazivanja.

36 Primjerice, u svojoj knjizi Citizens of an Empty Nation vrlo se dosljedno bavim vlastitom pozicijom na terenu kako bih objasnila potku svojih susretanja, procjena i tumacenja.

37 U vezi s time, jednako je problematicna podjela na emsko i etsko - zastarjeli su to termini u antropologiji koji grubo dijele svijet na (vecinom konceptualizirani putem nacije i "rase") insajdere i autsajdere. Nije li svaki etnografski teren stalno pregovaranje i manevriranje mnogostrukim linijama ukljucenosti i iskljucenosti koje zamagljuju razlike i nikada nisu jednoznacne i jedinstvene, te stavljaju u pitanje dihotomiju emsko/etsko i oblike znanja (etsko/objektivno nasuprot emskom/subjektivnom) koje navodno stvaraju?

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Azra Hromadzic

Department of Anthropolog y

Maxwell School, Syracuse University

200 Eggers Hall

Syracuse, NY 13244-1020

USA

[email protected]