Military Adaptation in War: With Fear of Change

Military Adaptation in War: With Fear of Change Williamson Murray. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011. 342 pp. Notes. Index. $35.

Williamson Murray has crafted a compelling argument that adaptation in war is a difficult, problematic process. Often, militaries adjust to the changing nature of the battlefield at the tactical level but fail at the operational and strategic levels, thus undercutting any accrued tactical advantages. Murray points out that adaptation in war "represents one of the most persistent, yet rarely examined problems that military institutions confront."

Problems abound for adaptation. An unwillingness to challenge authority; a lack of intellectual preparation and strategic or critical thinking; prior investments in equipment, organizations, and methods; and prejudice, inability to think imaginatively, or fear of untested methods all complicate the process. Murray asserts that a major detriment is that military organizations, especially among senior leaders, envision future wars based on their assumptions and experiences, but as technology and methods advance, assumptions and notions clash with reality once combat is engaged.

The author addresses two distinct dynamics that affect the ability to adjust to circumstances - the fundamental nature of war itself and human nature. Citing the great theorist Carl von Clausewitz, who said that war was the realm of "friction" and "chance" with ambiguity and uncertainty, Murray adds an opponent's own adaptation. All of this complicates the decision-making process. Bureaucracies and military organizations, structured to impose order on the chaos of armed conflict, are naturally resistant to change and thus typically oppose radical...