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John Schellenberg's The Wisdom to Doubt is an impressive and important book. It is clearly written, and clearly argued. It is a valuable contribution to epistemology as well as to philosophy of religion (although Schellenberg is careful to limit the range of his epistemological points). It will have a strong effect on current discussions in philosophy of religion. In this review I can offer only the barest of bare-bones account of his rich and remarkable work; let me begin by simply recommending it highly.
'Reason', says Schellenberg (1), 'requires us to be religious skeptics'. He begins by drawing our attention to the notion of ultimism, reminding us in passing that many workers in the philosophy of religion have an unacceptably narrow focus. They concentrate almost exclusively on the religions of the book, traditional theistic religions, while conscientiously avoiding any consideration of wider possibilities. Nonetheless, 'there is unceasing disagreement and controversy over the lineaments of the Divine' (57), and it is just such a wider perspective that any discussion in philosophy of religion must have if it is to attempt anything like a complete view of the field.
Religion, for Schellenberg, involves the claim (3) that 'there is a reality metaphysically and axiologically ultimate (representing the deepest fact about the nature of things and also unsurpassably great), in relation to which an ultimate good can be attained', that is, 'that there is an ultimate salvific reality'. This very general religious view Schellenberg terms ultimism. Ultimism cannot to be equated with traditional theism, for it is consistent with non-theistic traditions. Indeed, Schellenberg's discussion of traditional theism in the third part of the book suggests that his sceptical approach is, to put it no more strongly, as likely to support atheism as it is to support current theistic positions.
Following the widening of our horizons, Schellenberg draws our attention to two aspects of scepticism. Scepticism may be categorical: it may be a scepticism about any view concerning ultimism being rationally grounded. More narrowly, it may be a scepticism based on dubiety about human abilities: a capacity scepticism which allows us to wonder whether humans can, now or ever, attain 'basic truths about religion' (5).
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