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Those who are familiar with the history of Army special operations recognize the terms "OSS," "SOE," "Det 101" and "Jedburgh" - all those terms are associated with unconventional warfare, or UW, conducted during World War II.1 Few who are familiar with the foregoing terms, however, have heard of "Donkeys," "FEC/LG," "8086 Army Unit," "8240 Army Unit," "CCRAK" and "JACK" - those terms are associated with UW during the Korean War.
The military legacy of the Korean War has been Task Force Smith, Inch'on, the Yalu River, the Chosin Reservoir, Heartbreak Ridge and the 38th Parallel. Yet while conventional soldiers were fighting initially for survival, and finally for re-establishment of a free South Korea, guerrillas and partisans - aided by a few American soldiers - were conducting an active UW campaign behind the lines of North Korean forces, or NK, and the Chinese Communist Forces, or CCF.2 Although the 50th anniversary of the Korean War has given rise to several works that examine the previously unrecognized role of partisan operations in that conflict, UW remains a little-known aspect of the Korean War.
During World War II, the Office of Strategic Services, or OSS, provided the United States with the capability for performing UW. But three weeks after World War II ended, President Truman disbanded the OSS, and the American military capability for performing unconventional operations disappeared.3 Not until the National Security Act of 1947 created the Central Intelligence Agency did the U.S. government formally acknowledge the need for a UW capability. National Security Council Directive 10/2, "National Security Council Directive on Office of Special Projects," dated June 18, 1948, assigned to the CIA the responsibility to "conduct covert operations," including "direct action, including sabotage ... assistance to underground movements ... [and] guerrillas."
NSC Directive 10/2 also directed the Joint Chiefs of Staff to assist the CIA during "wartime covert operations." The Joint Chiefs implemented the military's portion of Directive 10/2 through a March 1, 1949, memorandum, "Study on Guerilla Warfare," which stated that the Army "shall be assigned primary responsibility for all other guerrilla warfare functions."4 But not until September 1950, when secretary of the Army Frank Pace forced the Army to activate the Office of the Chief of Psychological Warfare under Brigadier General Robert A....