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On April 2000, a third MV-22 Osprey tilt-rotor aircraft crashed, on a remote desert airstrip killing all 19 on board. At the time, the aircraft was number two in a two-plane MV-22 formation. The pilot, wearing night-vision goggles (NVGs), had roughly 80 hours of flight time in the aircraft. This particular crash is yet another example of a military aviation mishap in which the level of training and pilot proficiency were significant factors.
That the Department of Defense wants this $40 billion MV-22 program to move forward was demonstrated by a swift public-relations blitz. A dozen press releases related to the Osprey crash were lodged quickly on the Marine Corps official website, and at least three major press conferences were held at the Pentagon. The Commandant of the Marine Corps and his wife later were on board the first aircraft to fly after the fleet returned to service.
The training issue was raised briefly at one press conference when a reporter asked if the pilot, by regulation, had enough hours flying the MV-22 to carry troops. The briefer confirmed that the mishap pilot had roughly 80 hours at the controls of a MV-22, but then went on to stress the mishap pilot's 3,500 flight hours in KC-130s. The reporter persisted. "My question was-is 80 hours [in the V-22] a sufficient number of hours under Marine Corps regulations to be flying...