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The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Departments of the Army and Defense, or the U.S. Government.
The Situation
Since 9/11, getting better Intelligence has increased in importance and priority for commanders from the Infantry company to the Commander- in- Chief. While we have entered a new period of transformation focused on lighter, more expeditionary forces enabled by superior situational awareness, our attempts to leap forward in Information Superiority have made progress but we have not made a revolutionary change.
Even as a debate goes on over increasing or decreasing the number of soldiers deployed to Operations Iraqi Freedom (OIF) and Enduring Freedom, in many units nine or more maneuver companies over a hundred soldiers each depend on a couple of dozen intelligence soldiers-many junior enlisted straight from the schoolhouse to the battlefield-in order to provide situational understanding, develop targets, and provide predictive intelligence assessments for decision makers. This shortage of intelligence support at the tactical unit level reduces the effectiveness of having additional combat units when only a few are conducting intelligence- driven operations.
Information systems limitations and increased intelligence support needs are at the center of many after action reports. The senior commander who wants to see the environment, see his force, and see the enemy is often frustrated by the lack of timeliness, accuracy, and depth of detail available to him despite huge headquarters full of systems and personnel. The junior commander in the fight is frustrated by being cut off from technology and information that could protect his soldiers and make his unit more capable and successful in their mission. In the Information Age, what factors are preventing the realization of Information Superiority? This article will explore some of the essential principles of Intelligence that determine success or failure.
Principle 1. "Ground Truth" cornes from the bottom, up.
Planned improvements in intelligence capability continue to focus on the corps and division level, but are beginning to shift to the brigade combat team (BCT). The battalion and company are either low priority or there is a perception that they do not need the powerful tools, since the real analytical work is being done at higher headquarters and...