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"The Foglights of War"
(See D. Grissom, pp. 76-77, August 2001 Proceedings
Captain Keith F Kopets, U.S. Marine Corps-Captain Grissom demonstrates how a professional reading program was one of the pillars of General George S. Patton's development and success. What's even more motivating and fascinating were the obstacles General Patton had to hurdle in order to read.
Reading for George Patton was a battle in itself. From early childhood, General Patton unknowingly suffered from the afflictions doctors today recognize as dyslexia and attention deficient disorder. He always was insecure and frustrated by his inability to spell, read, and pronounce words correctly. "I am either very lazy or very stupid or both for it is beastly hard for me to learn and as a natural result I hate to study," wrote George Patton as a plebe at West Point in 1909 to his future wife.
That General Patton read as devoutly as he did says as much about his determination, ambition, and insecurity because of his learning disorder, as it does about his dedication to making himself a better soldier. Of course, with George Patton, the former and the latter were always one and the same.
Even before he graduated from West Point, George Patton knew he was destined for glory. Just days before his commissioning, he inscribed the following in the back cover of one of his books: "Qualities of a great general: (1) Tactically aggressive (loves a fight); (2) Strength of character; (3) Steadiness of purpose; (4) Acceptance of responsibility; (5) Energy; (6) Good health and strength."
Geroge Patton was dyslexic, but he never let that stop him. He had the courage and determination to overcome his affliction. There's a lesson in that for all of us.
"Greeneville's Collision: Is There a Better Explanation?"
(See P. Wright, pp. 28-29, July 2001; R. Raaz, pp. 25-26, August 2001 Proceedings)
Captain Carl D. Olson, U.S. Navy-Mr. Wright's commentary appears to be attempting to find excuses for the apparent lack of professional competence on the part of the submarine's commanding officer (CO). His explanation is that the system at least partially is to blame for the collision because of the CO's perceived lack of at sea time and because his formative years were heavy with nuclear ballistic...