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Seizing the initiative through commercial communications solutions
Minutes before crashing his vehicle into pedestrians on "Westminster Bridge, Khalid Masood was using WhatsApp.1 Investigators believe Masood was at the very least inspired by ISIS, and the terrorist group has claimed responsibility for the attack that left 5 people dead and more than 20 wounded. But the extent to which the group coordinated the attack remains unclear. Was the violence merely precipitated by ISIS propaganda, or did ISIS actually command and control Masood via WhatsApp? Investigators are still unable to determine whether Masood was "sending, receiving, or simply viewing messages"2 before he struck, but the lessons are clear: commercially available point-to-point communication applications are difficult to decrypt; can easily access public networks; and are available to anyone, anywhere-even lone wolf operatives thousands of miles from their C2 nodes.
If true, the coordination of another successful terror operation-like the Westminster Bridge attack-demonstrates that advancements in commercia lly-avai labie technology are closing the C2 capabilities gaps between irregular non-state actors and conventional state militaries. Admittedly, the C2 requirements for the London attack do not directly correlate to the complex requirements for inter-team and hierarchical communications necessary to support most Marine Corps operations, but if successful use of available communications solutions to attain a desired end state İs the goal, then ISIS clearly has the advantage.
While terrorist groups capitalize on commercial, low-cost, and relatively secure communication solutions, the Marine Corps remains hamstrung by a rigid, bureaucratic communications infrastructure with severe aversion to both risk and grass-roots innovation. These deficiencies adversely affect operational units, and nowhere are the effects more evident than in CENTCOM'S AOR (Central Command's area of responsibility). In CENTCOM's AOR, ISIS, Syrian, and Russian forces have integrated commercial communications solutions into their C2 infrastructures with lethal effectiveness. In contrast, the Marine Corps' shore-based SPMAGTFCR-CC remains almost completely reliant on DOD and American Government-specific communications systems. These systems are custom built to meet strict compliance standards, and while they are secure, they are incredibly inflexible and do not allow Marine forces to match the operational tempo of adversaries who are able to rapidly adopt innovative commercial technologies to facilitate C2 on the battlefield.
The Marine Corps' Mandate for C2 Infrastructure Innovation
The Marine Corps' current adversaries are...