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1st Battalion, 37th Field Artillery (1-37 FA), the FA battalion assigned to the Army's first Stryker Brigade Combat Team (SBCT), conducted combat operations in Iraq from November 2003 to October 2004. The deployment of 3d Brigade, 2d Infantry Division (2/3 SBCT) to Iraq was the first operational deployment of an SBCT to combat.
During this yearlong effort in Iraq, 1-37 FA conducted many operations in support of the brigade-conducting counterfire and civil military operations (CMO), securing key assets, processing detainees, training the Iraqi National Guard as well as conducting maneuver operations in 1-37 FA's bat-tlespace. The battalion proved flexible and capable of meeting the demands and preserved options for the brigade commander by serving as an economyof force maneuver unit.
Just as other FA battalions before and FA battalions currently serving in a maneuver task force (TF) role in Iraq, 1-37 FA had to grow in terms of honing new skill sets, deliberately reorganizing its structure and preparing for many unknowns. Most challenging for the battalion and its leadership was serving in the role of infantry-maneuvering and controlling an area of operations. But, like other FA units, 1-37 FA proved it was fully capable of serving in this capacity.
Tough Decisions and Breaking New Ground. During the final months of preparation for deployment, the battalion conducted a mission analysis and created a training plan to set up the batteries and Soldiers for success. Immediately, we established communications with FA battalions in Iraq to harvest current tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs) and enemy trends, building a better understanding of the operating environment and the unique missions being performed by fellow Red-legs. This was a "real-time" source of data from the theater and the basis of our training.
We altered the current battalion mission essential task list (METL) and focused resources on skills that previously had not been at the forefront (see Figure 1). Additionally, the task of massing battalion fires was eliminated from training plans. We realized that, given the small-unit decentralized operations in Iraq, it was unlikely there would be a demand for massed fires or that the three batteries would be in position and ready to fire simultaneously. Instead, the battalion ensured each firing battery was proficient in providing fires. The battalion also...