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'Negative Training'
Probable cause:
The probable cause of the accident involving AAL [American Airlines] 587 was the structural overload of the vertical stabilizer induced by the inappropriate and unnecessary application of cyclic, stop-to-stop inputs to the rudder pedals by the first officer in anticipation of what he mistakenly believed would be the aircraft reaction to an encounter with a wake vortex.
This mistaken belief and the consequent inappropriate and unnecessary pilot actions were conditioned by elements of American Airlines' AAMP that advocated the aggressive use of rudder for roll control. This was reinforced by negative training generated by American Airlines' modifications of the A300-600 training simulator that resulted in temporary inhibition of normal roll control functions such that pilots were forced to use rudder as a primary means of roll control to recover from simulated wake vortex encounters.
Contributing to the accident was the failure of American Airlines to make timely corrections to the AAMP in response to information provided to them by the manufacturers and FAA shortly after this specialized training program was introduced.
The rudder control system design was not at fault (again, sub- heads by ASW)
The A300B4-605R aircraft model, its flight control systems and its structure meet or exceed all certification requirements at the time of certification.
Neither during testing nor in 16 million flight hours of operator service experience did Airbus receive even one complaint or criticism of the handling qualities aspect of its design.
The rudder system characteristics (pedal forces and displacements) comply with certification requirements and were evaluated by the certification authorities (including FAA) in particular during the aircraft flight handling qualities evaluation where necessary rudder pedal inputs are performed to demonstrate the adequacy of the rudder pedal system for its intended use.
The rudder travel limiter ensures that the loads developed by a single, full rudder pedal input followed by a return to the neutral position will remain inside limit loads as prescribed by the certification requirement.
There are no possible flight control system failures that could have caused the large rudder and rudder pedals movements recorded ... during the 30 seconds prior to departure of the vertical fin.
It is clear ... that the copilot applied forces (up to 139 pounds) on the rudder pedals...