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The tragic toll of civilian casualties will never be fully known. What is known is that those caused by U.S. and coalition forces adversely affected our strategic and operational efforts in Afghanistan, as well as left many U.S. warfighters morally injured. After senior officers and studies emphasized the need to reduce civilian casualties, Congress directed an assessment of nonlethal weapons. It found that greater integration of non-lethal weapons in U.S. warfighting could not only reduce civilian casualties but increase operational effectiveness-and indicated the challenge ahead.
The Insidious Effects of Civilian Casualties
More than any world power, the U.S. has sought to minimize civilian casualties in war. That's greatly evidenced by U.S. forces' strict rules of engagement, stringent target identification, precision targeting, and efforts to limit collateral damage.
Afghanistan brought home the realization that U.S. intent and existing practices for minimizing civilian casualties were not enough. Coalitioncaused casualties still occurred and "had an increasing strategic impact in Afghanistan," reported the 2010 Joint Civilian Casualty Study.2 Notably, civilian casualties became a contentious point between Afghan and U.S. leadership. They also undermined Afghan support for the counterinsurgency campaign,3 with some incidents causing violent protests against coalition forces.4 And, like other adversaries, the Taliban used civilian casualties to accuse coalition forces of using force indiscriminately.5
Civilian casualties also contributed to "insurgent math," as NATOled International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) called it. "When ISAF is responsible for civilian casualties, kinetic activities increase 25-65% for 5 months."6 This finding was also supported by studies done by economists at Princeton and London School of Economics: "In Afghanistan we find strong evidence that local exposure to civilian casualties caused by international forces leads to increased insurgent violence over the long-run, what we term the ?revenge effect.'"7
It was not enough to say to the Afghan people, "Look at the atrocities the Taliban are committing." Such messages simply didn't resonate. More was expected of U.S. and coalition forces. "When the Taliban blow up a bunch of people, you don't see a lot of protest. But when we screw up and accidentally kill somebody, you get riots in the streets," said an ISAF spokesman.8
Civilian casualties also have insidiously affected our warfighters, suffering what the Veterans Administration calls "moral injury." Many are haunted by these...